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ABSTRACT 
 
Post-independent Cameroon has grappled with the problem of systemic violation of civil 
and political rights (CPR) despite a transition from single party dictatorship to multiparty 
democracy in the 1990s. Various legislative measures including the adoption of a 
supposedly ‘rights friendly’ constitution in 1996 have done little to ameliorate that 
problem. 
 
This thesis adopts a concept of constitutionalism, based on contemporary international 
standards, to analyse the problem of CPR violations from the perspective of the 
constitutional arrangements in Cameroon. It examines the system of separation of 
powers, the method of securing judicial independence and the mechanisms for judicial 
review. The argument is made that the problem can be attributed in part to the 
predominant influence of the French civil law system in Cameroon’s bijural legal system. 
Although for historical reasons, Cameroon operates both the English common law and 
the French civil law, constitutional developments have continued to be influenced by the 
latter which lends itself to practices that are not sufficiently supportive of 
constitutionalism as defined herein.  
 
The thesis, however, goes further to explore how the constitutional system could be 
reinforced to provide a more conducive framework for the protection and enhancement of 
CPR. Drawing on two strands of arguments, one highlighting features of the common law 
system that can be more supportive of constitutionalism and the other which highlights 
the value of indigenous antecedents of constitutionalism, the thesis proposes the 
development of a contextual model which is more reflective of Cameroon’s peculiar legal 
and socio-political circumstances. It proposes what is described as an Optimal Integrative 
Approach (OIA) as a framework for developing a contextual model, more conducive for 
the protection and enhancement of CPR in Cameroon. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
 
In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Cold War, several Eastern European and 
sub-Saharan African states embarked on constitutional reforms. Those reforms brought to 
the fore the renewed importance of constitutions in organising governmental power and 
in particular the protection of civil and political rights (CPR). In the case of Cameroon, it 
is doubtful to what extent constitutional reforms have improved on the protection of CPR, 
as its record in that respect has been consistently poor.
1
 According to independent reports 
issued by some domestic and international human rights organisations, CPR are 
persistently violated with impunity.
2
 This thesis takes as a central focus an examination 
into the problem of systemic violations of CPR in Cameroon.  
 
Events that occurred in February 2008 are symbolic of that problem. At that time there 
were widespread demonstrations in major towns in Cameroon organised in protest at both 
escalating costs of living and proposed constitutional amendments to eliminate 
presidential term limits.
3
 The amendments would have permitted President Paul Biya, 
who has been in power since 1982, to run for another term. Rather than address the 
grievances of the public, President Biya accused the opposition of trying to orchestrate 
insecurity and attempting to oust him through unconstitutional means.
4
 Security forces 
responded to the demonstrators with repression, using water canons, tear gas, batons and 
                                                 
1
 See for instance U.S. Department of State (USDS) Human Rights Reports on Cameroon for 2011, 2010, 
2009 and 2008 which can be accessed at < www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/>. See also Susan Dicklitch, 
‘Failed Democratic Transition in Cameroon: A Human Rights Explanation’ (2002) 24(1) Human Rights 
Quarterly 152. 
2
 ibid. See also Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2011: Cameroon’ 
<www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/cameroon>  accessed 20 July 2012; Committee to 
Protect Journalists, ‘Attacks on the Press in 2011: Cameroon’ (21 February 2012) < 
http://cpj.org/africa/cameroon/>; Observatoires Nationale des Droits de L’Homme, ‘Rapport de 
L’Observatoires National des Droits de L’Homme 2008-2010’, 21-23, <www.ccfd-
terresolidaire.org/e_upload/pdf>; Amnesty International (AI), ‘Impunity Underpins Persistent Abuse’ (29 
January 2009) <www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR17/001/2009> accessed  15 May 2012. 
3
 Amnesty International, ‘Impunity Underpins’ (n 2) 36; USDS, ‘2008 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ 
(25 February 2009) <www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118990.htm> accessed 12 June 2012. 
4
 BBC News, ‘Cameroon Head Blames Opposition’ (28 February 2008) < 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7267731.stm> accessed 12 June 2012. 
 2 
rifles with live ammunition. About 100 people were reportedly shot and killed by security 
forces, over 1,500 were arbitrarily arrested and detained, some were severely tortured, 
while others were charged and summarily tried without minimum guarantees of a fair 
trial.
5
 Local radio stations which reported on the demonstrations or organised debates to 
discuss the proposed constitutional amendments were arbitrarily shutdown by the 
government.
6
 The police beat and harassed journalists covering the demonstrations and 
confiscated their equipment.
7
 In response to international denunciation of the security 
forces’ actions, the government of Cameroon delivered a report to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) and argued that security forces acted in self-defence 
and that their response was proportionate to the disorder caused by the demonstrators.
8
 
 
The February 2008 debacle was not an isolated occurrence. In fact, the systemic violation 
of CPR has been a problem throughout Cameroon’s history. The government of former 
President Ahmadou Ahidjo which lasted from independence and reunification till 1982 
was said to be authoritarian.
9
 Under that regime, multipartism was abolished, criticism of 
the government was repressed through stringent laws circumscribing freedom of speech, 
while activists were arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured.
10
 It was hoped that, the 
transfer of leadership in 1982 to the incumbent President Biya, and the political transition 
to multipartism would transform Cameroon’s authoritarian past and guarantee better 
                                                 
5
 Amnesty International, ‘Impunity Underpins’ (n 2) 10; United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Cameroon’ (CCPR/C/CMR/CO/4, 04 August 
2010) 5, para 18 <www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR.C.CMR.CO.4.doc> accessed 13 
December 2010. 
6
 Amnesty lnternational, ‘Impunity Underpins’ (n 2) 21-23; USDS, ‘2008 Human Rights Report: 
Cameroon’ (n 3) s 2(a). 
7
 ibid. 
8
 USDS, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1) s 1(a); HRC, ‘Concluding Observations’ (n 5) 5, 
para18. 
9
 Richard Joseph, ‘France in Africa’ in Richard Joseph (ed), Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou 
Ahidjo (Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978) 8. See also Mbu Etonga, ‘An Imperial Presidency: A Study of 
Presidential Power in Cameroon’, in Ndiva Kofele-Kale (ed), An African Experiment in Nation Building: 
The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification (Westview Press 1980)151-155. Cameroon was 
administered as separate UN trust territories by Britain and France respectively from 1916. The French 
administered section (French Cameroon) gained independence in 1960 and became known as La 
République du Cameroun. The Southern Cameroons administered by Britain gained independence in 1961 
by integrating with La République. The history of Cameroon is discussed below in ch 2. 
10
 Joseph (n 9) 8; Etonga (n 9) 151-155. See also Abel Eyinga, ‘Government by State of Emergency’ in 
Richard Joseph (ed), Gaullist Africa (n 9) 106; Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political 
Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton University Press 1970) 197-198. 
 3 
protection for CPR. In that regard, under the government of President Biya, a number of 
international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
were ratified in 1982, 1986 and 1989 respectively. Moreover, following the ‘third wave 
democratisation’11 or what Kwasi Prempeh has referred to as ‘Africa’s constitutionalism 
revival’12 in the 1990s, the government made various commitments to the values of 
constitutionalism and to improve the exercise of CPR. To that end a number of laws 
dubbed the Liberty Laws were promulgated to enhance the exercise of various 
freedoms,
13
 regulate the maintenance of law and order and a state of emergency.
14
 Again 
in 1992, the government embarked on setting up the National Commission on Human 
Rights and Freedom (NCHRF). Those reforms were underscored by the 1996 
constitutional revision, which according to the Minister of Communications at the time 
purportedly, ‘establishe[d] the supreme valor of human dignity, the balance and 
separation   of powers’15 and established as, ‘the key element… the solemn declaration 
and the vigorous defence of human rights.’16  
 
In spite of these innovations, Cameroon’s record remains poor. Such practices as torture, 
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances have persisted.
17
 In 2000, following visits 
                                                 
11
 The phrase was first used by Samuel Huntington to refer to the transition from authoritarian or non-
democratic rule to democratic regimes in the early 1990s. Huntington, Third Wave: Democratisation in the 
Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press 1991) 15-16. 
12
 Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Africa’s “Constitutionalism Revival”: False Start or New Dawn?’ (2007) 5(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 469. 
13
 Law No. 90/052 on the Freedom of Social Communication (FSC); Law No. 90/053 on Freedom of 
Association; Law No. 90/055 on Public Meetings, Processions and Parades; Law No. 90/056 on Political 
Parties, all promulgated on 19 December 1990. 
14
 Law No. 90/47 on the State of Emergency; Law No. 90/54 on the Maintenance of Law and Order. 
15
 Augustin K. Kouomegni, ‘Minister of Communication’s Introductory Note to the 1996 Constitutional 
Amendment’ Fundamental Legal Texts (vol 1, National Printing Press 1996). 
16
 ibid. Other reforms included the creation of a Department for Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice, 
the transfer of the Penitentiary Service from the Ministry of Territorial Administration to the Ministry of 
Justice in 2005 and the promulgation of a new uniform Criminal Procedure Code in 2006, with scope to 
better secure the rights of the defence. An Electoral Code has also been recently adopted in April 2012. 
17
 Dicklitch (n 1) 154-158; Amnesty International, ‘Impunity Underpins’ (n 2) 34, 36; USDS, ‘2010 Human 
Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1) 1; World Organisation Against Torture, ‘Cameroon: Series of Enforced 
Disappearances in the North Province’ (CMR 04 April 2008) <www.omct.org/urgent-campaigns/urgent-
interventions/cameroon/2008/04/d19217/>; Marga Lacambe, ‘Cameroon: Series of Forced Disappearances’ 
 4 
to prisons and detention centres, the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur described torture 
in Cameroon as widespread and systemic.
18
 Over a decade since the publication of that 
report torture is still a grave concern.
19
 In 2010, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee expressed grave concerns regarding the persistence of torture and called on 
the government to take systemic measures to eradicate that practice among security 
officers.
20
 
 
A report issued by Bertelsmann Stiftung
21
 described the regime of President Biya as an 
authoritarian regime with the tendency to stifle political opposition of any form.
22
 It also 
noted that the regime responds to opposition and other grievance from the public through 
repression with the use of security forces.
23
 Security forces arbitrarily arrest civilians and 
in particular opposition leaders, journalists and human rights activists as a means of pre-
empting challenge or criticism against the regime.
24
 Moreover, although the Constitution 
guarantees freedoms of speech, press and association
25
 other statutory instruments 
circumscribe the exercise of these freedoms. As already mentioned, foremost are the so-
called Liberty Laws, some provisions of which circumscribe press freedom by 
criminalising libel and defamation
26
 and impose heavy pecuniary and custodial sentences 
                                                                                                                                                 
(8 April 2008) <www.desaparecidos.org/notas/2008/04/cameroon> accessed 05 April 2010; UK Foreign 
Office. ‘Cameroon Country Profile’ (July 17 2006) <www.fco.gov.uk/servlet> accessed 05 April 2010. 
18
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel 
Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/38’, 
(E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.2). See also Olivia Ball, ‘Torture in Cameroon: Every Morning Just Like Coffee’ 
(Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, 2002) 
<www.freedomfromtorture.org/document/publication/5387> accessed 20 July 2012. 
19
 HRC, ‘Consideration of Cameroon’s Fourth Periodic Report’ (CCPR/C/CMR/Q/4, 12-30 0ctober 2009) 
3, para 15; HRC, ‘Concluding Observations’ (n 5) 5, para 17; Observatoires Nationale des Droits de 
L’Homme (n 2) 21-23; USDS, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1) s 1(c). 
20
 HRC, ‘Concluding Observations’ (n 5) 5, para 17. 
21
 Bertelsmann Stiftung is one of the largest German based charitable foundations committed to social 
change and the common good. Its work includes strengthening civil society organisations in the area of 
democracy, freedom and sustainable development. See www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
689C6A2E-70CAC8A6/bst_engl/hs.xsl/271.htm.  
22
 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012- Cameroon Country Report’ (Gütersloh: 
Betlelsmann Stiftung, 2012) 8 <www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/lnhalte/reports/2012/pdf > accessed 20 July 
2012. 
23
  Bertelsmann Stiftung (n 22) 20, 22. 
24
 ibid 7. See also Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2011: Cameroon’ (n 2); Dicklitch (n 1) 156. 
25
 Constitution of Cameroon 1996, Preamble. 
26
 For instance Law No. 90/52 as amended by Law No. 96/04 of 4/01/96 on Freedom of Social 
Communication (hereafter Freedom of Social Communication (FSC) Law). See also Charles Fombad, 
 5 
for criticism against the President and government officials.
27
 Amnesty International and 
the United States’ Department of State have asserted that libel laws are used to gag the 
press and in particular to prevent local journalists from reporting abusive behaviour of 
state officials.
28
 Other provisions of the laws regulating press freedom and mass 
communication vest administrative authorities with wide discretionary powers to suspend 
or ban print media or mass media for public policy reasons.
29
 Like the libel laws, this has 
provided a formidable basis for banning organisations that are critical of the 
government.
30
 According to the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters without 
Borders (amongst others) Cameroonian journalists face formidable challenges in 
attempting to expose arbitrary governmental practices as they are subject to arbitrary 
arrests and detention, torture and malicious prosecutions.
31
 Cameroon has been rated 
consistently since 2007 as ‘not free’ by Freedom House.32 The latter has concluded as 
recently as 2010 that although the Constitution guarantees free speech ‘genuine freedom 
of expression remains elusive’.33 
 
There are also persistent problems with democratic rights of participation and a flawed 
electoral system which facilitates electoral rigging and other unfair advantages in favour 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Freedom of Expression in the Cameroonian Democratic Transition’ (1995) 33(2) Journal of Modern 
African Studies 211, 218-221. 
27
 See for instance the Penal Code, ss 113, 153, 154, 240, 307 which prescribe pecuniary and custodial 
sentences for libel and defamation related offences such as ‘contemptuous’ statements about public 
officials. 
28
 Amnesty International, ‘Impunity Underpins’ (n 2) 18; USDS, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ 
(n 1) s 2(a). See also International Freedom of Expression  Exchange, ‘RSF Urges Government to take 
Action on Media Reform in Mission Report’ <www.ifex.org/cameroon/2011/10/06> accessed  06 January 
2012; RefWorld, ‘Freedom of Press 2011: Cameroon’ <www.unhcr.org/refworl/docid/4e5f71b527.html> 
accessed on 06 January 2012. 
29
 FSC Law, ss 13, 14, 17(1). 
30
 USDS, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1) s 2(a); Fanny Pigeaud, Au Cameroun de Paul Biya 
(KARTHALA 2011) 173-180; Francis Nyamnjoh, Mass Media and Democratisation in Cameroon in the 
Early 1990s (Langaa Books 2011) 59. 
31
 Committee to Protect Journalists (n 2); Reporters without Borders, ‘After Visiting Cameroon, Reporters 
without Borders Urges Government to take Action’ (5 October 2011) <http://en.rsf.org/cameroun-after-
visiting-cameroon-reporters-05-10-2011,41120.html> accessed 12 June 2012. 
32
 See Freedom House Reports on Cameroon from 2007-2011 available at 
<www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/> accessed 20 July 2012. 
33
 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2010: Cameroon’ <www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2011/cameroon> accessed 20 July 2012. 
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of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM).34 These culminate to 
establish an atmosphere adverse to genuine political opposition. According to the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung report, Cameroon has one of the lowest levels of democratic 
progress on the continent.
35
 They assert further that elections held since the 
reintroduction of multipartism in the 1990s have been seriously flawed and therefore 
lacked democratic value.
36
 Those assertions resonate with concerns raised by other 
institutions including the Commonwealth, the National Democratic Institute and the 
Foundation for Democratic Advancement.
37
 In the Presidential election held in October 
2011 in which the incumbent President Paul Biya won a landslide majority (75%), 
independent observers noted gross irregularities which marred the credibility of the 
election.
38
 
 
2. AIMS OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In the light of the preceding observations, this thesis aims firstly, to provide some 
explanation as to the possible source(s) of the problem of systemic violations of CPR in 
Cameroon. Secondly, to identify what possible alternative solutions could be adopted 
with a view towards enhancing the protection and enhancement of those rights.  
 
To achieve these aims, the following questions will be addressed: Do constitutional 
systems matter for the effective protection and enhancement of CPR? If so, what 
constitutional system exists in Cameroon and to what extent can the problem be 
                                                 
34
 Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA), ‘2011 Global Electoral Fairness Audit- Cameroon’s 
Presidential Electoral System’ pp 18, 19 (09 October 2011); < 
http://foundationfordemocraticadvancement.blogspot.co.uk/2011/08/cameroons-republic-presidential.html 
> accessed 06 January 2012. 
35
 Bertelsmann Stiftung (n 22) 4. 
36
 ibid 6. 
37
 All Africa ‘Commonwealth Observers on Cameroon Poll: “not credible”.’ <www.afrol.com/articles> 
accessed 01 May 2010>; Foundation for Democratic Advancement (n 34) 1, 18, 19; National Democratic 
Institute, ‘Interim Report: International Delegation to the Presidential Elections in Cameroon’ (28 October 
1992) 92 <www.ndi.org/files/0822_cm_interim_102892.pdf> accessed 05 January 2012. 
38
 Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘2011 Cameroon CET Presidential Election Report’ (22 December 2011) 
<www.thecommonwealth.org/files/242978> accessed 06 January 2012; Foundation for Democratic 
Advancement (n 34); USDS, ‘2011 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1)1. 
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attributed to it? Further, to the extent that the problem can be attributed to the 
constitutional system, what measure(s) can be adopted towards its improvement?  
 
3. STATEMENT OF THE THESIS 
 
In addressing the above questions, the thesis advances two main hypotheses. First, the 
problem of systemic violations of CPR in Cameroon can be attributed in part to the 
predominant influence of the French colonial constitutional legacy in Cameroon’s bijural 
legal system. Second, a solution to that problem can be derived through a more 
contextual conceptualisation and application of constitutionalism. 
 
The thesis will resort to a contemporary conception of constitutionalism to support the 
hypothesis that constitutional systems matter in the protection of CPR. Constitutionalism, 
as understood in this thesis, is a concept that deals with the way power is allocated to 
governmental institutions, their relationship with the citizenry and how those powers are 
exercised and disciplined to provide optimum opportunities for the realisation of good 
governance objectives, of which the exercise of fundamental rights (CPR inclusive)
39
 has 
increasingly become a defining objective.
40
 Constitutionalism requires at a minimum a 
constitution with a fundamental rights provision and the mechanism for their enforcement 
which should include a system of separation of powers, institutional checks and balances, 
the independence of the judiciary and a system of judicial review (of administrative and 
legislative acts).
41
 The basic premise underlying the rationale for a system of separation 
                                                 
39
 The fundamental rights ideology espoused in the contemporary understanding of constitutionalism 
particularly after the collapse of the Cold War advocates recognition of both CPR and socio-economic 
rights. See David Beetham, ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights’ (1995) 43 Political Studies 
Quarterly 41; Bellamy & Castiglione, ‘The Communitarian Ghost in the Cosmopolitan Machine: 
Constitutionalism, Democracy and the Reconfiguration of Politics in New Europe’ in Bellamy (ed) 
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot 1996); 
Ersnt-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Time for a UN ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European Integration’ (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 621; Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multi-level Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) 
European Law Review 511; Frank Michelman, ‘The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political 
justification’ (2003) 1(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 13. 
40
 This is discussed further in ch 1. 
41
 S. N. Ray, Modern Comparative Politics: Approaches, Methods and Issues (Princeton-Hall of India Press 
1999) 111-112; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’ 
(2001) 74 Southern California Law Review 1307, 1307; Neil Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism beyond the 
 8 
of powers and checks and balances is that those normative standards are geared at pre-
empting the arbitrariness and tyranny that inheres in the over-concentration and 
uncontrolled exercise of power.
42
 Judicial independence at the minimum purportedly 
promotes the rule of law by providing scope for a fair, equitable and accessible process of 
dispute resolution. While judicial review also promotes the rule of law by ensuring 
government officials act in accordance with the law and by ensuring that the corpus of 
legislation regulating the exercise of fundamental rights are consistent with constitutional 
guarantees. These elements, when adequately conceptualised, should ideally act 
collectively to provide a more conducive framework for the protection and enhancement 
of the fundamental rights provisions in the constitution. 
 
Indeed, there is fairly wide consensus that constitutionalism has become a legitimate 
benchmark for assessing governmental systems and their protection of fundamental 
rights.
43
 While that may be the case, it may also be prudent to question the form that 
constitutionalism should take. Is it possible to construct a ‘one-size fits all’ model that 
can succeed in enhancing respect for rights in every society? It is submitted that, there is 
good reason to suppose that, in developing a model of constitutionalism appropriate for a 
particular country, the specific socio-political context should be taken into account.
44
 
That should be an important consideration with respect to constitutionalism in Africa 
which is predominantly based on Western models transplanted during the colonial era. 
Those models developed in the West, responded to specific socio-political conditions 
(among others) and have been consistently adjusted to respond to developments there,
45
 
                                                                                                                                                 
State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519, 520-521. See also Jon Elster, ‘Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: 
An Introduction’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 447, 465 on the role of the constitution in 
defining and protecting rights of citizens and in establishing a machinery for their enforcement. 
42
 Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism beyond the State’ (n 41) 521. 
43
 Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 18; Larry Catá Backer, ‘From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A 
Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems’ (2009) 113(3) Penn State Law Review 101, 112, 
167; Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ in P. 
Dobner & M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2010) 3. 
44
 Ray (n 41) 116; Michael Davis, ‘East Asia after the Crisis: Human Rights, Constitutionalism and State 
Reform’ (2004) 26(1) Human Rights Quarterly 126, 128; NOTE, ‘Counter Insurgency and Constitutional 
Design’ (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1622, 1637. 
45
 Yash Ghai, ‘The Theory of the State in the Third World’ in Greenberg et al (eds), Constitutionalism and 
Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Oxford University Press 1993) 190-191; Richard 
Sklar,, ‘On the Study of Constitutional Government in Africa’ in Okon Akiba (ed), Constitutionalism and 
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whereas conditions in colonial and post-colonial Africa have differed significantly from 
those in the West. The export models appear not to have considered the specific 
circumstances in the African context (such as its history, underdevelopment, fragile 
democracies, and ethnic divisions).
46
 Indeed, it has been argued that the application of 
purely Western models without taking cognisance of Africa’s peculiar circumstances has 
limited the potential for constitutionalism to act as a bulwark against arbitrary 
government action on citizens.
47
 Michael Reisman asserts that ‘Framers must design a 
constitution to reflect a country’s particular historical and political context’.48 In 
recognition of the contextual dimension, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Ali Mazrui and others 
have argued that the development of constitutionalism in Africa should of necessity 
engage more with indigenous principles and institutions in order to develop mechanism 
for the protection and enhancement of CPR that are relevant to those societies and reflect 
their specific historicity and contemporary dynamics.
49
 That should entail adapting and 
incorporating indigenous principles and institutional mechanisms of governance into 
modern systems of constitutionalism. 
 
Based on the theoretical underpinnings of constitutionalism as concisely depicted above 
(a matter to be discussed further in Chapter 1), this thesis thus argues that the problem of 
systemic violations of CPR in Cameroon can be attributed in part to the predominance of 
the French colonial legacy in Cameroon’s bijural legal system. The French colonial 
legacy as used here refers to the French civil law constitutional model which was 
transplanted to Cameroon and its subsequent development and application in the context 
of Cameroon.
50
 That legacy is constitutive of some divisive elements which are 
unsupportive of constitutionalism as currently understood and as such fails to provide a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Society in Africa (Ashgate 2004) 45; Abdullah A. An-Na’im, African Constitutionalism and the Role of 
Islam (University of Pennsylvania Press 2006) 161-173. 
46
 ibid. 
47
 Ghai (n 45) 190-191; Sklar (n 45) 45; An-Na’im (n 45) 31; Hastings Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Constitutions 
without Constitutionalism’ in Greenberg et al (eds) Constitutionalism and Democracy (n 45) 65-82. 
48
 Michael Reisman, ‘Introductory Remarks: Symposium Constitutionalism in the Post-Cold War World’ 
(1994) 19(1) Yale Law Journal 189, 191. 
49
 An-Na’im (n 45) 31-32; Ali Mazrui, ‘Constitutional Change and Cultural Engineering: Africa’s Search 
for New Directions’ in Joseph Oloka-Onyango Constitutionalism in Africa: Creating Opportunities Facing 
Challenges (Fountain Publishers 2001) 20-21. See also Sklar (n 45) 46-49; Francis Deng, Identity, 
Diversity and Constitutionalism in Africa (USIP 2008). 
50
 For clarity and consistency the reference French colonial legacy will be adopted in this thesis. 
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framework conducive to the realisation of CPR. The Constitution of Cameroon which is 
primarily influenced by its French colonial heritage does not sufficiently accord with the 
standards of a good constitution. The system is based on a deficient separation of powers 
and checks and balances with potential for excessive and unaccountable executive power. 
It has developed into a system of over-concentration and personalisation of presidential 
power creating a condition of imperial presidency often associated with tyranny and 
oppression, the very conditions which constitutionalism seeks to diffuse. In addition, the 
judiciary is structured in ways that make it accountable to the executive and in particular 
the President thus jeopardising its independence which is vital for the protection and 
enhancement of CPR. These deficiencies are compounded by a restrictive mechanism for 
judicial review which precludes review of promulgated legislation and prevents ordinary 
citizens from challenging the constitutionality of oppressive laws.  
 
Not only is the constitutional structure inadequate from a conceptual perspective, it is 
also ill-suited to the specific context of Cameroon. The country faces certain challenges 
due to the fact that it is a relatively young country and also due to its difficult transition 
from a one-party dictatorship to a multiparty democracy. Further, problems emanating 
from its underdeveloped economy in addition to poverty, health concerns and ethnic 
divisions place additional expectations on the government. In a country facing such 
challenges, more robust features of constitutionalism are necessary to ensure that the 
government remains accountable and refrains from responding to public demands 
through repressive means.  
 
In the 21
st
 Century, when constitutionalism as Michel Rosenfeld asserts ‘has so 
dramatically soared … that it seems poised to achieve a worldwide sweep’51 it is 
submitted that Cameroon’s constitutional system should be reassessed with a view 
towards more effectively securing respect for CPR. To attain that objective, this thesis 
                                                 
51
 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Difference’ in Michel 
Rosenfeld (ed), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (Duke 
University Press 1994) 3. See also Grimm (n 43) 3; Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World 
Constitutionalism’ (1997) 83(4) Virginia Law Review 771; Richard Kay,’ American Constitutionalism’ in 
Larry Alexander (ed) Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press 1998) 17; 
Donald Lutz, ‘Thinking about Constitutionalism at the Start of the Twenty-First Century’ (2000) 30(4) 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 115. 
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argues for the contextualisation of constitutionalism to reflect the specific circumstances 
of Cameroon.  
 
Although Cameroon’s legal system is widely regarded as bijural52 it is perhaps fair to 
assert that the description is inaccurate as indigenous systems of law and governance 
institutions exist in Cameroon albeit with limited application. It is argued that, developing 
a contextual approach to constitutionalism should entail taking into account Cameroon’s 
legally pluralistic nature. This implies a departure from the excessive adherence to its 
French colonial heritage and greater recognition and engagement with the features of its 
British colonial (constitutional) legacy and indigenous customs and institutions. Since 
reunification, Cameroon’s British colonial legacy has continued to be undermined to the 
point that it has very minimal influence at the constitutional level. It is perhaps ironic 
therefore that in post-colonial Africa there is some analytical literature and empirical 
evidence suggesting that the British colonial legacy is more supportive of 
constitutionalism than the French.
53
 In particular, it has been argued that the British 
colonial legacy is characterised by a more robust system of checks and balances, 
buttressed by more entrenched features of judicial independence and a more accessible 
and holistic mechanism for judicial review of legislation.
54
 Based on those propositions, 
it has been asserted that the combined effect of those normative elements may partly 
account for the better record of former British colonies in the protection of CPR than 
former French colonies.
55
 That, however, does not imply that former British colonies do 
not have problems with the protection of CPR. The assertion is that some features of their 
                                                 
52
 The former Southern Cameroons, administered by Britain, adopted the English common law while the 
former French Cameroon, administered by France, adopted the French civil law system. After 
independence, both systems were maintained by virtue of the Federal Constitution 1961, article 46. 
53
 Ben O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (Hurst Publishers 1973); Frank Moderne, 
‘Human Rights and Postcolonial Constitutions in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Louis Henkin & Albert Rosenthal 
(eds), Constitutionalism and Rights: the Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (Columbia 
University Press 1990); Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1193; Henry F. Carey, ‘The Postcolonial State and the Protection of Human Rights’ (2002) 22 
Comparative Study of South Asia, Africa & Middle East 59; Sandra F. Joireman, ‘Colonisation and the Rule 
of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries’ (2004) 15, Constitutional 
Political Economy 315; Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’ (2004) 112(2) Journal of 
Political Economy 445. 
54
 ibid. 
55
 ibid. But cf Linda C. Keith & Ayo Ogundele, ‘Legal Systems and Constitutionalism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: An Empirical Examination of Colonial Influences on Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly 1071. 
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constitutional structure give these countries comparably greater capacity for the 
protection of rights than the French counterparts. As Rhoda Howard surmises, although 
Commonwealth countries face CPR challenges just as francophone Africa, the former are 
not amongst the worst violators in Africa.
56
 Given that the British colonial legacy is part 
of Cameroon’s heritage and forms part of the lived experiences of people in Cameroon, it 
is worth exploring further to incorporate some advantages that inhere in the system. 
 
Like the British colonial legacy, the influence of indigenous principles and institutions 
that can potentially enhance a contextual development of constitutionalism have been 
undervalued. Indeed, there has been a decline in appreciation for those indigenous aspects 
which began in the colonial era. Yet, an examination of some of the indigenous systems 
reveals positive aspects of traditional leadership and other institutional features or 
regulatory institutions such as ekpe and nwerong which can be broadly perceived as 
autochthonous antecedents of constitutionalism. Such features, as will be argued in 
Chapter 6, should be given some recognition in developing more robust institutional 
features for the enhancement of CPR in Cameroon.  
 
From the above it may be apparent that the thesis advanced is that Cameroon’s solution 
to improving its record in the protection and enhancement of CPR may lie plausibly in 
developing an approach which attempts to synthesise the positive features of 
constitutionalism inherent in the three existing legal orders. What is envisaged is a 
framework based on the general principles of constitutionalism but also incorporating 
indigenous principles and institutions, taking into account the specific contemporary 
circumstances of Cameroon. The expectation is that such a framework would be more 
conducive to the realisation of CPR.   
 
Of course, a challenge that immediately arises is that of synthesising constitutional 
features or precepts from disparate constitutional models. The thesis approaches that 
                                                 
56
 Rhoda Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa (Rowman & Littlefield 1986) 11. See also 
Philip Reyntjens, ‘The Winds of Change: Political and Constitutional Evolution in Francophone Africa, 
1990-1991’ (1991) 35(1,2) Journal of African Law 1, 54. 
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challenge by proposing a framework or approach referred to as the Optimal Integrative 
Approach (OIA). Essentially, OIA advocates for a contextual development of 
constitutionalism which focuses on prioritising the positive features of each of the 
relevant systems and demonstrates how they can be mutually supportive in developing 
the best possible foundation for the realisation of CPR in Cameroon.  OIA as discussed in 
Chapter 6, however, is not presented as a fully developed framework on contextualising 
constitutionalism. Nevertheless, it is discussed as a necessary prelude to the development 
of a more comprehensive theoretical framework on the contextualisation of 
constitutionalism in Cameroon with a view towards enhancing the protection and 
enhancement of CPR. 
 
4. LIMITATIONS 
 
It may be helpful at this point to explain the limits of this thesis, first in terms of its scope 
and secondly, a practical difficulty resulting from limited access to information in 
Cameroon. 
 
4.1. Scope of Thesis 
 
This thesis is focused on examining the problem of systemic violations of fundamental 
CPR in Cameroon. It is not concerned with examining how all fundamental rights are 
protected and enhanced. However, I take the view, along with some notable theoretical 
perspectives, that CPR are essential to realise all human rights.
57
 Consequently, focusing 
on these rights is a necessary prelude to examining a broader rights promotion.  
 
There is no implication here that other fundamental rights are not important. It is 
presumed that in Cameroon people are as much concerned with having their basic 
subsistence conditions improved as they are in having the ability to freely express their 
discontent for the failure of the government to do so, without being arrested. The 
                                                 
57
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2
nd
 ed, Harvard University Press 2001); Allen 
Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2004). 
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February 2008 debacle discussed earlier
58
 attests to that presumption. Equally, none of 
this implies that any lessons learnt from researching on the CPR dimension will have no 
relevance for socio-economic rights. As the South African Constitutional Court has 
demonstrated, an independent and empowered judiciary is important for the protection 
and enhancement of CPR, as well as socio-economic rights.
59
  
 
4.2. Access to Information 
 
One of the major challenges encountered in undertaking this study has been the problem 
of lack of access to information in Cameroon.
60
  This is in part the result of the problem 
of CPR failings in the country which this thesis examines. For that reason it has been 
difficult to obtain some relevant and fairly recent cases, legislation and documentation 
relating to government services. The author made several attempts to contact officials in 
the relevant services as well as friends and relatives. Government officials contacted 
through their contact details published on official websites simply did not respond, while 
some friends and relatives expressed concerns as to their safety. It is a challenge for a 
person resident in Cameroon to obtain information from public services and even more 
challenging for a researcher who is not physically present in Cameroon. The source of 
that problem can be traced to legal and socio-political factors. 
 
From the legal dimension, there is no specific domestic legislation on the right of access 
to information.
61
 The Constitution, however, indirectly guarantees that right through 
some international conventions that have been ratified by Cameroon.
62
 Additionally, the 
right is implicit in some substantive laws such as the law on freedom of social 
                                                 
58
 See section 1 above. 
59
 Dennis Davis, ‘Socio-economic Rights: Has the Promise of Eradicating the Divide between First and 
Second Generation Rights been Fulfilled?’ in Ginsburg & Dixon (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 519-529. 
60
 USDS, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1) s 4 at 29; Citizen’s Governance Initiative (CGI), 
‘The Right to Information and Administrative Transparency in Cameroon’ (Yaoundé, Imprimerie Saint 
Paul 2010) <www.citizens-governance.org/IMG/pdf/Right_Access_Info_Admin_Transparency_CMR.pdf> 
accessed 24 January 2012; Sustainable Development Networking Programme (SDNP), ‘Cameroon: 
Bridging the IT Gaps’ (UNDP) <www.undpegov.org/sdnp/stories/cameroon.html> accessed 19 August 
2012. 
61
 ibid. 
62
 For instance, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 9(1) which states that ‘Every 
individual shall have the right to receive information’. 
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communication.
63
 Article 49(1) of that law provides that individuals shall be free to have 
access to official documents except otherwise provided by law. Nevertheless, the absence 
of a specific law on the subject makes it difficult for an individual to assert that right by 
demanding access to information. In Cameroon, most government documents are not 
readily available to the public.
64
  
 
Moreover, despite the provision of the law, the ability to access information depends 
substantially on the type of information and the officials to whom a request is made.
65
 
Information which is considered ‘sensitive’ for political reasons by the government or the 
official to whom a request is made would usually be unobtainable.
66
 Generally, 
information on government activities is considered confidential and therefore release to 
the public is the exception rather than the norm.
67
 In 2010, in a first ever systemic survey 
of the right to information in Cameroon, the Citizen’s Governance Initiative (CGI) a 
domestic non-governmental organisation described the greatest socio-political obstacle as 
being the ‘culture of secrecy and disservice’.68  Government officials tend to consider the 
release of such ‘sensitive’ information not in the public interest and do not perceive part 
of their duty as making information available to the public.
69
 Again, officials are 
apprehensive of reprisal from the executive if ‘sensitive’ material is released to the 
public.
70
 This latter point makes obtaining information sometimes dependent on personal 
relationships. A personal relation may dare to release information on the assurance that 
they will not be identified as the source.
71
 Much of the information relevant to the present 
thesis can be considered sensitive in the Cameroonian context to the extent that it has a 
significant political implication. There is an implicit assumption here that the above 
                                                 
63
 Law No. 90/052 on the Freedom of Social Communication (FSC). 
64
 USDS, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Cameroon’ (n 1) s 4 at 29; CGI (n 60) 21-23, 59, 78; SDNP (n 60). 
65
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the Registrar of the Court for assistance in accessing its repository. I was fiercely turned down. 
66
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Fombad, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Cameroonian Democratic Transition’ (n 26). 
67
 SDNP (n 60). 
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 CGI (n 60) 21, 75. See also SDNP (n 60). 
69
 CGI (n 60) 21, 75. 
70
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factors partly explain why requests for information from various public services in 
Cameroon were simply ignored.  
 
Other problems included the absence of a systemic programme for the documentation of 
government information. In the context of the present research, that problem was 
particularly obvious in attempting to access cases, legislation and information on 
parliamentary processes. Cases are not generally reported due in part to lack of funding, 
which makes it difficult for the administrative units of the judiciary to produce hard 
copies of decisions. Some modest private initiatives have been undertaken to report cases 
but they appear sporadically and are not widely distributed.
72
 With regard to legislation 
the primary source for legal instruments is the Official Gazette, the availability of which 
is undermined again by lack of funding and centralisation. Its publication appears 
infrequently and is mostly available in Yaoundé (the capital city of Cameroon) where it is 
published.
73
  
 
In addition, there is poor record keeping of available documentation. According to the 
CGI, that is a systemic problem affecting public institutions in Cameroon. In the absence 
of a systemic mechanism for documentation, searching for a specific document is a 
Herculean task.
74
 Recently, a number of public services have created websites to enhance 
transparency and access to information. Although this has attempted to improve on the 
situation, access to information is still a problem. In addition, some of the websites are 
either not functional, have dated information
75
 or refer to nonexistent links
76
 and links 
with no substantive content.
77
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73
 CGI (n 60) 23, 78. 
74
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In spite of those difficulties, material from Cameroon relevant to this thesis was obtained 
with the assistance of personal contacts from the bar, the judiciary, the Ministry of 
Justice, the School of Administration and Magistracy and law professors from some 
universities in Cameroon. Where relevant and possible, these sources have been 
acknowledged. 
 
5. THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
In order to substantiate and explore the thesis already outlined above this work is divided 
into six chapters and a concluding part. Chapter 1 provides an understanding of 
constitutionalism influenced by contemporary perspectives on the concept. It also 
discusses the importance of context in developing a more relevant model suitable to the 
circumstances in question. The chapter goes further to apply that understanding of 
constitutionalism to propose a framework of three central constitutional principles against 
which the development of Cameroon’s constitution can be analysed with regard to its 
record of CPR. These principles consist of, first, the separation of powers and checks and 
balances (discussed as an integral principle), second, the independence of the judiciary 
and, third, judicial review. The chapter justifies this demarcation and demonstrates how 
the framework can serve as an analytical tool to identify the parameters of CPR violation 
at a systemic level.  
 
Chapter 2 begins that analysis in the particular circumstances of Cameroon by providing 
a historical background for understanding the origins of the current constitutional 
framework vis-à-vis CPR. It examines the transplantation of the French civil law system 
and the British common law system during the colonial period and the relegation of 
indigenous customs and institutions. Postcolonial constitutional developments from 1960 
to 1972 are discussed to demonstrate the constitutional trajectory of Cameroon. An 
                                                                                                                                                 
76
 Ministry of Communication, ‘Documentations et Archives: Textes Législatifs et Réglémentaires’ 
<www.mincom.gov.cm/index.php?info=treg&&rub=rtreg> accessed 13 September 2012. That link appears 
not to be functional.  
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 Supreme Court of Cameroon, ‘Publications de la Cour’ 
<www.coursupreme.cm/index.php?csc=publications-de-la-cour> accessed 09 September 2012, no data is 
provided through that link.   
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attempt is made to demonstrate how the enforcement of CPR was affected in the course 
of the developments. The prelude to the adoption of the current 1996 Constitution is also 
discussed to provide the background for understanding the reasons for its adoption and 
for analysis in subsequent chapters. 
 
The next three chapters then apply the analytical framework in detail. Chapter 3 analyses 
presidential power in Cameroon against the backdrop of the principles of separation of 
powers and checks and balances discussed in Chapter 1. It outlines the constellation of 
presidential powers and the available mechanisms to regulate their exercise. It will 
attempt to demonstrate that presidential power is excessive and unaccountable, a situation 
which provides scope for the arbitrary exercise of power. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the institutional mechanisms for guaranteeing judicial independence 
in Cameroon. It first provides an understanding of judicial independence, building on the 
principle as briefly discussed in Chapter 1. The chapter aims to demonstrate that the 
judiciary is subordinated to the executive and therefore lacks independence. That position 
undermines the capacity of the judiciary to deal assertively with executive violations of 
CPR. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the system of judicial review of legislative and administrative acts in 
Cameroon. It examines the institutional structure, the methods and scope of review of 
legislation. The overall assessment, as the chapter will attempt to demonstrate, is that it is 
an inadequate system which leaves the ordinary citizen with no avenue to challenge the 
constitutionality of a law adversely affecting their exercise of CPR. With regard to 
administrative review, the chapter highlights the challenges that litigants can encounter in 
attempting to assert their rights against administrative authorities. In particular, the 
chapter asserts that the problem of absence of judicial independence discussed in Chapter 
4 undermines the effectiveness of administrative review.   
 
Having provided an assessment of the Cameroonian constitutional system and found it 
wanting with regard to the three core constitutional principles, Chapter 6 then considers 
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the proposition that an appropriately constructed constitutionalism in Cameroon could be 
a solution to the problem of enhancing CPR realisation. It reviews existing discourse on 
contextualising constitutionalism in Africa through the adaptation and incorporation of 
autochthonous principles and institutions. It also visits the debates on the potentially 
progressive constitutional features of the British colonial legacy as compared to the 
French colonial legacy. The chapter introduces the Optimal Integrative Approach and 
discusses it as a preliminary framework on contextualising constitutionalism in 
Cameroon by focusing on the positive features inherent in the three legal influences or 
orders existing in Cameroon. The overall objective is to develop a constitutional 
framework appropriate for Cameroon to address the CPR problem identified earlier in the 
thesis. 
 
The thesis ends with a general conclusion which draws together the analyses in the 
preceding chapters. 
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Chapter 1 
Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights: A Framework for Analysis 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines more closely the concept of constitutionalism and how it can be 
supportive of CPR. It aims to apply that concept to develop a normative benchmark for 
assessing, in the first instance, the Constitution of Cameroon and its influence on the 
protection of CPR. Secondly, the framework will serve as the basis for the development 
of a contextualised conception of constitutionalism in the latter part of this study. 
 
This chapter is partitioned into three sections. The first explores the concept of 
constitutionalism and attempts to provide an understanding of that concept as conceived 
in the present study. In section two, the constitution is explored in relation to its role in 
constitutionalism. Section three discusses a framework of three central constitutional 
principles consisting of the separation of powers and checks and balances,
1
 judicial 
independence, and judicial review. An explanation for that demarcation is provided in 
that section, together with the ways in which the principles can support the protection and 
enhancement of CPR. It is worth noting that in discussing constitutionalism in this 
chapter, the author will adopt the term ‘fundamental rights’ to imply civil and political 
rights. 
 
 
1. AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Constitutionalism is essentially a contested concept whose meaning is not self-evident.
 2
 
As such, it has been subjected to a diversity of interpretations and meanings.
3
  This 
                                                 
1
 Although the separation of powers and checks and balances are distinct constitutional principles, they are 
discussed together in the framework. That is deemed necessary here in order to better capture their 
usefulness as constitutional principles that can enhance the protection and promotion of fundamental rights. 
2
 Louis Henkin, ‘A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects’ in Michel 
Rosenfeld (ed), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (Duke 
University Press 1994) 40. 
3
 Henkin (n 2) 39-40; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and 
Diversity’ in Rosenfeld (ed) Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy: Theoretical 
Perspectives (Duke University Press 1994) 3; Eric Murkens, ‘The Quest for Constitutionalism in the UK 
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section will very briefly examine two leading perspectives on constitutionalism. From 
that examination, it will attempt to extrapolate and discuss what appears to be a fairly 
consensual understanding of contemporary constitutionalism.  
 
The first perspective, which is considered the historical purport of constitutionalism, is 
that it is concerned with the limitation of governmental power.
4
 That view was 
subsequently contested as it tended to portray constitutionalism simply as concerned with 
constraining the powers of government.
5
 According to Larry Backer, constitutionalism 
was tied to the idea of limiting government but not to the ends of the limitation.
6
 That 
perspective has evolved to include the need for organisation and control of governmental 
power to be geared towards the enhancement of good and effective governance 
objectives.
7
 The protection of fundamental rights falls within the purview of good 
governance
8
 and has increasingly become a defining feature of constitutionalism.
9
  That 
was influenced by developments in the international scene after World War II
10
 and also 
after the collapse of communism in 1989.
11
 Michel Rosenfeld for one, states that ‘in the 
broadest terms, modern constitutionalism requires imposing limits on the powers of 
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4
 Charles McIIwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Cornell University Press 1940) 24. 
5
 Larry Backer ‘From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power 
Systems’ (2009) 113(3) Penn State Law Review 101,103, 115. 
6
 ibid. 
7
 Paul Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) 7(2) European Law 
Journal 125, 126; John Hatchard et al, Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the 
Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2004) 7. 
8
 World Bank, Governance and Development (Washington D.C., 1993); United Nations Development 
Programme, ‘Governance for Sustainable Human Development’ (UNDP policy document, New York, 
1997) < http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/> accessed 21 October 2012. 
9
 Bellamy, ‘The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative 
Democracy’ (1996) 64 Political Studies 436, 436; Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Reconciling Constitutionalism with 
Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering’ (2010) 23(3) Ratio Juris 390, 391. See also 
Issa Shivji, ‘State and Constitutionalism: A New Democratic Perspective’ in Issa Shivji (ed), State and 
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Constitutionalism in Africa’ (2000) Centre for Democracy and Development Occasional Series Paper No. 
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 Ruti Teitel, ‘Human Rights Genealogy’ (1997) 66 Fordham Law Review 301, 302; Backer, ‘God(s) Over 
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Mississippi College Law Review 101, 114-115. 
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government, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights’.12 
Similarly, Judith Squires takes constitutionalism to comprise two key elements namely 
the rights provisions which are seen as providing constraints on the political process, and 
structural provisions for controlling and regulating governmental power.
13
 
 
The second perspective sees constitutionalism as a process through which citizens and 
governmental powers mediate conflicts and articulate competing interests.
14
 It 
emphasises the role of participation and deliberation in decision making processes. 
Proponents of this view share a common understanding that mediation of conflicts and 
articulation of interests should be done through pre-established processes and institutional 
structures.
15
 The processes and institutions are governed by a normative standpoint which 
serves as a reference point for all participants. The normative standpoint (constitution) 
will usually prescribe such aspects as the allocation of powers, their method of 
accountability and the form of participation of various stake holders.
16
 According to this 
perspective, an important objective that decision making processes should seek to achieve 
is respect for and the protection of fundamental rights.
17
  
 
Both conceptions of constitutionalism appear to be concerned with governmental powers, 
the exercise of those powers and how citizens interact with governmental powers and 
institutions to achieve certain objectives, prominent amongst which is the protection of 
fundamental rights. Indeed, David Feldman asserts that, ‘constitutionalism in both senses 
… is an essential precondition for the effective protection of human rights’.18 
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Drawing from both perspectives, constitutionalism is perceived in the present thesis as 
situated at the heart of the relationship between governmental powers inter se and 
citizens, and the extent to which the exercise of those powers enhance the enforcement of 
fundamental rights. Fundamental rights standards may be embodied in positive law 
whether by way of bills of rights or general statements in the constitution, some domestic 
legislation or international instrument to which the country subscribes.
19
 Those standards 
express the rights which a government purports to accord to its citizens from which it 
should not deviate. However, they are not self-executing.  They are enforced in an 
institutional context whose effectiveness depends in part on the nature of the institutional 
arrangements within which they operate. Constitutionalism connects with fundamental 
rights in this way by providing the institutional context within which governments and 
citizens aspire to achieve the effective enforcement of fundamental rights.  
 
The instrumentality of constitutionalism is conceived here on the basis of two related 
perspectives - the limiting and the empowering. The limiting perspective is based on the 
conventional conception of constitutionalism as concerned with the limitation of 
governmental power.
20
 The purpose of that limitation is not to incapacitate government 
but to protect citizens against the arbitrariness that inheres in the uncontrolled exercise of 
power. This conception presupposes that there are pre-established rules which clearly 
define the relationship between citizens and the government and the permissible 
boundaries within which that relationship is exercised.
21
 For instance a constitutional 
provision for the right to personal liberty requires that executive officials should not 
arbitrarily arrest or detain citizens. It also suggests that subordinate legislation, which 
regulates personal liberty, should be formulated in such a way as to prevent arbitrariness 
in its enforcement.  
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On the other hand, the empowering perspective perceives constitutionalism not simply as 
a mechanism for limiting governmental power, but also as providing government and 
citizens with the capacity to implement and exercise fundamental rights standards. It 
connects with the perspective of constitutionalism as a process, in terms of its 
preoccupation with the way governmental institutions and citizens interact to enhance the 
realisation of fundamental rights. The empowering perspective deals not only with the 
structural division of government authority, but also with the manner in which 
institutional structures are imbued with the capacity to facilitate the exercise of 
fundamental rights. For instance, a constitutional guarantee of a democratic right such as 
the right to vote presupposes a duty on the state to ensure the integrity of the electoral 
process.
22
 It entails the need for institutions to provide avenues for participation in free 
and fair elections. It also entails that the law establishing such institutions should take 
into consideration their ability to meet the democratic aspirations of society. Empowering 
governments in this way potentially opens up avenues through which citizens can more 
readily exercise their rights. A well functioning electoral system, with regular, free and 
fair elections has the potential to provide citizens with the power to oust a corrupt or 
unaccountable government or legislative or elected executive officials who fail to 
articulate or promote the fundamental rights aspirations of the population. 
 
Jeremy Waldron asserts that although the empowering dimension is less articulated, it 
adds to the limiting dimension to provide a more comprehensive and constructive way of 
understanding constitutionalism.
23
 According to Waldron, the widespread view of 
constitutionalism as primarily concerned with limiting or constraining government has a 
more profound implication which goes beyond preventing the arbitrary use of power.
24
 It 
may also imply that government is restricted in its ability to provide conditions necessary 
for the effective implementation of rights.
25
 If constitutionalism is concerned only with 
limiting government, then, ‘many of the aspirations of government – particularly 
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democratic government – are per se illegitimate’.26 The empowering perspective provides 
that legitimacy and the ability to steer government action towards the achievement of its 
fundamental rights objectives. As Francis Deng notes, modern constitutionalism entails 
‘more positive action to promote human dignity to the fullest possible extent’.27 The 
empowering perspective being advocated here is not limited to the positive obligation of 
the government to provide social and economic rights or the conditions for their 
realisation. The negative obligation of the government to desist from violating 
fundamental rights has a positive implication which complements the former by ensuring 
that the procedural and institutional framework within which power is exercised allows 
the institutions to perform the specific responsibilities they are vested with. For instance, 
the judiciary as an institutional component of the governmental framework for 
implementing fundamental rights requires it to be sufficiently vested with power and 
autonomy to exercise its functions effectively.
28
 Constitutionalism so conceived can 
enhance the state’s obligation to provide those minimum prerequisites for the proper 
functioning of a judiciary. Michael Davis notes that by shifting the focus away from 
negative constitutionalism, attention can be paid to the empowerment conception and the 
way it provides the basis for thinking of new practices and possibilities for orderly 
decision making.
29
  
 
Besides limiting and empowering governmental institutions, contemporary 
constitutionalism is also associated with constitutions. That relationship is considered 
below. 
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2. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
The quest for an ideal constitution has been embraced as fundamental to an 
understanding of constitutionalism as it is the basic document which structures the 
relationship between governmental powers inter se and government’s relationship with 
citizens for the realisation of fundamental rights.
30
 Constitutions establish governmental 
institutions, confer powers on them and establish the limits of legitimate governmental 
action. In addition to structural elements, constitutions contain basic values and 
commitments, fundamental rights aspirations and the method of enforcing their 
provisions.
31
 They also act as a higher law to which other laws must conform.
32
 Given 
those significant functions, the provisions of a constitution are entrenched against 
frequent and easy amendments.
33
 From a constitutionalism perspective, a constitution 
should contain at least two parts to it; the rights provisions and enforcement 
mechanism.
34
 Additionally, it is submitted that in establishing the enforcement 
machinery, the specific circumstances of the context in which the constitution is to be 
applied should be taken into account. These points are considered below in turn. 
 
2.1. The Rights Provisions 
 
The rights provisions in a constitution are important because they impose obligations on 
the government with regard to their citizens and act as limitation on the exercise of public 
power.
35
 They also give citizens an idea of the claims they have and can assert against 
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their governments and the basis to assess governmental action in relation to the provision 
of those claims.
36
  
 
The development of constitutionalism after World War II was characterised by an 
increased focus on fundamental rights and the proliferation of constitutions as the 
instrument for their articulation.
37
 The focus on fundamental rights was partly in response 
to the Nazi holocaust and the desire to rid the world of atrocities on humanity.
38
 The 
normative foundations were initially laid down by the United Nations Charter, the 
Universal Declaration and subsequent U.N. instruments (ICCPR and ICESCR).
39
 Those 
developments also had an impact on states’ approaches to the recognition and expression 
of fundamental rights. Constitutions became an instrumental means of expressing a 
state’s commitment, with most drawing from or reflecting the international normative 
standards.
40
 The post war German Constitution (Basic Law), one of the precursors to the 
spate of new constitution drafting, gave pre-eminence to fundamental rights.
41
 The very 
first chapter is comprised of nineteen articles enumerating a plethora of fundamental 
rights including, human dignity, individual liberty, and equality, freedoms of speech, 
religion and assembly.
42
 Elsewhere, some countries emerging from colonialism were 
bequeathed with constitutions recognising fundamental rights,
43
 predominantly CPR (as 
was the case with former British colonies).
44
  
 
The significance of constitutions has continued to increase particularly after the end of 
the Cold War in 1989. The subsequent democratic transitions that occurred in sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe were marked by a flurry of new constitutions 
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expressing commitment to fundamental rights.
45
 In sub-Saharan Africa some francophone 
countries which had previously listed fundamental rights in non-justiciable preambles 
now had entrenched provisions.
46
 The Constitution of South Africa by far the most 
celebrated
47
 incorporates a Bill of Rights recognising CPR and the justiciability of socio-
economic rights.
48
 In Eastern Europe, one of the distinguishing features of some post-
communist constitutions was the incorporation or recognition of CPR which had 
previously been underemphasised in comparison to socioeconomic rights.
49
 The 
Constitution of Poland for instance recognises CPR such as equality, freedom of 
assembly, speech and expression.
50
  
 
Although constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights provide an idea of what rights 
are available in a country, their effective realisation depends in part on the existence of an 
efficient mechanism for their enforcement.  
 
2.2. The Enforcement Mechanism  
 
Establishing an effective mechanism of government is an essential pre-requisite as 
constitutions provide the framework but cannot predict exactly how in practice 
governments will operate within it.
51
 This has been one of the major concerns with some 
constitutions which have failed to adequately limit governmental arbitrariness prompting 
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sceptics to regard constitutions as mere window dressing which does not reflect a state’s 
actual practices or commitment to the tenets of limited government and enforcement of 
fundamental rights.
52
 Such constitutions as classified by Karl Loewenstein are either 
nominal or semantic.
53
 A nominal constitution is one which on paper upholds the values 
of limited government and democracy but is ineffective and therefore only a constitution 
in name.
54
 On the other hand, semantic constitutions serve to formalise the existing locus 
of power for the benefit of those exercising it.
55
 Such constitutions serve as smokescreens 
which may appear to express the virtues of limited government and fundamental rights 
but in the absence of effective mechanisms for their implementation, political leaders 
may use them to pursue unconstitutional ends.
56
  
 
To pre-empt such negative instrumental functions of a constitution, effective mechanisms 
need to be developed for the legitimate exercise of power which in turn provides scope 
for the exercise of fundamental rights.
57
 Lowenstein notes that ‘the ethos of any 
constitution in the ontological sense must be seen in the articulation of devices for the 
limitation and control of political power’.58 In the absence of robust machinery the 
commitments in the constitution will remain under-enforced or worse, be violated by the 
institutions that should ensure their protection and enhancement. So, a constitution should 
provide an effective governmental mechanism where, for instance, powers are separated 
to the extent necessary to prevent usurpation of power by one governmental organ. 
Additionally, it should allow necessary scope for mutual cooperation which is vital for 
the empowerment of various government organs with a view towards the effective 
protection and promotion of fundamental rights. Moreover, the incorporation of a checks 
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and balances system is essential for ensuring the accountability of government organs for 
their actions or inaction which either enhance or undermine fundamental rights.  
 
2.3. The Context 
 
Context as used here refers to a geographical setting and the specific circumstances such 
as historical, social, economic, political and legal that characterise that setting. As stated 
earlier the issue of context is one that permeates discourse on the adaptability of Western 
constitutional models transplanted to foreign jurisdictions. Western constitutionalism 
developed in response to specific socio-economic, political and historical conditions 
which were consolidated and reinforced by their specific constitutions.
59
 As such, the 
divergent approaches adopted by major Western democracies such as France, Britain and 
the U.S.A. although mirroring the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism, are tailored to 
the specific circumstances and political traditions of those societies.
60
 Given their 
developmental peculiarities, it is questionable that those models transplanted abroad can 
succeed under dissimilar circumstances. Michael Reisman asserts that the experiences of 
Latin America and Africa with Western constitutions of the 18
th
 century demonstrate that 
constitutions cannot ‘simply be copied on the assumption that they will miraculously 
transform a political system into a constitutional democracy’.61 
 
In Africa, Western constitutional models were transplanted at a time when Africa was 
emerging from colonialism with weak and sometimes non-existent democratic 
institutional structures relevant to support constitutionalism. There were also economic 
and social problems such as underdevelopment, poverty, ethnic divisions all of which can 
adversely affect the smooth functioning of institutional structures particularly in nascent 
states such as they were. The transplanted models did not reflect the fact that in addition 
to the fundamental tenets, the mechanisms transplanted needed some relevance to the 
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specific post-colonial contexts.
62
 It has been argued that, that omission led to the 
establishment of weak constitutional restraint mechanisms that were exploited by some 
African leaders to pursue their political ambitions which in many cases involved the 
violation of fundamental rights.
63
  
 
It is submitted that context should be considered relevant because the principles 
underlying constitutionalism, although discussed in abstract, are applied within specific 
contexts. Constitutionalism is a dynamic rather than a rigid concept.
64
 It espouses general 
principles and presuppositions which should guide the establishment of institutional and 
procedural mechanisms for the protection and enhancement of fundamental rights. 
Beyond the matters of principle, it may become difficult to be prescriptive on the specific 
form of institutional and procedural arrangements that should apply at all times and in 
every place. As a dynamic process, constitutionalism should respond to or reflect the 
specific circumstances in which constitutional arrangements are to apply as those 
circumstances are likely to determine the consolidation or decline of constitutionalism.
65
 
Identifying a parliamentary system as a model of governance in country A may be 
suitable for that country but the same may not apply to country B particularly where the 
specific circumstances of country B may require a more functional and institutional 
separation of powers to allow for the effective protection of fundamental rights. Davis 
argues with respect to historical context that concerns about past experiences ‘may 
fundamentally shape new democratic regimes, creating primary imperatives that in other 
systems may be less important’.66 The South African Constitution is illustrative. A 
distinct feature of its society prior to the democratic transition in the 1990s was the 
apartheid system based on racial discrimination. That influenced the democratic 
transition and the pre-eminence that has been accorded to matters of equality, freedom 
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and social justice. The Preamble to the 1996 Constitution states one of its purposes as to 
‘Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental rights’. Section 7(1) further endorses those commitments by 
providing that the Bill of Rights enshrines the rights to all people in South Africa and 
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. The establishment 
of some institutional features to enforce those commitments has been shaped by its 
history and also reflects contemporary dynamics of ethnic diversity.
67
  
 
The idea of context here is not to imply a variation of the fundamental tenets of 
constitutionalism. Rather, it is the form in which they are articulated, but always within 
the framework of the fundamental tenets.
68
 Taking context into account can have a pre-
emptive effect on the adoption of institutional structures which can potentially be 
problematic for the recipient society.  As Louis Henkin has noted Western constitutional 
models ‘may have carried with them some inherent deficiencies’ which, in the absence of 
adaptation may affect the development of constitutionalism in ‘newly developing 
constitutional systems’.69 As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, in Africa, the 
dissatisfaction with Western constitutional models is partly what is driving the ‘search for 
autochthonous principles of constitutionalism’, an ideology espoused by some scholars of 
constitutionalism in that continent who assert that indigenous principles can be used to 
complement Western elements of constitutionalism.
70
 In that way, African constitutions 
can develop models of constitutionalism which are robust and reflective of their 
individual circumstances and by so doing engender better prospects for the realisation of 
fundamental rights in their specific countries. 
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3. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR ANALYSIS 
 
Having presented a plausible understanding of constitutionalism above, this section 
applies that understanding to develop a framework which will serve as a benchmark for 
assessing the Constitution of Cameroon and its influence on the protection and 
enhancement of CPR. It will also serve as a foundation on which to develop a contextual 
approach to constitutionalism in Cameroon. The framework applies the principles of 
separation of powers and checks and balances (1), judicial independence (2) and judicial 
review (3), which together constitute institutional mechanisms through which 
constitutionalism can be seen as providing a more conducive framework for the 
realisation of fundamental CPR. As my analysis above shows, respect for fundamental 
rights and constitutions are intertwined.  
 
As mentioned earlier there are competing views on the various principles or elements of 
constitutionalism and the mechanism through which constitutionalism empowers and 
limits governmental actions.
71
 Other concepts associated with constitutionalism include 
the rule of law,
72
 democracy
73
 and control of constitutional amendments.
74
  They are 
considered integral to the concept of constitutionalism as understood here and have been 
captured in various forms under the proposed framework. For instance, the rule of law is 
the primary basis for the institutional arrangements to limit governmental power.
75
 In 
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both its substantive and procedural conceptions, it is captured in the idea of government 
by pre-established and clearly defined standards - in the present instance, fundamental 
rights standards (endorsed by the separation of powers and checks and balances; judicial 
independence; and judicial review).
76
 
 
Similarly, democracy can be considered as inextricably linked to constitutionalism
77
 
given that democracy and the rights intrinsic to the democratic process are considered 
fundamental.
78
 According to Neil Walker, constitutionalism functions to realise 
democracy.
79
 The constitution in establishing the standards for the exercise of 
governmental power incorporates the rules that govern democracy and democratic 
participation. The elements of the current framework are deemed to operate collectively 
to prevent constraints on democracy and allow the democratic process to flourish. As 
such, citizens can exercise their rights of participation and also use the democratic 
process to assert other fundamental rights.  
 
Granted, it is not always clear which of the two concepts precedes the other. For on the 
one hand, for democracy to exist first and foremost, people have to decide what form it 
should adopt. While on the other hand, the decision making process depends on the 
existence of institutions and normative principles guiding the process of participation and 
decision making. Moreover, once a democratic structure is established, its survival 
depends on the existence of the relevant institutions and mechanisms. The process model 
and empowerment potential of constitutionalism are particularly useful at the decision 
making stage. They regulate the processes and institutions through which people 
articulate their differing interests and how decisions are arrived at and their methods of 
implementation. The limiting dimension regulates subsequent exercise of powers to 
ensure that it is done within the limits of the agreed parameters. While constitutionalism 
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promotes democracy in those ways, it is also relevant that people continue to have the 
capacity to articulate their interests and demand that their governing institutions or 
representatives remain accountable.   
 
Democracy and constitutionalism are inseparable for, as Julio Faundez notes, ‘the task of 
creating stable and efficient institutions … should not be seen as separate from the 
struggle for democracy. The choice and design of state institutions are not technical 
decisions without relevance for democracy’.80 As will become evident in the case of 
Cameroon, although the Constitution provides for democratic features and rights intrinsic 
to the democratic process, their survival is undermined by the inadequacy of the relevant 
constitutional structures. 
 
With regard to the control of constitutional amendments, the method developed to that 
effect is relevant to the supremacy of the constitution. Given the constitution’s primary 
importance to constitutionalism, it is necessary that its durability and stability are assured 
through more stringent mechanisms for its amendment than ordinary law. Nevertheless, 
given that it deals with the allocation of power, it can be considered as embedded in the 
broader principles of separation of powers and checks and balances to the extent that the 
control of constitutional amendments limits governmental powers to prevent abuse of the 
constitution.
81
  
 
Thus while the framework proposed here may initially appear minimalist, it is in fact 
integrative and attempts to represent the core elements that associate constitutionalism 
with better standards for the realisation of fundamental rights. A focus on the proceeding 
three principles is an attempt to show that they are basic elements which should ideally 
be found in any constitutional system without however discounting the contextual 
dimension in institutional design. The framework is discussed below. 
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3.1. The Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances  
 
An essential feature of constitutionalism, as seen above, is the institutional context within 
which fundamental rights are enforced or protected. It requires that in practice, the 
constitutional arrangements to that effect have the capacity to impose limits on 
governmental action to prevent the violation of fundamental rights and also to empower 
those institutions with the capacity to promote the same. The separation of powers and 
checks and balances are interrelated principles which are seen here as having the 
potential to enhance the realisation of those objectives. This subsection first outlines 
those two principles and their implications for fundamental rights and then discusses 
some relevant aspects related to institutional design. 
 
3.1.1. The Principles and their Implications for Fundamental Rights 
 
The separation of powers in its pure formulation requires a separation of the three 
governmental powers - executive, legislative and judiciary. Separation is conceived as 
both functional and institutional implying that each institution is vested with a separate 
function and staffed by personnel without overlapping functions.
82
 The importance of that 
separation lies in the fact that each institution performs the functions vested in it by the 
constitution.
83
 In that way authority is dispersed thereby reducing the incidence of over-
concentration of powers in one institution which might otherwise lead to a situation 
where one institution exercises substantial control over major aspects relating to 
fundamental rights. For instance, an executive wielding legislative power would be able 
to enact laws which it can enforce in a specific way to undermine fundamental rights. The 
underlying idea in the separation of powers is to prevent such arbitrariness.
 84
   
 
As Montesquieu noted, liberty could not be secured under a system where executive and 
legislative functions were vested in the same institution, in particular where judicial 
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power was united to either the executive or the legislative body.
85
 An even more 
dangerous prospect was uniting all three functions in one body, which he regarded as 
outright despotism.
86
 In such a situation the executive enacts fundamental rights 
legislation, enforces it and adjudicates disputes between citizens and the government 
arising from its enactment of that legislation or its application.  
 
Admittedly, a pure separation of powers may be practically impossible.
87
 More effective 
governance may require some form of interaction between these institutions thereby 
overriding a complete separation of functions.
88
 Montesquieu and Locke acknowledged 
the necessity for some form of cooperation, for instance, the executive’s exercise of 
prerogative powers to deal with emergency situations.
89
 Moreover a pure separation in 
itself does not pre-empt the arbitrary use of power.
90
 For it to effectively pre-empt 
arbitrariness it should be complemented by a checks and balances system, which allows 
for interdependence of governmental institutions and yet creates a network through which 
the institutions can exercise mutual accountability.
91
 An effective checks and balances 
system is predicated upon the degree of interdependence between each institution and the 
extent to which they are empowered to exercise mutual oversight or to resist undue 
incursions on their authority.
92
 It is designed to operate in a way that the executive is able 
to exercise control over the legislature through, for instance, a power to veto legislation.
93
 
The legislature on its part can check the executive through a motion of censure, vote of 
no confidence, oversight commissions or impeachment.
94
 The judiciary is seen as a 
neutral arbiter empowered under a checks and balances system to perform oversight over 
both the executive and the legislature.
95
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The checks and balances system complements separation of powers and can create scope 
for the protection of liberties by subjecting the executive to the rule of law. The principle 
operates to ensure that the legislature enacts laws which the executive must adhere to in 
law enforcement. The judiciary further consolidates government’s adherence to the rule 
of law by having the power to strike out government action which violates established 
standards.
96
 Again, the judiciary performs oversight on the legislature through judicial 
review of legislation to ensure that laws relating to fundamental rights do not unduly 
circumscribe the same rights they intend to guarantee.
97
 
 
In addition to the aim of preventing governmental arbitrariness, both principles entail the 
empowerment of governmental institutions for the purpose of enhancing fundamental 
rights. The latter proposition can be substantiated through the efficiency aim of 
separation of powers and checks and balances. It presupposes that governmental 
institutions are provided with the necessary power and autonomy to effectively carry out 
their various functions of legislation, law enforcement, adjudication and providing mutual 
oversight.
98
 The pursuit of efficiency is one that has gained less attention than the 
prevention of tyranny. According to Nick Barber, Locke, who was foremost in 
advocating the efficiency aim, saw separation of powers as necessary to facilitate 
efficient governance.
99
 He asserts that Locke viewed the imposition of limits on 
governmental powers as a means to enhance their ability to function to the best interest of 
society.
100
 So, the legislature for instance was prohibited from adjudicating in particular 
cases as there was a risk of blurring between its legislative and adjudicatory function and 
also its impartiality could not be guaranteed given that it would be applying a law which 
it enacted.
101
 It was not sufficient for the legislature to enact laws that pre-empted 
restriction on public interest. The enactment of laws that promoted public interest was 
also necessary.
102
 However, the restrictions on governmental powers and enactment of 
laws that protected and promoted the public interest depended on an efficient 
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constitution.
103
 ‘Thus, efficiency and liberty are combined; an efficient constitution is one 
that protects and fosters liberty.’104 
 
Advocating separation of powers here as part of the framework for constitutional 
governance does not imply a rejection of the intricacies of contemporary governance 
which allows for some functions to be shared or delegated. Indeed, the modern 
conception of separation of powers applies to multiple governmental institutions such as 
ombudsmen, human rights commissions, specialised courts, administrative bodies such as 
electoral and corruption commissions.
105
 Bruce Ackerman also advocates for specialised 
branches such as an integrity branch, a regulatory branch, a democracy branch and 
multiple avenues for legislation such as public referendum.
106
 Certainly, these are hardly 
new and are covered in various forms in the preceding set of institutions. The 
contemporary sources of separation of powers are important in that they act as avenues 
through which powers have been dispersed and in various ways affect the protection and 
enhancement of fundamental rights. For instance, electoral commissions are usually 
charged with regulating the exercise of elections to ensure regular, free and fair elections. 
Human rights commissions on their part monitor government human rights practices and 
policies and others, like the South African Human Rights Commission, investigate 
complaints lodged by victims, secure the provision of adequate redress and evaluate the 
extent to which governmental institutions achieve their objectives towards the provision 
of positive rights.
107
 Societies have become increasingly complex and so has modern 
administration. In order to keep in step with changing dynamics, it is important that new 
ways of conceiving of old principles are considered. Multiple avenues through which 
fundamental rights can be enhanced are not only commendable but desirable. 
Nevertheless, it is important that the relevant institutions are subjected to robust forms of 
checks and balances by corresponding independent institutions.
108
 In the absence of 
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robust accountability mechanisms, the separation of powers at the level of state 
institutions and other regional, federal or local institutions will likely produce multiple 
sources of possibly conflicting authority and unchecked powers prone to arbitrariness. 
Similarly, they need to be empowered with the necessary capacity to perform their 
functions in order to make their existence consequential.
109
  
 
3.1.2. Institutional Design  
 
In arguing for a system of separated powers and mutual accountability mechanisms, it 
may be imprudent to be prescriptive with regards to their specific character in the 
abstract. Although the principles have elements of universal validity, in drafting 
particular arrangements, the constitution should take into account the historical, political 
and socio-economic context in which the formal institutions operate.
110
 The existence of 
a variety of models of separation of powers and checks and balances system in Western 
constitutionalism attests to the relevance of context. The three major Western models 
(U.S., British and French) bear similarities in the sense that they all have some form of 
separation of powers and some mechanisms for checks and balances. However, beyond 
the general expressions of those principles, the specific mechanisms differ. For instance, 
the American system consists of a distinct separation between the legislature, the 
judiciary and the executive. The arrangements also include mutual accountability 
mechanism such as judicial review of executive and legislative acts, presidential 
accountability through impeachment by Senate
111
 and presidential veto of legislative bills 
subject however to a two-third majority vote override by Senate and the House of 
Representatives.
112
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Similarly, the French system consists of a rigid separation between the executive, 
legislature and the judiciary.
113
 However, the checks and balances system places 
emphasis on the subordinate role of the judiciary as a result of which the ordinary courts 
are incompetent to perform oversight on the executive as that duty is vested in special 
administrative courts.
114
 Presidential accountability through impeachment is conducted 
by Parliament (sitting as the High Court).
115
 Again, until recent constitutional 
amendments in 2008, judicial review of legislation was limited to abstract review of pre-
promulgated legislation with jurisdiction thereof vested in a special constitutional 
court.
116
 With regard to the President, except in the event of high treason,
117
 he is immune 
from prosecution during his tenure although he may be prosecuted after its expiration.
118
  
 
The above cited arrangements have developed in the context of the political traditions of 
those countries concerned and in response to particular circumstances existing therein.
119
 
They have served those countries with varying degrees of success in protecting and 
enhancing fundamental rights. That does not imply, however, that the arrangements are 
transplantable without some form of modification to suit the specific context in which 
they are transplanted and for what purpose. The institutional design should be guided by 
how far it can minimise over-concentration of power and promote empowerment and 
accountability. Such considerations do not undermine the basic elements of the principles 
but help to gear constitutional engineering towards the establishment of more 
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constructive institutions and mechanisms that relate to the particular circumstances of the 
environment where the formal arrangements are intended to operate.
120
  
 
3.2. Judicial Independence  
 
The second key principle can be found in the concept of judicial independence. It is 
derivative of the principle of separation of powers as the latter principle inevitably 
requires that the judiciary be independent of the executive and legislative power. This 
subsection discusses the principle and its relevance to the enforcement of fundamental 
rights and some aspects related to the institutional design.
121
 
 
3.2.1. The Principle and Implication for Fundamental Rights 
 
Judicial independence requires that judges are accorded the ability to adjudicate fairly 
and impartially, guided by the law and are free from external influence be it from the 
legislature, the executive or other parties to a case. In this study, judicial independence 
will be mainly centered on independence from the political branches given the present 
focus on limiting governmental power.  
 
Judicial independence
 
involves two aspects - autonomy and power. Autonomy refers to 
the degree to which judges are capable of adjudicating impartially and are free from 
external influence,
122
 while power refers to the extent to which judicial decisions are 
enforceable.
 123
 The impact of an independent judiciary is given greater significance when 
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a decision rendered impartially and according to the law can be enforced against the 
relevant authorities.
124
 
 
An independent judiciary should be a desirable quality of a good constitutional system 
because it has potential to contribute to the checks and balances designed to minimise 
governmental arbitrariness.
125
 Limitation of governmental power entails that government 
is made to adhere to the rule of law. A judiciary that is empowered and autonomous can 
potentially impose limits on executive action by reviewing executive decisions or actions 
to ensure compliance with the law.
126
 A judiciary that is perceived as such and possesses 
the relevant power may also be able to enhance the impact of its decisions through their 
effective enforcement. It is through the practical enforcement of its decisions that 
restraints are imposed on governmental authorities.
127
 That objective would be difficult to 
achieve where the judiciary has neither the relevant capacity nor the autonomy to prevent 
executive arbitrariness.
128
   
 
In addition, judicial independence has potential to promote impartiality and fairness in 
the adjudication of fundamental rights disputes.
129
 As a guardian of fundamental rights, 
the judiciary should ensure that people are protected from governmental arbitrariness. But 
where such arbitrariness results in violations, the judiciary has the responsibility of 
according a fair and impartial dispute resolution process. That will require at least that 
judges have some degree of autonomy.
130
 A judiciary that is extricated from the control 
of political branches or other parties to a case is less likely to be motivated by political 
considerations or personal interest in deciding disputes. In the absence of such external 
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considerations, a judge can have greater scope to preserve impartiality and fairness by 
basing his/her decisions on the law and the facts to a case.
131
 Consequently, he/she may 
be more assertive in limiting governmental power.
132
 
 
Further, an independent judiciary can promote the empowerment role of 
constitutionalism to the extent that the judiciary is considered as an avenue through 
which citizens can pursue or exercise their fundamental rights.
133
 To understand that 
point, it is relevant to revert to the doctrine of checks and balances. This requires that the 
judiciary is empowered with the relevant conditions to perform its oversight function. 
According to Joseph Raz, these include the accessibility to the courts for litigants.
134
 
Accessibility also entails a prohibition on adverse factors such as undue delays and 
excessive cost which may inhibit people’s capacity to utilize the judiciary as an avenue 
for dispute resolution.
135
 A judiciary that is insulated from the political branches, and is 
empowered, accessible and not plagued by prohibitive costs and delays, has the potential 
to instil confidence in the population.
136
 This confidence can serve as a form of 
empowerment of the population which may now perceive an independent judiciary as a 
credible and accessible institution through which their rights could be effectively 
enforced.
137
  
 
The empowerment role of judicial independence is particularly important in less 
democratic societies where democratic processes and institutions are unavailable as 
alternative or concomitant avenues to hold the government accountable or where they 
exist but are weak and indeed can be used by power wielders as tools to perpetuate 
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fundamental rights violations.
138
 Gretchen Helmke and Francis Rosenbluth have argued 
that in such circumstances an independent judiciary with a commitment to fundamental 
rights protection has potential to compensate for that deficit.
139
  
 
The above suppositions should not be construed as an attempt to undermine the influence 
that personal ideologies and preferences may have on judicial decisions.
140
 These are, 
perhaps, aspects which cannot be dealt with by formal guarantees of independence but do 
not imply that independence is not useful. It is, however, possible to advocate for judicial 
accountability as a mechanism to minimise the incidents of unfavourable outcomes to 
fundamental rights enforcement that may result from such a situation.
141
 The judiciary as 
an important element in the checks and balances system, should be subject to some 
measure of accountability itself to pre-empt the abuse of judicial power. The absence of 
accountability can create scope for reliance on personal ideologies or may foster a culture 
of complacency which may result in inefficiency and unwarranted delays.
142
 Moreover, 
the absence of oversight may give judges free reign to engage in abusive practices such 
as corruption that adversely impact on their impartiality.
143
 By subjecting judges to some 
measure of oversight, judicial accountability has potential to reduce the incidence of an 
errant judiciary that is not responsive to its public duty to administer justice in a fair, 
impartial and consistent manner.
144
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Arguably, accountability is a difficult concept to reconcile with independence. Whilst the 
former has the potential to enhance the judiciary’s ability to promote the objectives 
discussed above, it can also undermine independence. That is so because too much 
accountability can inhibit independence particularly where accountability is to the 
political branches.
145
 That implies that the judiciary depends on the latter for the same 
aspects that are meant to secure their independence. Such a situation places judges at the 
mercy of the political branches and may create various career oriented imperatives for 
them to act partially.
146
 For instance, a judge may be disciplined as a punitive measure for 
failing to protect the interests of the executive or may receive a promotion as recognition 
for a decision which may have unfairly advanced the interests of the executive against the 
victim of a fundamental rights violation. 
 
By and large, an independent judiciary has the potential to contribute to the constitutional 
system for fundamental rights enforcement. Although judges might still be influenced by 
their personal ideologies, independence should still be considered relevant and can be 
complemented by accountability. The latter concept might be controversial, but it is 
feasible that a balance in that relationship can be achieved through institutional design of 
the mechanisms for guaranteeing independence.
 147
   
 
3.2.2. Institutional Design  
 
While a constitution may formally guarantee independence, its enhancement and 
consolidation are influenced by the conditions or strategies adopted to protect judges 
from extraneous influence. These include the method of appointment, terms of service, 
disciplinary mechanisms, remuneration, the internal organisation of the judiciary and 
financial and administrative regulations relating to the judiciary as an institution.
148
 Such 
conditions are important because they are designed to insulate judges particularly from 
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the control of political branches that may seek to influence their decisions.
149
 It requires 
at a minimum that the entire judicial career, from appointment, promotion and discipline 
is based on transparent and objective criteria and overseen by independent institutions.
150
 
The internal organisation of the judiciary should not be structured in such a way as to 
place judges under the unfettered control of hierarchical superiors or indeed external 
parties that can influence the hierarchy.
151
 Additionally, sufficient financial arrangements 
should be made for judges and the judiciary as an institution to promote the independence 
of judges and the judiciary as a whole.
152
  
 
The extent to which the constitution entrenches the conditions is crucial to promoting the 
judiciary’s autonomy and power. In some political systems the constitutional guarantees 
are backed by systems of diffused responsibilities through which a number of institutions 
including executive, legislatures and judicial councils are responsible for appointments, 
promotions, discipline and remuneration of judges.
153
 A key advantage of such an 
approach is that the judicial career is not placed under the control of a single institution. 
As such, judicial independence has greater prospects of being achieved given that it 
involves a number of institutions with shared responsibility rather than one possessing 
overall control. There is scope for the institutions to act collectively to ensure that the 
judiciary is provided with the necessary conditions for its autonomy and power. This is 
the approach adopted by the South African Constitution which involves a number of 
institutions. An example can be perceived from the method of the removal of judges 
which involves Parliament, the executive and the Judicial Service Commission.
154
  
 
The approach adopted by some Francophone African countries with variants of the 
French civil law model places emphasis on the executive who controls the judicial 
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councils and the judicial career.
155
 In Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, the judicial council which is 
responsible for recommending judges for appointments, promotion and discipline to the 
President, is chaired by the same President.
156
  Where responsibility is vested in judicial 
councils, it is possible to expect that judicial independence would be enhanced. But that 
too is predicated on the independence of the council and the powers conferred on it.
157
 
Whereas vesting overall control of the judiciary in the executive in effect makes the 
former accountable to the same institution that should guarantee its independence.
158
 
Such an approach is more precarious for judicial independence as it can provide greater 
scope for the executive to oversee the development of a compliant judiciary as a means of 
advancing its own objectives. Given that the executive unilaterally controls the conditions 
for guaranteeing independence it may use the same to exert pressure on the judiciary or 
control the outcome of decisions from the courts.
159
 As this thesis shall attempt to 
demonstrate, a major obstacle to the development of an independent judiciary in 
Cameroon is the extent to which the executive is vested with powers to control the 
judiciary.  
 
3.3. Judicial Review  
 
The third feature in the current framework of analysis of constitutionalism is judicial 
review of both administrative and legislative acts. They will be discussed separately, 
applying the terminology administrative and constitutional review respectively. There 
will be a greater focus on the latter because it is a more contested feature of 
constitutionalism than the former. According to David Law, ‘A judicial power to declare 
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void the acts of elected legislatures, however, is more controversial’.160 Matters relating 
to institutional design will also be discussed.  
 
3.3.1 (a) Administrative Review  and Fundamental Rights 
 
Administrative review is the process by which courts review executive or administrative 
acts to determine conformity with the law.
161
 It serves at least three interrelated purposes 
with regard to constitutionalism. Firstly, it upholds the checks and balances system, 
secondly, it promotes adherence to the rule of law and lastly, it enhances the protection of 
fundamental rights.
162
 Because some aspects of the first two points were covered above,
 
only the last point will be dealt with here. 
 
The courts are the principal institutions that adjudicate disputes between executive 
officials and citizens.
163
 Because executive officials exercise powers that may affect the 
exercise of fundamental rights, there is potential for abuse where such powers are not 
controlled. Fundamental rights can be protected in that the courts can declare a rights 
infringing act to be unlawful. In that way, it defines the contours of legitimate 
government action. In addition, the courts can make an order for remedies. In certain 
circumstances, the provision of remedies is considered a fundamental right.
164
 That point 
is underscored by some international instruments which regard the provision of effective 
remedies as integral to the substantive rights guaranteed therein.
165
 For instance, the right 
to personal liberty guaranteed under the ICCPR incorporates the rights to habeas corpus 
and compensation for unlawful or arbitrary detention.
166
 The ability of courts to declare 
an action unlawful and to provide remedy is an important aspect of the empowering 
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dimension of constitutionalism. This is so because it creates scope for citizens to assert 
their rights against the executive.  
 
Administrative review is also useful where executive powers are exercised in excess of 
authority. That is particularly important as administrative authorities are sometimes 
granted wide discretionary powers to pursue policy objectives.
167
 Subjecting such powers 
to judicial oversight helps to establish limits on the way they are used by making them 
operate in ways that do not undermine fundamental rights.
168
  
 
3.3.1(b) Constitutional Review and Fundamental Rights 
 
Constitutional review can be referred to as the mechanism through which courts interpret 
legislative enactments to determine conformity with the constitution.  Its potential to 
enhance the protection of fundamental rights are discussed below. 
 
Constitutional review serves as an oversight mechanism to ensure that legislative powers 
are not exercised arbitrarily to undermine fundamental rights. As history has 
demonstrated, legislative power if left unchecked can produce tyranny against the 
population.
169
 This was formerly the case in South Africa where apartheid was 
institutionally legalised through legislative enactments.  Constitutional review can pre-
empt the application of such legislation and ensure that they are constructed in 
accordance with the constitution. By so doing, the constitution is reinforced as the 
reference point for governmental action. Given the central role of the constitution in 
articulating fundamental rights commitments and regulating governmental power to that 
effect, it is important that some mechanism exists to ensure that the constitution is fully 
implemented.
170
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Constitutional review can also promote the adaptability of legislation to reflect evolving 
conceptions of fundamental rights.
171
 Fundamental rights concepts are not static and do 
evolve to respond to changing social circumstances which may affect the nature and 
scope of various rights provisions. If constitutionalism is understood partly as concerned 
with the organisation of governmental power, it implies that that organisation should 
adapt to changing circumstances to guarantee continued protection of rights. 
Constitutional review can serve as a catalyst enabling individuals or the population to 
initiate that change and legislatures to respond to the demand for change.
172
  
 
Constitutional review can also empower individuals to have a more influential role on the 
legislative process. People can then be more assertive in demanding better protection of 
their constitutional rights especially when changing circumstances necessitate a change in 
the law or where some rights have been under-protected. As Keith Whittington suggests, 
the nature of politics is such that legislators may be more driven by the will to retain 
power or by other issues which provide fewer incentives to focus on civil liberties 
concerns.
173
 As such, there may be an outcry from the population for law reform to 
improve on the protection of rights but the legislature has not done so or has failed to do 
so sufficiently with the effect that rights are being infringed. The availability of 
constitutional review in such circumstances provides scope for people to use the courts to 
challenge such infringing statutes and by so doing possibly triggering legislative 
reform.
174
  
 
Although constitutional review has increasingly gained prominence as a feature of 
constitutionalism, it has been challenged on the basis of its democratic legitimacy in a 
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democratic society.
175
 Jeremy Waldron for one has argued that constitutional review may 
not be necessary in a democratic society where rights are respected and the judiciary and 
other democratic institutions are well functioning.
176
 He asserts that, by taking 
democratic decisions away from elected representatives and vesting in the courts, it strips 
the people of their rights to participate in the democratic process.
177
 Those concerns are 
of course salient in the American system where the constitution does not expressly 
provide for constitutional review and the Supreme Court which has final jurisdiction in 
review matters, is composed of unelected judges.
178
 Nevertheless, as Annabel Lever 
argues, judges can gain popular legitimacy by representing the democratic aspirations of 
the society through their actions and deliberations.
179
 Besides, the legitimacy of 
constitutional review can be inferred from popular support and the objective that it seeks 
to achieve. Assuming as Waldron does that there is popular support for the protection of 
fundamental rights,
180
 then it is possible to presume that a mechanism geared at 
enhancing their protection would receive support from the population. Popular support 
can then provide the legitimacy that sceptics deem to be absent.
181
 
 
Despite legitimacy concerns, constitutional review even in democracies has the potential 
to reinforce the protection framework. It can serve as an additional avenue through which 
citizens can be more assertive in demanding better protection.
182
 Legislation may cause 
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great injustices and facilitate violations of fundamental rights of individuals who would 
have to wait for an amendment initiated by parliament, however long it takes. By 
contrast, constitutional review can allow such individuals with genuine concerns to 
trigger the process of amendment.
183
 Recent developments in the constitutional review 
systems in France and Britain (the bastions of parliamentary supremacy) suggest that, it 
can function as an additional protection mechanism.
184
 France for one has embraced ex-
post constitutional review
185
 with individuals guaranteed access by being able to raise 
issues of constitutionality during ordinary litigation.
186
 
 
In constitutional systems where constitutional review is expressly provided for, concerns 
about the best ways of achieving its objectives are more important.
187
 In most European 
constitutional systems, domestic constitutions or international instruments expressly 
provide for constitutional review, as such legitimacy concerns are not pervasive.
188
 In less 
advanced democracies the ideal of constitutional review as a mechanism for rights 
protection is compelling.
189
 Waldron, despite his scepticism suggests that it can be 
supported in certain circumstances such as ‘peculiar pathologies, dysfunctional legislative 
institutions, corrupt political cultures, legacies of racism and other forms of endemic 
prejudice’.190 Such circumstances are prevalent in sub-Saharan African countries where 
the political systems are not as advanced or well ordered as Western democracies and the 
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democratic processes cannot even be considered as having the potential to regulate 
themselves. Under those conditions, it is arguable that there is need for an alternative 
mechanism to regulate the extent to which legislatures articulate the fundamental rights 
concerns of their societies. Indeed Charles Fombad argues that deficient democratic 
processes have become one of the most significant causes of democratic paralysis in 
Africa and have provided avenues for the perpetuation of unjustified domination by 
incumbent political leaders.
191
 According to Fombad, the position is made more 
untenable by the absence of efficient oversight mechanisms on the legislature particularly 
in some Francophone African countries where constitutional review is almost non-
existent due to its deficient institutional design.
192
 The existence of an effective judicial 
review mechanism provides optimism that its potential benefits can help to nurture and 
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights.
193
  
 
3.3.2. Institutional Design  
 
As with the separation of powers and judicial independence, the institutional 
configuration adopted for review should have the potential to enhance the realisation of 
fundamental rights. There are at least three issues that are worthy of note here - the form 
of review, access, and the structure of the institution vested with powers of review.  
 
With regard to constitutional review, there are various forms ranging from weak to strong 
and abstract a priori (ex-ante) to ex-post review. In a system of weak form, a court can 
make a declaration to the effect that a statute is incompatible with fundamental rights 
provisions but the court will not decline to apply it. Variants of this are practiced in 
Britain, Canada and New Zealand.
194
 On the other hand, with strong form review as 
practiced in the U.S.A., the court’s decision on unconstitutionality is conclusive and leads 
to the invalidation of the law. As a result, the statute will not apply to the case being 
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heard in the court. Both forms are also variants of ex-post review given that they operate 
after a statute has been promulgated.  With a priori review, however, which operated in 
France prior to 2008, the constitutionality of a statute is determined in the absence of a 
concrete case and only prior to the promulgation of the statute.
195
  
 
It is again difficult to be prescriptive in the abstract about the approach that any society 
should adopt. That notwithstanding, it is more than arguable and in line with the view of 
constitutionalism generally advanced in this thesis that the overriding concerns guarding 
choices should be the positive impact that any approach is likely to have on the protection 
of fundamental rights given the salient conditions (political, legal, social, etc) of the 
society. For instance, in less democratic societies with ‘peculiar pathologies’ a more 
robust and affirmative approach is desirable rather than a weak form. The public may 
have a strong commitment to the protection of CPR but any reaction to rights infringing 
laws may not elicit any or sufficient response from their elected representative. 
Moreover, a declaration of incompatibility which depends on the goodwill of an 
executive official or the same unresponsive legislative representatives is almost as good 
as the status quo. A system based on a priori review is even less protective and in a way 
worse than a complete absence. That is so because a statute which by its application 
facilitates violation of CPR will continue to apply given that its constitutionality cannot 
be challenged once it has been promulgated. As will be demonstrated in the case of 
Cameroon, the a priori form of review constitutes one of the major challenges to the 
realisation of CPR. Given that the constitutionality of legislation cannot be invoked after 
its promulgation, it has been possible for legislation infringing some CPR to be applied. 
 
Regarding access, in both administrative and constitutional review, as earlier mentioned 
it is an important means of empowering people to use the courts to assert their rights.
196
 
With constitutional review in particular, some systems are designed to specifically restrict 
individual access to the courts. Such a restriction undermines the rule of law.
197
 It also 
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deprives the ordinary citizen of the ability to engage more assertively with the legislative 
process to enhance the enactment of progressive fundamental rights legislation. 
 
Another key aspect regarding institutional design is judicial independence, as the 
judiciary cannot perform review effectively if it is subject to executive or legislative 
constrains. The conception of empowerment and autonomy here follows the basic 
presumptions discussed above with regard to judicial independence.
198
 Thus, the method 
of selection of judges, their tenure, terms and conditions of service need to operate in a 
way that guarantees their autonomy and power.
199
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has proposed the concept of constitutionalism presenting it as one 
possessing instrumental value for protecting and enhancing fundamental rights. The 
constitution is central here, establishing and defining amongst other things, fundamental 
rights commitments and their method of enforcement, governmental powers and the 
contours of legitimate governmental action. In addition, it was argued that constitutional 
engineering should take into account the specific dynamics of the context in which a 
constitution is to operate. Constitutionalism being a system of organisation of power 
structures, allows scope for such contextualisation. It provides for basic principles (which 
have universal value) to guide such arrangements but in putting those arrangements into 
place, constitutionalism becomes a living reality when the arrangements are relevant to 
the context and are sufficiently robust. Should a constitution fail to adequately reflect 
those considerations, it is likely to produce enforcement machinery inadequate for the 
realisation of fundamental rights. 
 
The chapter also presented an analytical framework which will be applied as a template 
for assessing the practise of constitutionalism in Cameroon. The framework broadly 
outlined some considerations that are relevant for the development of institutional 
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features of constitutionalism. While recognising that institutional designs should be 
tailored to the specific context, it is submitted that they should be guided by the basic 
tenets of constitutionalism advocated here.  
 
The following chapters will analyse in more detail constitutional arrangements in 
Cameroon and their influence on CPR. That analysis begins with a discussion of its 
constitutional evolution. 
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Chapter 2  
The Colonial Legacy and the Constitutional Evolution of Cameroon 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter charts the constitutional evolution of Cameroon from the period of colonial 
administration to independence and immediate post independence. It attempts to explain 
how and why having been bequeathed with the British and French colonial legacies, the 
latter today is the predominant system. It will also attempt to explain how in the process 
of constitutional evolution customary law and indigenous institutions were progressively 
subordinated. The aim is to provide the background within which the current approach to 
constitutionalism and CPR enforcement can be understood.  
 
The chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which provides a very brief 
background to the advent of British and French colonial administration. Section two 
discusses some aspects relating to British and French colonial governance and CPR. In 
section three, a comparative analysis of the British and French colonial constitutional 
legacy is carried out. This analysis aims to draw attention to the differences in the 
approach to constitutionalism and underscore the point that some of the features of the 
British colonial legacy potentially provide a more conducive foundation for CPR 
enforcement.
1
 Section four charts the post-independence constitutional developments in 
1961 and 1972 within the framework for constitutionalism developed in Chapter 1. It will 
demonstrate how the French constitutional legacy became entrenched and how the British 
legacy and indigenous features were subsequently relegated. That section also provides a 
prelude to the adoption of the 1996 Constitution which will be examined in detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
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 59 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
The Germans were the first European powers to establish colonial administration in 
Cameroon from 1884 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Following their 
defeat in the War, an Anglo-French Condominium was set up from 1914-1916 and they 
were eventually expelled from Cameroon in February 1916.
2
 Cameroon was 
subsequently divided unequally between France and Britain with Britain gaining control 
of two non-contiguous sections of the territory which later became known as Northern 
and Southern Cameroons, while France took portions constituting about ninety percent of 
the territory.
3
 In June 1919 the Treaty of Versailles established a mandates system to 
place conquered colonies under international administration.
4
 Cameroon was brought 
under that system and from 1922 it was administered by France and Britain as a 
mandated territory of the League of Nations until 1945 when the mandates were replaced 
by trusteeship agreements under the auspices of the United Nations.
5
 France and Britain 
proceeded to administer their territories according to their respective policies from that 
point until independence was granted in 1960 and 1961 respectively.
6
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2. RECEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL LAW IN CAMEROON 
 
In Cameroon as elsewhere in colonial Africa, France and Britain adopted a civil law or 
common law systems in their respective sections of the territory. The basis of that 
transplantation was initially Article 9 of the League of Nations Mandate Agreement with 
France
7
  and Britain
8
 which gave these colonial powers authority to pursue administration 
and legislation in accordance with their laws contingent on modifications to 
accommodate local conditions. Subsequently, that provision was replaced by article 4 of 
the Trusteeship Agreement with France and Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement with 
Britain when Cameroon became a Trust Territory.
9
 Article 5 (a) relating to Britain 
provided that Britain shall have ‘full powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction 
in the Territory’ to be administered in accordance with its laws subject to modifications 
necessitated by local conditions and subject to the United Nations Charter and the present 
Trusteeship Agreement. Article 4(1) of the Agreement relating to France was similarly 
worded except that it did not require French law to be modified to accommodate local 
conditions. The experiences in both the French and British territories are considered 
separately below. 
 
2.1. Law and Constitutional Politics in French Cameroon under French Colonial 
Administration. 
 
The delegation of legislative powers over French Cameroon to France led to the 
transplantation of French civil law through the use of reception statutes. A Decree of 
1924 made applicable laws and decrees promulgated in French Equatorial Africa prior to 
1 January 1924,
10
 which consisted of legislation transplanted from metropolitan France. 
The rest of the colonial era witnessed further enactment of decrees specifically applicable 
to French Cameroon and also legislation already enforced in France.
11
 Notwithstanding 
                                                 
7
  Mandate for the Administration of Part of the Former German Territory of the Cameroons Conferred 
upon the Government of the French Republic, Confirmed and defined by the Council of the League of 
Nations. London, 20 July 1922. Reproduced in Rubin (n 2) Appendix 1, 196-198. 
8
 British Mandate for the Cameroons, 20 July 1922. Reproduced in Rubin (n 2) Appendix II, 199-203. 
9
 See (n 5). 
10
 Decree of 22 May 1924, art 10 cited in Salacuse (n 3) 29. 
11
 Salacuse  (n 3) 31. 
 61 
the transplantation of French laws, customary law was preserved although its influence 
was considerably diminished. It only applied insofar as it was not repugnant to public 
policy (ordre public) and its jurisdiction was limited to the indigenous population that 
had not acquired French citizenship.
12
 
 
The French colonial administrative landscape consisted of a civil commissioner at the 
helm and supported by regional and district administrators and an advisory body known 
as the Conseil d’Administration.13 There was no distinct separation of powers as the 
administrators exercised executive and judicial powers concurrently. By 1925 in a bid to 
incorporate indigenous populations into the administrative network, a Conseil de 
Notables composed of local chiefs, was created in each district.
14
 That institution was 
firmly controlled by the French authorities who proceeded to alter the chieftaincy system 
by creating artificial chiefs amenable to colonial manipulations.
15
 In addition, 
adjudicatory powers previously exercised by local chiefs were dispensed with and the 
chiefs were vested with powers of conciliation in civil matters, although they could also 
give advisory opinions to French administrators in criminal matters.
16
 In this way, the 
French developed a system which ensured the erosion of local authority and the firm 
establishment of French rule.
17
 It also added to the mistrust of traditional chieftaincy 
institutions by indigenous populations who regarded the chiefs as tools of the colonial 
administration.
18
  
 
The judicial system (consisting of courts with jurisdiction over persons of French origin 
and indigenes) was considered an administrative body under the French Ministry of 
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Justice and Ministry of State in Charge of relations with Associate States.
19
 Their 
administration at the territorial level was overseen by the Conseil Supérieur de la 
Magistrature (CSM), which was also responsible for discipline and independence of 
judges.
20
 Nevertheless, the judges did not benefit from a guarantee of security of tenure.
21
 
Judicial independence was also undermined through the control exerted by administrative 
authorities in the courts, particularly those with jurisdiction over natives. The 
Commissioner was responsible for appointment and dismissal of judges and could 
transfer cases between courts.
22
 District administrators supervised, controlled and 
presided over native courts.
23
 They also had powers to authorise execution of judgements, 
receive appeals from judgments delivered by other native courts and record depositions 
from native witnesses.
24
 The powers granted to judicial courts did not extend to review of 
administrative acts. The institution with jurisdiction in such matters was the Conseil du 
Contentieux, an administrative rather than a judicial body.
25
 
 
As elsewhere in French West and Equatorial Africa, France instituted the policy of 
assimilation in French Cameroon. In pursuance of its mission civilisatrice
26
 France 
sought to transform the indigenous population into French citizens through the adoption 
of French culture, language and education.
27
 Through that policy, the French perpetuated 
a system of inequality and discrimination. For instance, prior to 1946, citoyens 
(assimilated indigenes) had some CPR accorded persons of French origin.
28
 The system 
of justice applicable to them was identical to that applied in Metropolitan France in terms 
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of the courts as well as the penal and criminal procedure codes.
29
 On the other hand the 
sujets (unassimilated indigenes) were subjected to the repressive policy of indégenat.
30
  
 
Through its application, the indégenat undermined any idea of limitation of governmental 
power as it placed considerable discretionary and unrestrained powers in the 
administrative officials.
31
 They had authority to impose extrajudicial disciplinary 
sanctions for a wide range of loosely defined offences.
32
 It also made it possible for the 
French to continue the German Policy of forced labour under harsh conditions which the 
French termed the covée and another form of forced labour known as prestation.
33
 Under 
prestation the natives (males) were obliged to furnish compulsory labour of ten days in a 
year without remuneration. The indégenat was used to punish workers who deserted or 
farmers who failed to grow items required of them.
34
 The labour policies violated the 
terms of article 4(3) of the Mandate Agreement which required the prohibition of forced 
or compulsory labour. Subsequently, following concerns raised by the Permanent 
Mandates Commission
35
 the French administration passed a law instituting a 
commutation of two francs for a day of work but this was done infrequently.
36
 So, forced 
labour persisted, prompting a large number of indigenes to escape to British Cameroons 
and Rio Muni.
37
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The indégenat had portentous repercussions for other CPR of the indigenous population, 
including freedom of expression, movement and association.
38
 Some offences created 
under the indégenat were the offences of circulation of rumours which were likely to 
disturb public order and seditious utterances.
39
 Because the offences in the indégenat 
were loosely defined, it was not clear what statements could be considered seditious or 
inimical to public order.
40
 Further, to ensure a constant supply of labour, a Decree of 
1925 was promulgated which prohibited the emigration of Cameroonians without prior 
authorisation from the Commissioner or an authorised district head.
41
 Women were 
generally forbidden from emigrating from the territory. The French administration 
defended this policy by arguing that it was to prevent illegal trafficking in women.
42
 In 
1936, a further circular directed the administration to forbid indigenes from leaving the 
territory if they had signed a labour contract with a French employer.
43
 
 
In addition, the indégenat prevented the participation of indigenes in political activity and 
in any case there were no local institutions which would have provided that opportunity.
44
 
The administration did not permit the formation of political associations until the 1930s 
when it approved the formation of Union Camerounaise and Jeunesse Camerounaise 
Francaise (JEUCAFRA) in 1937 and 1938 respectively.
45
 The administration’s 
unwillingness to tolerate political opposition was evident in the fact that the above 
associations were quasi-political associations which were adherents to French rule and 
propagated the integration of French Cameroon into the French Union.
46
 However, two 
watersheds transformed the legal and political situation. 
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The first was the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 held at the instance of General de 
Gaulle to improve Franco-African relations.
47
  Resolutions passed at the Conference saw 
the abolition of the indégenat across French colonial Africa
48
 and the institution of 
universal application of the French criminal justice.
49
 Citoyens were accorded voting 
rights and in 1951 universal suffrage was extended to non-assimilated indigenes.
50
 A 
Representative Assembly (hereafter ARCAM) was also created for Cameroon but it 
remained accountable to the French Conseil d’Etat which had to veto all its decisions.51 
Trade unions were legalised in 1944 and from then on political associations 
proliferated.
52
 Nevertheless political activity was restricted and the administration did not 
hesitate to crack down on those organisations that propagated nationalist views.
 53
 One of 
such associations which came into frequent conflicts with the administration was the 
Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) which advocated for complete independence 
for French Cameroon and reunification with Southern (British) Cameroons.
54
 The 
administration reacted by issuing emergency decrees which curtailed the activities of the 
UPC and its members were frequently arrested, detained and tortured.
55
 Following 
prolonged violent altercation with the administration, the UPC was banned and some of 
its members sought refuge in British Cameroons.
56
 
 
The second watershed was in June 1956 when the French Assembly passed the Loi 
Cadres revolutionising colonial administration in French Africa. In Cameroon, the 
Territorial Assembly was accorded more powers over territorial affairs although France 
retained authority over such aspects as defence, civil liberties and education.
57
 Moreover 
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provision was made for internal self-government. Legislative elections were held in 
December 1956 and, in 1957, Andre Marie Mbida was appointed the first Premier of 
French Cameroon. Meanwhile, the exiled UPC continued to instigate opposition and 
violence from behind the scenes.
58
 Mbida’s regime soon fell into disrepute with the 
indigenous population due to its brutal response to the UPC and his reluctance to endorse 
a programme for eventual independence.
59
 Mbida’s intolerance to opposition was 
illustrated by the arrest and detention of the editor of L’Opinion au Cameroun, for 
publishing articles highly critical of his regime and reminiscent of UPC rhetoric.
60
 Owing 
to immense unpopularity, Mbida was forced to resign in February 1958 paving the way 
for Amadou Ahidjo to be appointed Premier.
61
 It was in that climate of hostility and 
violence that Ahidjo led French Cameroon to independence in January 1960. Its first 
Constitution was adopted in October 1960.
62
 Before discussing the relevant provisions of 
that Constitution, the position of Southern Cameroons under British colonial 
administration will be considered.
63
 
 
 
2.2. Law and Constitutional Politics in Southern Cameroons under British Colonial 
Administration 
 
Southern Cameroons was administered as part of the neighbouring British colony of 
Nigeria.
64
 That arrangement was prompted by financial and geographical reasons.
65
 It 
was endorsed by article 9 of the Mandate Agreement
66
 which provided inter alia that 
Britain could constitute the territory (Cameroons) into an administrative union or 
federation with its adjacent territories. 
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The laws applicable in Southern Cameroons consisted of the common law, doctrines of 
equity and the statutes of general application which were in force in England on 01 
January 1900.
67
 In addition, in 1924 the Nigerian Legal System was extended to Southern 
Cameroons as a result of which some of its statutes and ordinances became applicable.
68
 
Similar to the French approach, customary law was retained to the extent that it passed 
the repugnancy test.
69
 Again, it applied exclusively to the native population and had 
jurisdiction predominantly over private aspects such as land, marriage, divorce and 
inheritance.
70
 Customary law also had limited jurisdiction in criminal matters were the 
penalties did not exceed six months imprisonment or a fine of £10.
71
 
 
With regards to the administration of justice, the British did not have the two-tier system 
that differentiated between the assimilated and unassimilated indigenes in French 
Cameroon. All indigenes were subject to common law oriented criminal and penal 
procedures and locally enacted legislation. There were also provincial courts in Nigeria 
which had jurisdiction over indigenes and non-indigenes subject to certain limitations.
72
 
This did not, however, preclude discriminatory and arbitrary practices against the 
indigenous populations. For instance, the provincial courts had jurisdiction to impose 
lashes as penalties for some offences.
73
 Further, the German policy of forced labour was 
initially retained although it was abolished due in part to high death rates and the self-
motivation of the indigenes who required no compulsion to work.
74
 Labour became 
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voluntary and conditions were considerably improved, attracting migrant workers from 
Nigeria and French Cameroon.
75
  
 
In Southern Cameroons as elsewhere in British colonial Africa, the system of 
administration applicable was indirect rule. This system was characterised by the use of 
traditional authority (chiefs and fons)
76
 as instruments through which the local British 
administrators implemented their policies.
77
 At the helm of the territorial administration 
of Southern Cameroons was the Governor-General of Nigeria who was responsible for 
(amongst others) governance, administration of justice, revenue and maintenance of law 
and order.
78
 The territory was divided into administrative divisions headed by a Resident, 
below whom were Divisional Officers and District Officers. The administration was 
represented at the local levels by chiefs or fons.
79
 The policy of indirect rule worked 
better in the ‘Grassfield’80 regions of Southern Cameroons which already had centralised 
authorities.
81
 Indirect rule was not particularly ideal in the forest regions which were 
loosely organised and the British authorities sometimes had to raise artificial chiefs or use 
former ‘German created chiefs’ where none was immediately apparent.82 As a result, 
some of the artificial chiefs were rejected by the indigenous population.
83
 The native 
authorities had responsibility for the efficient running of the administration in their 
jurisdiction, particularly with respect to the maintenance of law and order, collection of 
taxes and the provision of elementary health and education facilities.
84
 In spite of the 
powers given to native authorities, the administration enacted stringent laws like the 
Deposed Chief Removal Ordinance of 1929 to deal with uncooperative chiefs. That law 
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authorised the governor to order a deposed chief to leave his area of jurisdiction or any 
other parts of the territory within a specific time.
85
 Failure to comply with the order 
resulted in the incarceration of the deposed chief.
86
 That law became an effective 
mechanism for consolidating colonial administration as the governor’s orders were not 
subject to appeal.
87
 
 
During the colonial era, the practice of separation or limitation of governmental powers 
was uncommon. Administrative officials such as the Resident and Divisional Officers 
presided over provincial courts.
88
 The Governor, the highest administrative official, was 
given ‘reserve power of legislation’ by certification.89 This implied that, if the Legislative 
Council failed to pass a Bill or Motion, the Governor could still declare that it had effect 
if he considered it expedient or in the interest of public order or good governance.
90
 
However, he was required to inform the British government immediately that power was 
used and provide reasons for his decision.
91
 Again, a member of the Council could raise 
an objection to the Governor’s decision which had to be reported to the Secretary of 
State.
92
 Nevertheless, that did not diminish the discretionary nature of the power as the 
safeguards were not always sufficient to prevent abuse. Moreover, the Governor was 
vested with other excessive powers such as powers to dismiss African members in the 
administration and powers to dethrone traditional chiefs.
93
  In fact, the colonial 
administration was fiercely criticised by Nigerian and Southern Cameroonian politicians 
who staged massive campaigns to protest against (amongst others) the discretionary 
administrative powers.
94
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The conditions for securing judicial independence were not ideal as seen above with the 
concurrent exercise of administrative and judicial powers by executive officials. 
Moreover, the Chief Justice who was head of the colonial judiciary together with puisne 
judges and magistrates held office during ‘Her Majesty’s pleasure’.95 However, Carlson 
Anyangwe states that some measure of judicial independence could be envisaged.
96
 The 
Chief justice for instance had scope for independence given that he was neither a member 
of the executive nor the legislature. Further, although he was appointed by the Governor, 
his appointment was contingent upon consultation with and affirmation by the Colonial 
Secretary.
97
 With regard to other judges, their appointment was also contingent on 
recommendation by the Chief Justice and consultation with the Colonial Secretary.
98
  
 
In terms of rights, Southern Cameroonians were accorded some CPR, albeit very 
circumscribed. For instance, although the indigenous population was represented in the 
Legislative Council, they were vested with no more than advisory status.
99
 Political 
organisations were permitted, although Nigeria was more politically advanced than 
Southern Cameroons.
100
 The colonial administration while allowing a degree of political 
freedom was cautious not to allow the propagation of extremist nationalist views which 
had the potential of provoking violent outbursts.
101
 Colonial responses to nationalist 
activities were often in the form of press censorship, imposition of heavy libel fines
102
 
and banning of press organisations.
103
 A host of legislations were enacted for those 
purposes.
104
 The Seditious Offences Act of 1909 criminalised the circulation of 
statements or rumours which had the potential to inhibit the performance of a colonial 
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officer’s duties.105 This was an attempt to protect them from criticism which had begun to 
cause the colonial administration concerns about public security.
106
  
 
Politically, Southern Cameroons was largely uneventful until after 1940.
107
 Its status as 
part of Nigeria meant that Britain’s administrative focus was largely on Nigeria. Until 
1940 the territory had no representative in the Nigerian Legislative Council (NLC) which 
catered for Nigeria and the Cameroons.
108
 In 1939 a trade union organisation, the 
Cameroon Welfare Union (CWU) successfully petitioned the colonial authorities 
demanding Southern Cameroons representation in the NLC.
109
 Consequently, in 1940 
Chief Manga Williams and the senior colonial administrative authority in Southern 
Cameroons were appointed as the territory’s representatives in the NLC.110  Subsequently 
in 1946 when Southern Cameroons became a trust territory of the United Nations, a new 
constitution, the Richard’s Constitution, was drafted for Nigeria and the Cameroons. This 
improved Southern Cameroons position within Nigerian political administration.
111
 The 
Constitution divided Nigeria into three regions, incorporating Southern Cameroons 
administratively into the Eastern Region with increased representation in the Eastern 
Regional House of Assembly.
112
 However, it did not prevent financial and administrative 
subordination of Southern Cameroons which prompted the latter’s politicians to continue 
to press for autonomous status.
113
 In 1954 Southern Cameroons was granted quasi-federal 
status with a Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council but continued to be linked 
to the Nigerian Federal Legislature and administration.
114
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In 1960 Nigeria gained independence as a result of which Southern Cameroons was 
administratively separated from it.
115
 A Constitution, the Southern Cameroons 
(Constitution) Order-in-Council 1960 was also adopted to govern it until 
independence.
116
 Another consequence was the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from 
Southern Cameroons which had relied solely on Nigeria for military assistance. This was 
of great concern to the British due to the breakdown of law and order in the neighbouring 
newly independent République du Cameroun (hereafter La République).
117
 Ahidjo’s 
brutal response to political opposition led to a state of anarchy in La République which 
the British feared would spread to Southern Cameroons. With Nigeria now fully 
independent, Britain’s attention turned to the future of the Cameroons. In Southern 
Cameroons, the leaders were undecided about their aspirations for the future of the 
territory.
118
 While the Premier was in favour of continued trusteeship until such a time as 
Southern Cameroons would be ready for independence and possibly reunification with La 
République, the leader of the opposition pressed for integration with Nigeria.
119
 Prior to 
1959, Britain was in fact prepared to continue the trusteeship for another five years as 
requested by the Premier of Southern Cameroons.
120
 It even gave consideration to the fact 
that all possible alternatives be explored including integration of Northern and Southern 
Cameroons to form a single entity.
121
 This position changed following the publication of 
the Philipson Financial Report commissioned by the Southern Cameroons’ 
government.
122
 That report revealed that Southern Cameroons would not be economically 
viable, hence could not operate on its own without assistance
123
 to which the British were 
not inclined to commit.
124
 For those reasons the option of continued trusteeship was 
frustrated. Although Britain insisted that the consequences of the different options for 
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independence be explained fully to the electorate, it maintained that the United Nations 
(UN) alone had the mandate to decide which options were to be presented to the 
electorate.
125
 The UN thus resolved that Southern Cameroons could only gain 
independence by integrating with Nigeria or the newly independent République du 
Camroun.
126
 Faced with these choices in a UN conducted plebiscite in February 1961, 
Southern Cameroonians voted to gain independence through reunification with La 
République.
127
 In October 1961, the two territories were formally reunited to form the 
Federal Republic of Cameroon. This marked the beginning of Cameroon’s post-
independence constitutional evolution. 
 
Before examining the constitutional developments after 1961, it will be helpful at this 
stage to discuss the constitutional legacy in both Southern Cameroons and La République 
du Cameroun prior to 1961.
128
  
 
 
3. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE BRITISH AND FRENCH 
COLONIAL LEGACY IN CAMEROON. 
 
This section will examine substantive provisions of the Southern Cameroons Constitution 
(SCOC)
 129
 and the Constitution of La République du Cameroun (CLRC).
 130
 The analysis 
will be based on the framework of constitutionalism outlined in Chapter 1, captured 
under four headings; CPR, separation of powers and checks and balances, judicial 
independence and judicial review. 
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3.1. Civil and Political Rights 
 
The two Constitutions were similar to the extent that they recognised and guaranteed a 
plethora of CPR. These included the rights to life, personal liberty and security, private 
and family life, assembly and association, freedom of conscience and movement and 
freedoms from torture and inhumane treatment and discrimination.
131
 The Constitution of 
La République went further to affirm its attachment to the fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.
132
 However, there were material differences with regards to the substantive 
provisions. In the Constitution of La République CPR were stated in very broad terms in 
the Preamble. Moreover, the Preamble was not an integral part of the Constitution 
therefore the justiciability of CPR was uncertain.
133
 Not unexpectedly, as is the case with 
the French Constitution,
134
 the Constitution of La République specifically entrenched the 
right to personal liberty and entrusted the judiciary as ‘guardian’ of personal liberty with 
the duty to ensure the respect of that right pursuant to conditions provided by law.
135
 On 
the other hand, a distinctive feature of the Southern Cameroons Constitution was the 
entrenchment of CPR.
136
 They were specifically enumerated in elaborate form and their 
provisions followed closely international standards.
137
 
 
3.2. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 
 
The two Constitutions were also similar to the extent that they reflected the tripartite 
division of governmental power between the executive, legislature and the judiciary. 
Beyond that, there were fundamental differences in the nature of separation, the scope of 
their authority and the method of their accountability.  
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In La République there was a distinct separation of powers between the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary. The Constitution created a semi-presidential system (in line 
with what existed in France) headed by the President as Head of State and Prime Minister 
(PM) as Head of Government.
138
 It thus created an additional level of separation of 
executive power. Appointed by the President,
139
 the PM was responsible for the 
implementation of government policy, exercised regulatory powers and controlled the 
enforcement of laws, regulations and judicial decisions.
140
 The President however, was 
vested with greater powers than the PM. The former was vested with law making powers 
in the areas which did not specifically fall under the jurisdiction of the legislature.
141
 He 
was responsible for the promulgation of organic laws, appointment of government 
officials and military personnel as well as being commander in chief of the army.
142
 He 
was also vested with powers to declare states of siege or emergencies and to rule during 
those periods of exception single handed except that prior to the declaration of a state of 
siege, he was required to consult Parliament.
143
 
 
Although both the executive and the legislature were recognised in the Constitution as 
‘governmental powers’,144 the legislature seemed to have been undermined by the 
circumscription of its legislative capacity. Thus, Parliament was vested with powers to 
make laws in areas specifically enumerated in the Constitution. These included 
fundamental rights, the civil and criminal system, civic duties of citizens, civil status, 
nationality, the property regime and organisation of the political, administrative, 
financial, economic, judicial and educational system.
145
 Beyond these areas, the President 
reserved powers to legislate by decree or ordinance.
146
 Moreover, the PM could legislate 
by ordinances in those areas reserved to the legislature after acquiring the President’s 
                                                 
138
 CLRC, arts 11 & 21. 
139
 CLRC, art 14. 
140
 CLRC, arts 21, 22 & 25. 
141
 CLRC, art 24. 
142
 CLRC, arts 14, 15, 16,  17, 34 
143
 CLRC, art 20. 
144
 Indicating that both were co-equal as opposed to the judiciary which was referred to as an authority. See 
below, Section 3.3.  
145
 CLRC, art 23. 
146
 CLRC, art 24. 
 76 
consent and authorisation from Parliament, where such regulations were necessary for the 
fulfilment of government policies.
147
  
 
In terms of accountability, both government and Parliament could be held accountable.
148
 
In case of disagreement between Parliament and the government arising from a motion of 
censure or a vote of no confidence the government was dissolved as of right and the 
President was vested with powers to dissolve Parliament.
149
 The Constitution however 
did not provide any mechanism for the mutual accountability of the President. 
 
In Southern Cameroons, the Constitution created a complex parliamentary system of 
government with a bicameral legislature comprising of a House of Assembly and a House 
of Chiefs, a Premier, a Cabinet, an Executive Council
150
 and a Commissioner, 
representing Her Majesty.
151
 There was no distinct separation of executive and legislative 
powers. The Premier, Cabinet and Executive Council which exercised executive powers 
were also part of the legislature. The Premier and Cabinet were appointed from the House 
of Assembly
152
 while the Executive Council was composed of the Cabinet, the Deputy 
Commissioner, the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary.
153
 The last three 
officials were also ex-officio members of the House of Assembly.
154
 While the 
Constitution granted specific legislative and executive powers to the corresponding 
institutions, the nature of their composition implied that executive and legislative powers 
to an extent were exercised by the same personalities. It may be argued for instance that 
in the case of the National Assembly, the elected twenty six members
155
 who formed the 
majority of its membership pre-empted usurpation of powers by the executive. 
Nevertheless, such complex institutional arrangements may not have been ideal in the 
Southern Cameroons context which at the time had little experience in self- governance.  
                                                 
147
 CLRC, art 25. 
148
 CLRC, art 35. 
149
 CLRC, art 36. 
150
 The Executive Council was composed of the Cabinet, the Deputy Commissioner, the Attorney General 
and the Financial Secretary. See SCOC, s 34(2)(a)(b). 
151
 SCOC, s 2 
152
 SCOC, s 33(2)(3). 
153
 SCOC, s 34(2)(a)(b). 
154
 SCOC, s 7(2) (a). 
155
 SCOC, s 7(2)(b) 
 77 
The most controversial figure was the Commissioner who was vested with discretionary 
powers to (amongst others) dissolve Parliament by proclamation,
156
 appoint the 
Premier
157
 and his ministers (acting in accordance with the advice of the Premier),
158
 
convene and preside at Executive Council meetings.
159
 He also had powers to make 
decisions on matters within his authority where in his judgment an urgent action was 
required or Her Majesty’s service would sustain material prejudice.160 The Commissioner 
exercised reserved legislative authority to declare enforceable any bill which was not 
passed by Parliament where he deemed that necessary in the interest of public policy, 
public faith and good governance.
161
 He was also vested with powers to make laws for 
the peace, order and good government in any matter with respect to which the Federal 
Legislature of Nigeria had jurisdiction prior to 1960 or with regard to the application in 
Southern Cameroons of any treaty, convention, agreement or decision between Her 
Majesty’s Government and any other government or international organisation.162 
 
The Constitution nevertheless attempted to provide some measure of accountability. A 
bill passed by Parliament could not become law until assented to by the Commissioner on 
behalf of Her Majesty.
163
 Where a bill was not assented to, the Commissioner was 
required to submit it to Her Majesty for the latter’s assent.164 With regards to the 
Commissioner, his legislative powers were contingent upon the advice and consent of the 
House of Assembly
165
 and a law made in exercise of those powers could be invalidated 
by Her Majesty through the Secretary of State.
166
 Moreover, he was under an obligation 
to report the exercise of his reserved legislative power to the Secretary of State and any 
member of the House of Assembly could record their objection with the Secretary of 
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State.
167
 The Commissioner’s powers were further limited to the extent that any other 
powers (not classified as discretionary) were to be exercised in consultation with the 
Executive Council.
168
 However, that provided only a weak form of oversight at the 
domestic level as the Commissioner’s actions were not subject to domestic judicial 
review.
169
 He was only answerable to Her Majesty
170
 and was required to report to Her 
Majesty through a Secretary of State, at any time that a decision was taken in 
contravention of the responsibility to consult the Executive Council.
171
 
 
3.3. Judicial Independence  
 
Judicial independence received some recognition in both Constitutions although the 
extent differed as well as the status of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other powers. In La 
République the judiciary was not accorded the same status as the legislature or the 
executive. While the former were referred to in terms of powers, the judiciary was an 
authority whose independence was guaranteed by the President of the Republic.
172
 The 
President controlled the judicial career through his powers to appoint and discipline 
judges. He was assisted in this regard by the Higher Judicial Council (HJC)
173
  which was 
presided over by the President himself.
174
 In effect, the President controlled both the 
judiciary and the HJC. Nevertheless, the Constitution attempted to provide scope for 
independence through the French principle of ‘inamovibilité’ which meant that judges 
were to enjoy a fixed term until retirement.
175
 Other relevant organisational aspects 
relating to judicial independence were to be regulated by subsequent legislation.
176
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In Southern Cameroons, the Constitution dealt more elaborately with the judiciary and 
provided greater scope for judicial independence. Appointments to the judiciary were 
made by Her Majesty acting on nominations made by the Commissioner and confirmed 
by the Secretary of State.
177
 Security of tenure was assured in at least two ways. Firstly, 
the age of retirement was specifically stated. Thus, a judge could only retire after 
attaining the age of 63.
178
 Secondly, removal from office was contingent only upon 
‘misbehaviour’ of the judge or health issues which rendered the judge incapable of 
discharging his duties.
179
 The process to determine a judge’s removal involved at first a 
recommendation from the Commissioner to a special tribunal. The decision of the 
tribunal was then referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and then to Her 
Majesty.
180
 This process potentially inhibited any arbitrary action by the Commissioner. 
Judicial independence was further enhanced by charging the remuneration of judges to a 
consolidated fund, with specific provision not to alter their salaries to their 
disadvantage.
181
  
 
3.4. Judicial Review 
 
The failure to demonstrate a firm commitment to CPR in the Constitution of La 
République was also reflected in the absence of a mechanism to control the 
constitutionality of laws. On the other hand, in Southern Cameroons, the High Court was 
vested with jurisdiction to review legislation on CPR to determine conformity with the 
Constitution.
182
 By vesting that power in the High Court, ordinary citizens could 
challenge the constitutionality of laws which violated their rights. In fact, this practice 
already existed prior to 1960 when Southern Cameroons was still administered as part of 
Nigeria. The High Court was given jurisdiction to rule on applications where the 
constitutionality of a law infringing on Schedule VI (on Fundamental Rights) of the 
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Nigerian Constitution was being challenged.
183
 That practice was affirmed in Alawoyin v. 
Attorney General, Northern Region
184
 where the Court stated that it was its duty to 
determine whether a law was inconsistent with the provisions on fundamental rights, as 
such inconsistencies inhibited their effective enforcement.
185
 A restatement of the High 
Court’s jurisdiction in that respect in the Southern Cameroons Constitution could be seen 
as a means of preserving a practice recognised in that part of the territory. 
 
From the foregoing review, it can be seen that both the British and French colonial 
legacies reflected some fundamental principles of constitutionalism (as discussed in 
Chapter 1) and therefore provided some foundation for the protection of CPR. However, 
they differed significantly in the recognition granted those rights and the institutional 
structures for their realisation. The British colonial legacy accorded greater significance 
to CPR and their enforceability potentially reinforced through judicial review of 
legislation by a judiciary with greater scope for independence and accessibility. However, 
it demonstrated significant weaknesses with regards to the accountability and separation 
of executive and legislative powers.  
 
On the other hand, the French colonial legacy demonstrated a feeble guarantee of CPR, 
the enforceability of which was further undermined by uncertainty as to their 
constitutional status, the absence of judicial review of legislation and a judiciary whose 
independence was not sufficiently guaranteed. Nevertheless, its strength could be found 
in its distinct separation of powers and the additional separation of executive powers 
although it was hampered by the absence of mechanisms for presidential accountability.  
 
What was also evident in both Constitutions was the absence of some form of adaptation 
to reflect the context of the two Cameroonian territories. With the exception of the House 
of Chiefs in Southern Cameroons, both Constitutions failed to give sufficient recognition 
to indigenous institutions or principles of governance which had been part of the lived 
                                                 
183
 Nigerian (Constitution) Order-in-Council, ss 244 & 245. 
184
 Alawoyin v. Attorney General, Northern Region, Suit No. Z/22/1959 also discussed in (1960) 4(2) 
Journal of African Law 117-123. 
185
 See also Dahiru Cheranci v. Alkali Cheranci, Suit No. K/M26/1959, discussed in (1960) 4(2) Journal of 
African Law 115-117. 
 81 
experiences of Cameroonians prior to colonialism. They also failed to take account of the 
particular historical, socio-political and economic circumstances.  Firstly, the history of 
colonial authoritarianism was a potent model likely to influence the new Cameroonian 
leaders. Secondly, the territories had brief experiences of self-governance and therefore 
the complex structures they were bequeath with were not fully mastered to make them 
work for the territories. They did not take account of the fact that the territories were 
composed of diverse ethnic groups whose coherence had been maintained by colonial 
authoritarianism. How were Cameroonian authorities to apply the new structures to 
maintain coherence and stability without reverting to the colonial experience replete with 
deprivation of CPR? Moreover, the relatively underdeveloped state of the economies at 
independence provided yet another reason to question if the new governance structures 
could play a positive role in delivering sustainable economic development in Cameroon 
without government authorities arbitrarily suspending CPR as rationale for economic 
development. In La République for instance, the centralisation of executive power 
provided President Ahidjo with the means to continue the authoritarian regime inherited 
from the French and to suppress dissent from opposition and the UPC in particular, in the 
guise of maintaining stability, unity and promoting economic development.
186
  
 
Having examined the constitutional legacies of the British and French, the next section 
will discuss further their developments in the post-independence period. 
 
4. POST INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF CAMEROON. 
 
 
The major post-independence constitutional developments occurred in 1961, 1972 and 
1996. The 1961 and 1972 developments will be discussed independently to highlight the 
relevant changes as they relate to constitutionalism and CPR. The 1996 Constitution is 
the subject of subsequent chapters, given that it is the Constitution under which CPR are 
currently enforced. Nevertheless, a prelude to its adoption is provided to lay the 
groundwork for discussions in subsequent chapters. 
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4.1. The Federal Constitution of 1961 and the Gaullist Legacy 
 
Prior to reunification of the two Cameroonian territories in October 1961, it was expected 
that their representatives would address the issue of a constitution governing the entire 
union.
187
 This was a complex task given that both territories had over forty years of 
divergent colonial history and it was important to achieve internal coherence without 
excessive disruption of existing subsystems. In July 1961, a constitutional conference 
was held in Foumban with the aim of drafting a constitution.
188
 
 
At the conference, the proposals from the delegation representing the former Southern 
Cameroons reflected a desire to adhere to their British colonial heritage.
189
 They 
advocated for a loose federation, a ceremonial executive head of state with limited 
powers and the requirement to act with his ministers (who in turn would be responsible to 
parliament), the entrenchment of and specific provisions for the protection of 
fundamental rights, vesting ordinary courts with jurisdiction to review the 
constitutionality of laws, retention of the House of Chiefs and the separate legal 
systems.
190
 However, their counterparts from La République had different ideas.  With 
the exception of the last two proposals, the others were rejected by President Ahidjo who 
sought to consolidate his existing centralised executive powers.
191
 Ahidjo rejected the 
proposals for a loose federation on the basis that it would make the government 
unstable.
192
 He was also influenced by the innate fear of secession of the former Southern 
Cameroons.
193
  
 
Ahidjo’s success in suppressing the Southern Cameroons proposals has been attributed to 
a number of factors.
194
 Firstly, he did not conceal the fact that both Southern Cameroons 
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and La République were entering into the negotiations as unequal powers.
195
 On the one 
hand, La République was an independent sovereign state ten times the geographical size 
of its counterpart, whereas, Southern Cameroons was a territory with no independent 
international status.
196
 Secondly, Ahidjo’s delegation came prepared with a draft 
constitution, whereas the Southern Cameroons delegation only had outlines and disagreed 
amongst its delegates as to their objectives and underlying concepts in relation to the 
federation.
197
 Thirdly, the Southern Cameroons delegation had little time to produce its 
own proposals on the basis of what had been presented by the Ahidjo delegation.
198
 Thus, 
Ahidjo was able to use these limitations to push his constitution through.  
 
The Foumban Constitutional Conference culminated in the adoption of the Federal 
Constitution of 1961 which created a federal republic consisting of two federated states - 
East and West Cameroon representing respectively the former République and Southern 
Cameroons.
199
 It is significant to note that the 1961 Constitution was not a newly drafted 
constitution. It was an amended version of the 1960 Constitution of La République with 
adaptations to accommodate the Federation.
200
 Thus began another form of colonisation 
as the imposition of the 1960 Constitution of La République on the Federation implied 
that the former Southern Cameroons, now West Cameroon had moved from one colonial 
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administration to embrace another.
201
 The domination of West Cameroon was further 
evident in article 59 which provided that ‘La Constitution ainsi révisée sera publiée en 
franςais et en anglais, le texte franςais faisant fois’.202 The British colonial legacy was 
only preserved to the extent that the Constitution provided for the recognition and 
continued application of legislation formerly enforced in the two territories, provided 
they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Federal Constitution.
203
 However, at 
the constitutional level, the institutions that dominated were those introduced by the 1960 
Constitution of La République.  
 
The constitutional changes led to some important effects on both CPR and the 
institutional framework for their enforcement. These are considered briefly below. 
 
 
4.1.1. Civil and Political Rights 
 
One major controversial amendment introduced by the Federal Constitution was the 
failure to re-enact the CPR provisions contained in the 1960 constitutions of the formerly 
separated territories. Arguably, that relegation was repaired by the reaffirmation of 
attachment to the fundamental liberties guaranteed in the Universal Declaration and the 
United Nations Charter.
204
 Moreover, the reaffirmation was entrenched in the body of the 
Constitution.
205
 Thus as opposed to the previous position, CPR were in principle 
justiciable as provisions of the Constitution could be subject to judicial review.
206
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Curiously, the peculiar reference to the right to personal liberty in the previous 1960 
Constitution of La République
207
 was conspicuously omitted. 
 
4.1.2. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 
 
The Constitution created a presidential system of government and maintained the 
tripartite division of power between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
Federal power was divided between the President of the Federal Republic, the Vice 
President, the Federal National Assembly and the Federal judiciary.
208
 At the level of the 
Federated States, governmental power was divided between the PM, legislative 
assembles and the judiciaries. 
 
The Vice-President was a ceremonial authority with virtually inconsequential powers. In 
fact, the Constitution provided that Federal authority was exercised between the President 
and Federal Assembly.
209
  The Federal President was by far the most powerful of all the 
governmental authorities, retaining the powers conferred on him under the 1960 
Constitution.
210
 In addition, he was vested with wide ranging powers which included the 
promulgation and execution of both federal and state laws,
211
 the organisation and 
direction of the public service,
212
 appointment and dismissal of ministers
213
 and PMs.
214
  
 
The President’s legislative powers were also retained with a few innovations introduced 
in the realm of control of the regime of exception.
215
 As in the 1960 Constitution, the 
President had the sole discretion to determine what constituted a state of emergency or 
siege although in this case he was under a duty to consult the PMs of the Federated States 
for their opinion and not necessarily their consent, prior to a proclamation.
216
 Another 
                                                 
207
 See text to (n 135). 
208
 Fed. Const, arts  4, 8, 16, 32. 
209
 Fed. Const. art 4. 
210
 Fed. Const. arts 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 23, 31. cf subsection 3.2 above. 
211
 Fed Const. art 12. 
212
 Fed. Const, arts 8, 12. 
213
 Fed. Const. art 11. 
214
 Fed. Const.  art 39. 
215
 Fed. Const. art 23 & 24. 
216
 Fed. Const, art 15. 
 86 
innovation was a requirement for the Federal National Assembly to remain convened 
throughout the period of emergency.
217
  In terms of oversight, it is doubtful
218
  what 
effects the innovations may have had given that the same statute vested the President with 
powers to take all necessary measures in the circumstance without any limitation save for 
the requirement of informing the nation through a message.
219
  
 
In terms of accountability, a commendable innovation was the possibility for the 
horizontal accountability of the President. The Federal High Court of Justice (itself a 
novel institution) had jurisdiction to try the President for acts of high treason and other 
federal and state executive authorities for conspiracy against state security.
220
 Two 
fundamental weaknesses regarding presidential accountability emanated from the silence 
of the Constitution on the meaning of high treason and the mechanism for seizing the 
Court.
221
 Nonetheless the provision generally marked an improvement on the former 
position where the President remained unaccountable.  
 
With regard to legislative power, the federal legislature was an institution with limited 
legislative authority, circumscribed under parallel conditions that obtained in the 1960 
Constitution.
222
 At the state level, authorities had control over issues such as nationality, 
rules on conflict of laws, internal security, foreign affairs, the monetary system and 
education.
223
 The House of Chiefs was maintained in the West Cameroon House of 
Assembly.
224
 However, presidential power continued to dominate as seen above.
225
 In 
addition the president exercised veto power over state legislative assemblies.
226
 He also 
had power to dissolve Parliament in case of persistent gridlock between Parliament and 
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government or where a PM tendered his resignation following a vote of no confidence or 
motion of censure.
227
  
 
4.1.3. The Judiciary and Judicial Independence 
 
The influence of the Federal President also extended to the judiciary which still remained 
an authority rather than a power unlike the executive and legislature. Nevertheless, the 
Federal Constitution introduced significant changes to the judicial landscape. 
 
The judicial systems that existed in the formerly separated states were retained.
228
 Whilst 
civil law continued to apply in East Cameroon, common law continued to apply in West 
Cameroon. The two systems remained separate with respect to legislation on 
organisation, jurisdiction and operation.
229
 That was intended to be a provisional 
arrangement with a view towards eventually establishing uniform federal legislation 
applicable throughout the Federation.
230
 To achieve that objective, commissions were 
created in 1964 to prepare uniform codes on some areas of law. These efforts were almost 
futile and the only significant success at the time was the uniform Penal Code of 1967 
which was largely inspired by French principles of criminal law.
231
 
 
Nevertheless, the institutions of the French colonial legacy continued to dominate at the 
constitutional level. Similar to the position in 1960, the Federal President was responsible 
for guaranteeing the independence of the judicial authority with powers to appoint and 
dismiss judges.
232
 The Higher Judicial Council (HJC) was renamed the Federal Judicial 
Council but continued to exercise the same limited powers to provide advisory opinions 
to the President.
233
  The organisation and functioning of the judiciary and the Federal 
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Judicial Council were to be determined by federal legislation.
234
 The Constitution made 
no provision for security of tenure, contrary to what obtained under the 1960 Constitution 
of La République although it was subsequently preserved by legislation.
235
  
 
The fragile nature of judicial independence was said to have provided leverage for 
President Ahidjo to maintain an authoritarian regime as the judiciary was perceived as 
‘agents and justifiers of repression’.236  That was manifested in a 1962 case involving 
four UPC leaders perceived by the regime to be a threat to its stability and survival.
237
 In 
a published statement which accused the President of attempting to create a ‘fascist-type 
dictatorship’, the authors were cautious to condemn terrorism and proclaim their 
adherence to legal procedures to articulate their grievances.
238
 Following the publication 
of that statement, they were arrested and charged with acts of subversion under an 
emergency legislation on the suppression of subversion
239
 despite having indicated that 
they did not intend to carryout any subversive activities.
240
 They were tried, found guilty 
and sentenced to thirty months imprisonment, imposed a heavy fine and stripped of all 
political rights.
241
 That decision was appealed but the Yaoundé Court of Appeal allegedly 
in response to the government’s demands increased their sentences.242 On further appeal 
to the Supreme Court, the French judge
243
 before whom the convicts appeared, noted the 
irregularities of the case but before he reached a decision the President unlawfully 
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requested the case file transferred to the Presidency.
244
 Subsequently, presidential decrees 
dealing with the suppression of subversion provided that decisions in subversion cases 
were not subject to appeal.
245
 
 
4.1.4. Judicial Review 
 
A further innovation of the Federal Constitution was the specific provisions for 
constitutional and administrative review.
 246
  Jurisdiction in that respect was vested in the 
Federal Court of Justice.
247
 In administrative review, the Court had jurisdiction to 
entertain petitions for the annulment of ultra vires or unlawful acts and claims for 
damages resulting from acts performed by federal administrative authorities.
248
 In 
Constitutional review, the Court’s jurisdiction was limited to providing an advisory 
opinion on the constitutionality of state and federal laws.
249
 The constitution failed to 
state how to proceed once an opinion was given and the fact that it only delivered an 
advisory opinion implied that the President was under no obligation to adhere to that 
opinion. Another fundamental limitation was the restriction on standing. The jurisdiction 
of the Court could be invoked exclusively by the President at his discretion.
250
 Ordinary 
citizens or even other executive or legislative authorities had no recourse to challenge the 
constitutionality of laws that potentially undermined the exercise of CPR. 
 
A further constraint could be perceived from the composition of the Court in review 
matters. It was to be specially constituted by personalities appointed by the President for 
reason of their ‘competence and experience’ to serve for a period of one year.251 
According to Anyangwe, the appointment of non-judicial members to review the 
constitutionality of laws reflected the traditional French aversion towards a 
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‘gouvernement des juges’ and the subordinate position accorded the judiciary in the 
organisation of governmental power.
252
 
 
It is perhaps due to those limitations that in spite of the repressive laws that were 
promulgated during the application of that Constitution only one matter relating to 
constitutional review was reported in 1970 – Société des Grands Travaux de l’Est.253 
That case concerned the application of a new tax code which was applied retrospectively 
to the effect that a businessman (who initiated review proceedings) was made to pay 
taxes in excess of the amount due to the tax authorities.
254
 He argued that some sections 
of the new tax code should be amended as they breached the constitutional principle of 
non-retrospectivity.
255
 The Court however held that it was beyond its jurisdiction to 
declare a law unconstitutional and in any case the President of the Federal Republic was 
the only authority with standing.
256
 
 
Although the mechanism for constitutional review had limitations, from the perspective 
of East Cameroon, it was an improvement to the extent that no such provisions existed 
prior to 1961. However, to West Cameroon, it was a significant departure given that a 
more accessible and comprehensive mechanism existed prior to reunification. West 
Cameroonians had now been deprived of that ability to directly challenge the 
constitutionality of laws impinging on their CPR.  
 
The foregoing paragraphs have demonstrated how the British colonial legacy was 
subsumed in preference for the French. They also demonstrated some innovations 
introduced by the Federal Constitution with respect to constitutionalism, CPR and how 
some of the weaknesses of the earlier French colonial legacy were further entrenched in 
the Federal Republic.  In 1960 Ahidjo stated that the constitution of La République was a 
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compromise between the American Constitution and that of the French Third Republic.
257
 
However, it seemed more like a version of the Constitution of the Fifth French 
Republic.
258
 It was then amended and adopted as the Federal Constitution which 
contained a number of the institutions created by President Charles de Gaulle under the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic.
259
 That Constitution was de Gaulle’s response to a 
constitutional crisis in 1958 and it produced the institutions which helped to create 
stability and entrench his hold on power.
260
 The circumstances were not present in the 
prelude to the reunification of Cameroon and did not therefore warrant an almost 
complete transplantation of that Constitution without the relevant adaptations that were 
significant to the circumstances of the newly created state. That Constitution remained in 
force until it was repealed by the Unitary Constitution of 1972. 
 
4.2. The Unitary Constitution of 1972 
 
After the adoption of the Federal Constitution, there was an indication from the Ahidjo 
leadership of the intention to consider the creation of a unified party in Cameroon.
261
 
That vision was subsequently strengthened by continuing political instability occasioned 
principally by the opposition UPC party attempting to challenge Ahidjo’s authoritarian 
regime. Moreover, single party dictatorships were becoming rife across sub-Saharan 
Africa, justified on the basis of the need to reinforce national unity and to promote the 
‘African Tradition’.262  In Cameroon, the arrest of some UPC members in 1962 gave a 
firm indication that the future of political opposition was bleak.
263
 Moreover the 
administration created artificial obstacles to the participation of the opposition in daily 
political activities. Registration offices were closed to opposition candidates wishing to 
register their candidacy for local elections.
264
 On other occasions, party meetings or 
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rallies were dispersed by security officers.
265
 Constrained by these difficulties, some 
members of the UPC and other opposition parties deserted to join the ruling party, the 
Union Camerounaişe (UC).266 By 1965, all political parties in East Cameroon had been 
integrated into the UC.
267
 
 
Meanwhile, the West Cameroonian political parties were facing internal squabbles within 
their ranks and rivalry between the different parties.
268
 Ahidjo used these differences to 
highlight the need to reach a consensus by forming a unified party. In June 1966, the 
West Cameroonian politicians were to heed Ahidjo’s firm demand for the dissolution of 
political parties in that region.
269
 In August 1966, the regime succeeded in bringing all 
political parties at the federal level under one umbrella organisation dubbed the 
Cameroon National Union (CNU) thereby ensuring the demise of political pluralism in 
Cameroon.
270
 Ahidjo’s rationale for the formation of a single dominant party was the 
underdeveloped nature of the country and he was careful to emphasise that the measure 
was only temporary.
271
 However, that as it later emerged, was a move to ensure the 
centralisation of political parties in order to pave the way for a unitary state.
272
 
 
In May 1972, Ahidjo surprised the Federal Assembly with his intention to hold a popular 
referendum aimed at abolishing the Federation.
273
 Following an overwhelming vote in 
favour of a unitary system, the Federation was abolished. A unitary Constitution was thus 
adopted in June 1972.
274
 That Constitution divided Cameroon administratively into 
provinces with the name of the country amended from the Federal Republic to the United 
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Republic of Cameroon.
275
 Besides the abolition of state institutions, the 1972 
Constitution preserved much of the underlying themes of the Federal Constitution and its 
institutions. Nevertheless, it ushered in some innovations with respect to CPR and the 
mechanisms for their enforcement. The relevant innovations are discussed below. 
 
4.2.1. Civil and Political Rights 
 
The Unitary Constitution reverted to the position accorded CPR in the 1960 Constitution 
of La République. Thus, the CPR discussed earlier were similarly vaguely worded and 
listed in the Preamble of the Unitary Constitution. Similarly, affirmation of Cameroon’s 
attachment to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration returned to the Preamble. 
That was a retrogressive move from the perspective that the Preamble was 
unenforceable.
276
 
 
4.2.2. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 
 
The centralisation of executive power was further entrenched as the President became 
both Head of State and Head of Government.
277
 He remained largely responsible for 
appointments to ministerial offices, the civil service in general and allocated powers to all 
government ministries which were located in Yaoundé, the national capital.
278
 
Subsequently the post of PM was reinstituted through a constitutional amendment in 
1975.
279
 That institution was even weaker than the equivalent institution under the 1960 
and the Federal Constitutions. The PM was to be appointed and dismissed by the 
President.
280
 The role of the former was to assist the President in the discharge of his 
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duties through powers delegated by him. Moreover, the Cabinet was appointed and 
controlled by the President rather than the PM.
281
  
 
With respect to presidential accountability the position remained unchanged except that 
the court with jurisdiction to try the President for high treason was the Court of 
Impeachment, the organisation and functioning of which was to be determined by law.
282
 
The law subsequently vested Parliament with authority to impeach the President upon an 
absolute majority vote.
283
  
 
In terms of the legislature, the Unitary Constitution ushered in a unicameral Parliament 
for the territory represented by a single political party.
284
 One prominent effect was the 
dissolution of the West Cameroon House of Chiefs, signalling the demise of traditional 
authority at the national level. With regard to executive relations with Parliament, the 
power imbalance became more acute given the absence of opposition parties.
285
 The 
legislative powers of Parliament were further limited by the provision which stated that 
Parliament may empower the President to legislate by ordinance and for a limited period 
on the areas of competence reserved for Parliament.
286
 With respect to the control of 
periods of exception, Parliament was no longer required to remain convened.
287
 The 
impeachment provision consisted of a weak form of accountability given that parliament 
was now comprised of a single party. It was doubtful that the party would be keen to oust 
the President from a system in which they all benefited.  
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4.2.3. The Judiciary and Judicial Independence 
 
Another consequence of the creation of a unitary state was the establishment of a uniform 
judicial system
288
 thereby abolishing the separate court systems that existed in the former 
East and West Cameroon. That notwithstanding, the Constitution further endorsed the 
continuous application of the separate legislations in force in the former East and West 
Cameroon as long as they were not inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution 
or any subsequent laws or regulatory process.
289
  
 
Nevertheless, with regard to the administration of justice, French civil law institutions 
continued to dominate. The judiciary remained under the control of the executive who 
was responsible for judicial appointments and dismissals.
290
 The Federal Judicial Council 
reverted to the appellation of Higher Judicial Council (Consiel Supérieur de la 
Magistrature) preserving its advisory role.
291
  
 
4.2.4. Judicial Review 
 
The Constitution further preserved the mechanism for the review of administrative acts 
and the constitutionality of laws with perhaps the main significant difference being that 
the institution now vested with jurisdiction was the Supreme Court which replaced the 
Federal Court of Justice.
292
  
 
The Unitary Constitution as seen above, largely preserved the inadequate constitutional 
structure transplanted initially under the Constitution of La République and subsequently 
under the Federal Constitution. Admittedly, some attempts were made to improve the 
status of CPR although the overall framework for their enforcement undermined what 
gains may have been made. There was little recognition of the British colonial heritage at 
the constitutional level and its influence was limited to the Anglophone regions. 
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Indigenous institutions were similarly given little recognition at the constitutional level, 
particularly after the dissolution of the House of Chiefs. Whereas, the inadequate 
received civil law institutions continued to dominate with the erosion of what little 
protective mechanisms may have existed under that system.  
 
A consequence that ensued was the rapid descent of the regime into authoritarianism due 
in part to the excessive executive powers and the absence of sufficient constitutional 
restraint.
293
 Richard Joseph described the Ahidjo regime (which lasted from 
independence to 1982) as a perpetuation of the French regime of oppression.
294
 That 
regime was consolidated through CPR violations such as arbitrary arrests, torture, exile, 
extra-judicial executions and press censorship through presidential decrees.
295
 These 
arbitrary practices emerged in part because Ahidjo was trying to defuse the influence of 
the exiled wing of the UPC which continued to challenge the regime.
296
 From the period 
of independence of La République, pro-UPCists criticised the inadequate guarantees of 
CPR in the Constitution, the over centralisation of power and the importation of 
constitutional features which had not been ‘tropicalised’.297 In a bid to curb the influence 
of this group whose criticisms spilled over to the reunified states, Ahidjo ruled through 
ordinances and emergency regulations which contained wide restrictions on CPR.
298
 The 
wide use of presidential legislative powers created a state of ‘legalised’ oppression and 
uncertainty as to which emergency legislation was in force at any particular time and 
what offences had been created under it.
299
 Administrative actions pursuant to these 
regulations were purportedly replete with violations of CPR and disregard for the rule of 
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law.
300
 The emergency regulations were renewed every six months and were in fact not 
repealed until 1990.
301
 Encroachment on civil liberties was justified by the need to 
maintain ‘integrity of the national territory, or of life, independence or institutions of the 
nation’ although the definition of these terms remained subjective to Ahidjo’s perception 
of the situation.
302
  
 
The Unitary Constitution with its inadequate mechanisms for the protection of CPR 
remained in force until it was substantially revised in 1996. 
 
4.3. Prelude to the Adoption of the 1996 Constitution 
 
 
In 1982, reportedly for health reasons President Ahidjo unexpectedly resigned from 
power automatically conferring presidential power on the then Prime Minister Paul 
Biya.
303
 President Biya perpetuated the authoritarian regime established under his 
predecessor strengthened even further after 1984 following an abortive coup d’état 
orchestrated by supporters of Ahidjo.
304
 However, the political environment witnessed 
gradual changes through increasing domestic demands for political liberalisation.
305
 This 
course was championed by the Anglophone minority that witnessed increased 
marginalisation in socio-economic development and insufficient representation in public 
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administration.
306
 The wave of political change sweeping through sub-Saharan Africa in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s helped to fuel political and legal developments in 
Cameroon.
307
 The regime resisted calls for democratisation and responded to such 
demands with repression.
308
 In February 1990, a group of Anglophone elites organised 
meetings to discuss the declining economic and political conditions in Cameroon and the 
possibility of forming a political party.
309
 They were arrested, tried and convicted for 
holding clandestine meetings, promoting secession and for insulting the President.
310
 This 
sparked further tension as it became clear that the regime was not ready for a democratic 
transition.
311
 The government argued that the country was not ready for multiparty 
democracy as it would promote ethnic division and instability.
312
 The government’s 
response only increased the political tension and in May 1990 the Social Democratic 
Front (SDF), which remains the most influential opposition party, was formed.
313
 During 
its official launching, security forces responded with repressive force killing six 
participants, mainly children.
314
 The opposition responded by forming a coalition which 
organised nation-wide civil disobedience campaigns to paralyse governmental 
institutions.
315
  
 
The government attempted to ease the political tension by making some reforms, through 
the enactment of the Liberty Laws.
316
 A consequence was the proliferation of opposition 
parties and independent press organisations.
317
 However, those laws operated within the 
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framework of the Unitary Constitution which was hostile to genuine democratic 
participation.
318
 The opposition continued to request for a sovereign national conference 
which the President had rejected as having no purpose in Cameroon.
319
 However, in 
October 1991, a Tripartite Conference was organised by the government to bring together 
representative of the opposition, the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM) and government officials in an attempt to resolve the political crisis.
320
 It 
resulted in the Yaoundé Declaration which was essentially a concession to which the 
opposition agreed to end the civil disobedience campaigns while the government acceded 
to making democratic and constitutional reforms.
321
 However, the government failed to 
keep its part of the agreement particularly by failing to provide for an independent 
electoral system prior to presidential election in 1992. The incumbent President Biya won 
the elections which were reportedly marred by gross irregularities and electoral 
rigging.
322
 In response, supporters of the SDF whose candidate was alleged to have been 
the actual winner staged massive demonstrations in the North West Region.
323
 A state of 
emergency was declared in that Region and resulted in massive violations of CPR by 
security forces.
324
 The leader of the SDF was placed under house arrest.
325
 
 
While the government continued to resist genuine democratic reforms, international 
donors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank pressured repressive 
regimes such as that of Cameroon to increase the pace of democratic reforms.
326
 The 
government subsequently gave into those demands, and for a constitutional review. The 
President appointed eleven members to a Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters 
(TCCM), initially established during the Tripartite Conference.
327
 The TCCM was 
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composed of seven Francophones and four Anglophones and chaired by Joseph Owona, 
then Secretary General at the presidency and member of the central committee of the 
ruling CPDM.
328
  It set to work on a constitutional revision contrary to the terms of the 
Yaoundé Declaration which had agreed for a new constitution.
329
 Meanwhile an All 
Anglophone Conference (AAC) was convened in April 1993 to make proposals to the 
TCCM.
330
 The Standing Committee established by the AAC submitted a draft 
constitution to the TCCM, proposing among others, recognition of the principles of 
liberal democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, a return to the 
federal structure, reinstitution of the House of Chiefs, decentralisation, a presidential 
system with some features of separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial 
independence and judicial review reminiscent of the Southern-Cameroons 
Constitution.
331
 A number of opposition parties, including the SDF, National Union for 
Democracy and Progress (NUDP) and Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) also 
submitted proposals echoing those of the AAC. The SDF and NUDP went further to 
propose the establishment of a bicameral legislature comprising a House of Assembly 
and Senate, and that all presidential appointments be confirmed by Senate.
332
 
 
However, the TCCM did not meet to discuss the proposals and amidst pressure from the 
government rejected those proposals prompting the resignation of its Anglophone 
members.
333
 The Chair of the TCCM proceeded to submit proposals to President Biya, 
which were essentially a revision of the 1972 Constitution.
334
 The proposals were then 
submitted to Parliament in the November 1995 parliamentary session.
335
 They were 
subsequently enacted as the 1996 Constitution.
336
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Although the 1996 Constitution is not entirely new, the amendments are substantial and 
perhaps account for why it was described as ushering in a new era for the separation of 
powers, democratic governance and human rights.
337
 Specifically with regards to CPR, in 
addition to those provided for in the Preamble to the 1972 Constitution, the 1996 
Constitution affirms attachment to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and duly ratified international instruments relating thereto.
338
 These instruments form part 
of the corpus of CPR legislation
339
 and take precedent over national laws.
340
 CPR have 
been given further boost through the incorporation of the Preamble as an integral part of 
the Constitution, implying that they are now justiciable.
341
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has analysed the constitutional trajectory of Cameroon and demonstrated the 
divergent constitutional legacies bequeath by the French and the British. Post-colonial 
constitutional developments saw the continued erosion of the British colonial legacy 
despite the fact that some of its features adhered more to the basic tenets of 
constitutionalism as presented in Chapter 1. On the other hand, the French colonial 
legacy initially dominated constitutional reforms establishing a weak form of 
constitutionalism. Post-1961 constitutional developments further entrenched that legacy 
in the process intensifying its weaknesses by eroding what little protective mechanisms 
were in operation. Moreover, indigenous institutions continued to be relegated as in the 
colonial period. Thus, Cameroon inherited and further developed constitutional features 
which were neither sufficiently robust nor reflective of its specific circumstances.  
                                                 
337
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338
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339
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Human Rights (Oxford University Press 1983) 41-42. 
340
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341
 Constitution of Cameroon 1996, art 65. To the extent that preambular provisions are enforceable or 
possess interpretive status, they are also a relevant way of expressing a country’s fundamental rights 
commitments. See Liav Orgad, ‘The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2010) 8(4) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 718, 722-728. 
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The fall out became visible during the early post-colonial period which was characterised 
by authoritarianism and the violation of CPR. Faced with a system that neither effectively 
guaranteed rights, nor empowered the population to exercise what meagre rights were 
available, Cameroonians joined the rising tide of demands for political liberalisation in 
Africa to demand reforms geared at transforming the authoritarian regime in Cameroon. 
The 1996 Constitution was enacted against that backdrop purportedly to establish a new 
era which should pay greater recognition to CPR and demonstrate a greater commitment 
to developing more robust institutional features for their protection. 
  
The rest of the thesis will examine the supposedly new arrangements and what the 
outcome has been for the protection and enhancement of CPR. In particular, it will seek 
to demonstrate that continuities still exist in the constitutional framework, a situation 
which has continued to have adverse repercussions on CPR. The next chapter begins that 
analysis by examining presidential power in Cameroon. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances in Cameroon: The Case 
of an Imperial Presidency 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter examines presidential power in Cameroon in the context of the separation of 
powers and checks and balances. As discussed in Chapter 1, the separation of powers and 
checks and balances are complementary principles which have the potential to enhance 
the realisation of CPR.
1
 Through those principles, governmental institutions can be 
vested with powers to perform specific functions and also empowered to exercise mutual 
accountability to ensure that each institution operates within its limits. The separation of 
powers principle also makes allowance for some degree of overlap which may be 
necessary to enhance effective governance. Nevertheless, there should be a robust system 
of checks and balances to pre-empt potential arbitrary use of powers. An inadequately 
conceived system of separation of powers, with insufficient checks and balances creates a 
condition of imbalance which can provide scope for a more powerful arm to usurp power 
and rule by authoritarian means.  
 
In Cameroon, as noted in the previous chapter, the model adopted at independence and 
subsequently, granted wide powers to the President with insufficient restraint 
mechanisms. The 1996 Constitution purports to reverse that position by creating a more 
equitable balance of powers. Yet, as this chapter shall attempt to demonstrate, there is 
still considerable overlap of governmental powers which fails to remedy the problem. 
Because the 1996 Constitution has continued to be influenced by its French colonial 
heritage, the President remains vested with powers to control the government and 
governmental institutions, the legislature and legislative processes and to regulate the 
state of emergency. Similarly, the accountability mechanisms provided by the 
Constitution do not afford scope for robust control of the exercise of presidential powers. 
                                                 
1
  ch 1, s 3.1 at 36-42. 
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These factors combine to facilitate the development of an imperial president who can 
undermine the ability for other governmental institutions to protect and enhance CPR. 
 
The chapter is divided into three major sections. Section one provides a brief overview of 
‘semi-presidentialism’ (adopted in the 1996 Constitution) and a theoretical perspective of 
that model of separation of powers with regard to the protection and enhancement of 
CPR. Section two then discusses some of the powers vested in the President of Cameroon 
and how their exercise can affect CPR. Section three examines the constitutional 
accountability (horizontal) mechanisms and how they relate to the realisation of CPR.  
 
1. SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 
 
‘Semi-presidentialism’ is a term for a political system that combines a presidential with a 
parliamentary system. According to Maurice Duverger, who first coined the term, the 
distinguishing features of semi-presidential systems are, a popularly elected president 
vested with ‘quite considerable powers’ and a cabinet led by a prime minister who is 
responsible to the legislature.
2
 Although Duverger failed to describe what constitutes 
‘quite considerable powers’ recent scholarship has identified three distinctive powers as 
falling under that category. They include power to dismiss the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, presidential veto power and power to dissolve the Legislature.
3
 
 
The semi-presidential model can be described as an additional separation of powers 
because of the division of executive power between the President and Prime Minister.
4
 
From the perspective of constitutionalism, as defined in Chapter 1, an advantage of that 
additional separation is the potential of mitigating the over concentration of powers in a 
single executive head possibly affording the opportunity for a more equitable balance of 
power between the executive and other governmental powers. However, not all semi-
                                                 
2
 Maurice Duverger, ‘A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government’ (1980) 8 European 
Journal of Political Research 166.  
3
 Martin Shugart, ‘Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns’ (2005) 3 
French Politics 323, 340-342. 
4
 Cindy Skach, ‘The “newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism’ (2007) 5(1) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 93, 96. 
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presidential regimes exhibit a factual additional separation of power. That is particularly 
the case with highly presidential semi-presidential regimes.
5
 This sub-type is 
characterised by a very powerful president and a ceremonial prime minister, a variant 
which exhibits an over-concentration of executive powers in a president similar to some 
purely presidential systems.
6
 In addition, highly presidential sub-types face the problem 
of dual accountability of the Prime Minister
7
  who can be dismissed by the President and 
also censured by Parliament. Whereas, the President is neither accountable to the Prime 
Minister nor Parliament and in fact can make use of his special powers to dissolve 
Parliament.
8
 A third disadvantage emanates from the implications of ‘quite considerable 
powers’ as they provide scope for executive control of the legislature without a 
corresponding duty for the legislature to exercise control on the executive.  
 
Recalling at this point the issue of context highlighted in Chapter 1,
9
 the development of 
a system of separation of powers and checks and balances should take into account the 
context in which the system will apply. Relating that to semi-presidentialism, the highly 
presidential subtype is said to be problematic for nascent or fragile democracies.
10
 For 
Robert Elgie such systems have had a very poor record with freedom and foster 
authoritarianism
11
 particularly where presidential dominance is accompanied by a highly 
disciplined majority in parliament.
12
 Cindy Skach however, perceives a highly disciplined 
majority as a stabilising factor capable of mitigating the potential tension between 
warring executives.
13
 Both scenarios as perceived by Arend Lijphart and Skach are 
plausible as a disciplined majority is likely to always be in agreement with presidential 
                                                 
5
 Martin Shugart and John Carey refer to it as ‘president-parliamentarism’. Martin Shugart and John Carey, 
Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge University Press 
1992) 23. Various subtypes of this regime have been developed. They include highly presidential, balanced 
semi-presidential regimes and semi-presidential regimes with a ceremonial president. See generally, Robert 
Elgie, ‘A Fresh Look at Semi-Presidentialism: Variations on a Theme’ (2005) 16(3) Journal of Democracy 
98. 
6
 Elgie ‘A Fresh Look at Semi-Presidentialism’ (n 5) 202-203. 
7
 Francesco Cavatorta & Robert Elgie, ‘The Impact of Semi-presidentialism on Governance in the 
Palestinian Authority’ (2010) 63(1) Parliamentary Affairs 22, 29-30; Skach (n 4) 97-98. 
8
 Cavatorta &Elgie (n 7) 29-30. 
9
 ch 1, s 2.3 at 30-32. 
10
 Skach (n 4) 120-122; Elgie, ‘A Fresh Look at Semi-Presidentialism’ (n 5) 101-105. 
11
 Elgie, ‘A Fresh Look at Semi-Presidentialism’ (n 5) 101-105. 
12
 Arend Lijphart, ‘Constitutional Design for Divided Societies’ (2004) 15(2) Journal of Democracy 96, 
102. 
13
 Skach (n 4) 101-102. 
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policies and therefore pre-empt crises of disagreement.
14
 In the same vein, owing to the 
uncontested acquiescence of the majority, the President can easily promote his 
authoritarian ambition. 
 
It has also been argued that semi-presidentialism, particularly the highly presidential 
subtype tends to reinforce or ‘actively’ foster the development of a culture of personal 
rule,
15
 something which is inherently antithetical to CPR. Personal rule
16
 is a type of state 
authority structure based on the leadership of one individual who exercises institutionally 
unrestrained powers, presides over a neopatrimonial
17
 public administration through a 
patronage network and uses those features (power and patronage) as instruments for 
wielding political power.
18
 As power continues to be concentrated in, and exercised by 
one individual there is great tendency to descend into authoritarianism.
19
 This is largely 
because it is an arbitrary and personal regime that relies on law and coercive instruments 
of the state to accelerate its own agenda which includes elimination of political rights and 
opportunities of opposition and other political groups.
20
 Elgie asserts that in highly 
presidential semi-presidential regimes, the direct election of the President can lead to 
portrayal as the father or saviour of the nation thereby reinforcing the paternalistic view 
of the President in a political culture which perhaps already had traits of a personality 
cult.
21
 The extensive powers vested in the President are used to reward public officials in 
the patronage network. The latter perceive themselves as being accountable to the ruler 
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 Lijphart (n 12) 102; Skach (n 4) 101-102. 
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 Jackson & Rosberg (n 16) 23; Thomson (n 16) 108-109. 
20
 Jackson & Rosberg (n 16) 23. 
21
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only and therefore avoid formal institutional checks.
22
 Moreover, in order to preserve the 
regime, the executive may resort to extraordinary measures to prevent any circumstances 
which may result in curtailment of its powers.
23
 
 
Admittedly, the personal rule paradigm has been associated with some regimes in sub-
Saharan Africa which are either parliamentary or presidential in orientation. For Kwasi 
Prempeh, a factor that can be attributed to the persistence of imperial presidencies in 
Africa is the extensive powers exercised by presidents.
 24
   Therefore, there is an intuitive 
logic in arguing that through the exercise of those powers in the context of societies 
where personal relations play an important part in governance there is a high tendency for 
personal rule to develop. However, two significant factors which distinguish semi-
presidential regimes and may account for their greater probability of descending to, or 
nurturing a culture of personal rule, is the configuration of presidential powers and the 
inadequate accountability mechanism.
25
 The President in highly presidential subtypes in 
particular, exercises what can be considered as ‘ordinary’, ‘special’ and ‘quite 
considerable’ powers26  with little oversight making them over and above all other 
governmental institutions, society and the rule of law.  
 
Having presented a theoretical overview of semi-presidentialism above, the Cameroonian 
position is now examined.  
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 Bratton & Van de Walles, Democratic Experiments in Africa (n 17) 65. 
23
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Republic. Bankounda-Mpele, ‘Repenser le President Africain’ (Viiè Congres Français de Droit 
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2. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND THE PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT 
OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN CAMEROON.  
 
Cameroon, has adopted a semi-presidential system in its 1996 Constitution which reflects 
the highly presidential variant with its challenges as described above. As in the Unitary 
Constitution, the President is vested with considerable powers over the government, the 
civil service, the judiciary,
27
 the legislature and authority to regulate the state of 
emergency. The exercise of those powers has also been facilitated in practice by the fact 
that the President’s party retains an overwhelming and largely disciplined majority in 
Parliament.
28
 It will be contended that these factors have contributed to undermine the 
effective enforcement of CPR in Cameroon. The various types of presidential powers and 
their impact on CPR are analysed below. 
 
2. 1. Presidential Control of the Government and the Civil Service  
 
A number of provisions vesting the President with ‘ordinary’ powers demonstrate an 
unambiguous affirmation of his supremacy in the Constitution. Accordingly, the 
President represents the state in all acts of public life;
29
 defines national policy;
30
 ensures 
respect for the Constitution;
31
 and ‘through his arbitration’ ensures the proper functioning 
of public authorities;
32
 promulgates laws;
 33
 guarantees the independence, territorial 
integrity and continuity of the polity;
34
 and ensures the internal and external security of 
the State.
35
 Those powers create a paternalistic image of the President, reinforcing a 
perception that his very authority is imperative for the survival of the country. In 
addition, his control over the Prime Minister (PM), the Cabinet and civil service has 
facilitated the development and entrenchment of a personal rule culture, which as 
                                                 
27
 The judiciary is examined in the next chapter. 
28
 The ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) occupies 153 of the 180 seats in 
Parliament. 
29
 Constitution of Cameroon, art 8(1) 
30
 ibid art 5(2) para 1. 
31
 ibid art 5(2) para 2. 
32
 ibid art 5(2) para 3. 
33
 ibid art 8(5) and 31. 
34
 ibid art  5(2) para 4. 
35
 ibid art  8(3). 
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discussed above is inherently authoritarian. This section discusses the interplay between 
those powers, personal rule and CPR in Cameroon. 
 
2.1.1. The Prime Minister and Cabinet 
 
After various phases of abolition,
36
 the position of PM was reinstituted in 1991 following 
a constitutional amendment.
37
 The Constitution provides that the President shall appoint 
the PM and ‘on the proposal of the latter, appoint the other members of government’.38 In 
practice however, ministerial appointments are made concurrently with the appointment 
of a PM.
39
 In which case, it is possible to infer that he is not always consulted in the 
selection of his cabinet. The Constitution provides further that their duties shall be 
defined by the President who can also terminate their appointment.
40
 That position gives 
a prima facie case of Cabinet’s accountability to the President rather than the PM who is 
Head of Government.  
 
Besides his accountability to the President, the PM is accountable to Parliament.
41
 
Parliament controls government action through oral and written questions.
42
 In theory 
government can be held accountable through a motion of censure or a vote of no 
confidence,
43
 after which the PM would be expected to tender the resignation of the 
government to the President.
44
 In terms of achieving a balance and separation of powers, 
those arrangements are problematic for at least two reasons.  
 
                                                 
36
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37
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40
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Firstly, although the PM is head of government, policy is dictated by the President but it 
will be the PM and his Cabinet who will be censured if Parliament were to call into 
question the confidence of government. The dual accountability of the PM makes that 
institution practically of little significance in terms of separation of powers. Given that 
the PM and Cabinet are subservient to the President, it is in their interest to ensure that 
government policy (as defined by the President) is fully implemented. Such a position 
allows the President to deflect criticism and censure onto the Cabinet. According to 
Joseph Kankeu, the purported separation of powers is more apparent than real.
45
 The 
subordination of PM and the government has been entrenched by the Constitution which 
has merely developed the prime ministry as an institution with an instrumental role rather 
than one that develops and implements government policies.
46
 Kankeu and Solomon 
Bilong assert that the Prime Minister’s role is that of concretising and implementing 
unpopular policy preferences of the President.
47
 In which case, it might be more accurate 
to speak of the executive as composed of the President who is both Head of State and 
Head of Government.  
 
Secondly, the provision on motions of censure and vote of no confidence as measures to 
achieve government’s accountability is not effective in practice. The PM can be 
subsequently reappointed by the President even after a motion of censure leads to his 
resignation.
48
 This implies that parliamentary oversight is rather ineffective if it can be 
overridden by the reappointment of the PM. Moreover, it is unlikely that a motion of 
censure has a chance to succeed as the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Party 
(CPDM) controls a highly disciplined majority of 153 out of 180 seats in Parliament. 
Admissibility depends on endorsement by a minimum of one-third of the members of 
Parliament and its success depends on endorsement by a two-third majority.
49
 In the case 
of a vote of no confidence, it can only be passed by an absolute majority.
50
 According to 
                                                 
45
 Kankeu, Droit Constitutionnel (n 37) 168-169. 
46
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Paul Ayah MP,
 51
 in practice, the constraints have made it impossible for Parliament to 
hold the government to account.
52
 He argues that CPDM parliamentarians are reluctant to 
vote against their party as that may constitute grounds for disciplinary action.
53
 A case in 
point is the 2008 constitutional amendments which amongst others changes, eliminated 
presidential term limits. Paul Ayah was the only member of the ruling party who opposed 
the amendment and abstained from voting. Subsequently, in a press interview, he alleged 
threats to his life and that of his family and victimisation from security forces as a result 
of his criticism of the ruling party. He eventually resigned from the party to join the 
opposition.
54
  
 
Another factor which may explain the reluctance of CPDM members to vote against 
party initiatives (even if they disagree with such initiatives) is the patronage advantage 
that comes with belonging to the ruling party.
55
 The CPDM party affords the best 
opportunity for patronage and according to the Bertelsmann Stiftung,
56
 candidate 
selection is based on 100% loyalty to presidential policy.
57
 
 
2.1.2. The Civil Service 
 
With regard to the civil service, presidential powers include heading the armed forces;
 58
 
setting up and organising administrative services;
59
 and appointments to civil, military 
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and para-public institutions.
60
 These powers, in addition to those discussed in the 
previous subsection provide a formidable basis for the reward of key figures that support 
the regime.
61
 Due to the underdeveloped nature of the economy, spurred by scarcity of 
resources, there is competition for resources and key positions in the government and 
public services.
62
 The select few officials appointed to various positions are keen to 
remain in them to secure their political, economic and social status.
63
 Individually or 
collectively, some have expanded their support networks by granting favours to members 
of the public in order to elicit support for the regime.
64
 An example here is the former 
Anglophone Prime Minister Peter Musonge who was appointed in 1996. In a speech 
delivered at a reception in Buea,
65
 Capital of the South West Region, he called on the 
Anglophone community to unanimously support President Biya as a mark of appreciation 
for appointing an Anglophone to that office and also to receive further favours from the 
government.
66
 The Governor of that Region at the time (Peter Oben) endorsed South 
Westerners and ‘immigrants’ to support the CPDM party for similar reasons.67  
 
Given that the patronage network survives on loyalty and reward, public officials 
interested in advancing their career may feel compelled to promote the interest of the 
regime, despite the probability of their actions resulting in restrictions on CPR. They owe 
allegiance to the President who can dismiss them unilaterally. As Tom Ginsburg notes, 
bureaucratic agents can be influenced by the ruler through the use of incentive structures, 
to achieve certain objectives.
68
 He notes in particular that by rewarding loyal agents and 
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punishing disloyal ones through career advancement or retirement, rulers provide 
incentives for officials to perform.
69
 A classic example was noted by the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) during the 1992 presidential election in Cameroon. An 
excerpt from their report is worth reproducing here: 
 
The NDI has received direct testimony to the effect that, prior to the election, high 
level government officials were told that their performance would be rated on the 
number of votes President Biya garnered in their respective areas. They were 
given a goal of 60 percent and told that this figure should be achieved by 
whatever means was necessary.
70
 
 
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that there were severe irregularities 
recorded during that election. As the NDI noted there were extremely anomalous results 
in some areas such as the Mvila Division which reported a 100% turnout of voters (a total 
of 5,856) and 100% votes in favour of President Biya.
71
 In spite of serious allegations of 
electoral fraud perpetrated by executive officials the results were endorsed and 
proclaimed by the Supreme Court.
72
  
 
Security forces have also benefited from the patronage network and have played an 
indispensable role in reinforcing authoritarianism.
73
 Due in part to the difficult economic 
situation in Cameroon, and the political awareness of the population, the Biya regime has 
increasingly come under criticism.
74
  That situation has increased the need for him to 
maintain a firm hold on the country by systematic and arbitrary suppression of political 
dissent. Particularly after the failed coup attempt in 1984, the President has consistently 
appointed senior members of the military from his ethnic group.
75
 Those officials in turn 
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have developed support networks within the police and armed forces and awarded 
favours to their supporters to elicit their loyalty to the regime. During the 1990s the 
salaries of public servants were gradually reduced by approximately fifty percent as part 
of measures taken under the Structural Adjustment Programme.
76
 Yet, the salaries of the 
police and armed forces were not reduced and they have continued to be endowed with 
various fringe benefits as reward for their loyalty.
77
 According to the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, the military is constantly monitored by the presidency to detect signs of 
discontent.
78
 Security forces have been repeatedly deployed to crack down on opposition 
and other civilian groups as a means of preventing any perceived threat to the regime.
79
 
During the 2008 riots, security forces did not hesitate to violently crack down on 
protesters opposing the increasing cost of living and proposed amendments to the 
Constitution to eliminate presidential term limits.
80
 Given that the amendment would 
have facilitated the continued leadership of President Biya, disapproval amounted to a 
challenge of the regime and therefore warranted the deployment of security forces to 
‘maintain public order’. The President condemned protesters in very firm terms, 
describing them as ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ attempting to use unconstitutional means to put 
him out of office.
81
 As discussed earlier, there was wide spread violations of CPR, 
including arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and extrajudicial killings.
82
  
 
Given the level of presidential control over the coercive forces, decisive action against 
their impunity cannot be taken without his influence. As such, the lack of support on his 
part has enhanced authoritarianism. As Lynne Henderson notes, authoritarianism need 
not be based only on active coercion or oppression of specific groups opposed to the 
government.
83
 The latter can allow the development of a repressive culture through 
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omission ‘by permitting other institutions or persons to coerce and oppress others in the 
interest of maintaining control’.84 An example can be seen in the persistent attack on 
press and media freedoms to prevent publication of information critical of the President 
and other senior government officials – a situation which the government has failed to 
take decisive measures to address.
85
 Another illustration is the failure of the government 
to take systematic measures to prevent the continuous use of torture by security forces.
86
  
 
Presidential power with respect to the areas discussed above, have provided the means to 
reward government officials. That has in turn put those officials in a position to secure 
the interest of the regime regardless of how CPR may be affected. Personal rule in 
Cameroon or what has been recently described as ‘Biyaïsme’ has developed to the extent 
that all aspects of political, social and economic life are under ‘presidential siege’.87 As 
discussed below, the position is further undermined by presidential control of the 
legislature. 
 
2.2. Control of the Legislature and Legislative Process 
 
In Cameroon, law has been an instrumental mechanism for restricting CPR guaranteed in 
the Constitution. One factor that has facilitated the instrumentality of law in this way is 
the near monopoly of the process of the ‘production’ of law by the President.88 The latter 
is vested with wide ‘regulatory’ powers and substantial control over the legislature 
without corresponding checks and balances on the same. In the absence of limitations, the 
powers facilitate ‘capture’ of the legislative process to advance government policies as 
defined by the President.
89
 That position has facilitated the legalisation of executive 
repression through scrupulous enactment of new laws, modification of existing laws as 
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well as tactically pre-empting the enactment of legislation on CPR proposed by the 
opposition.
90
 This subsection examines three principal areas through which presidential 
influence is exerted on the legislature and the legislative process. 
 
2.2.1. Residual and Delegated Legislative Powers 
 
Legislative power is primarily vested in Parliament which in theory is bicameral 
consisting of the National Assembly and Senate.
91
 The Senate is an innovation of the 
1996 Constitution. However it is yet to be formed because election to, and appointment 
of its members is dependent on an implementing legislation which is yet to be enacted.
92
 
In practice therefore, Parliament consist only of the National Assembly.
93
 However, it is 
not the only legislative organ and its areas of competence have been specifically 
delineated. They include fundamental liberties, civil status, penal procedures, political, 
administrative and judicial organisation, financial and patrimonial matters, social and 
economic programme and the education system.
94
 The reason for that delineation 
emanates from the fact that the President is authorised to exercise statutory authority
95
 
and to issue rules and regulations in the areas which do not fall under Parliament’s 
competence.
96
  A problem with the residual legislative power is that the absence of 
delineation makes it very broad. The danger is that it can provide opportunities for the 
President to undermine the exercise of rights guaranteed in primary legislation. 
 
Those assertions can be supported by the fact that the implementation of some laws on 
CPR is left to enabling presidential decrees which determine the scope of the rights. This 
was the case with the Freedom of Social Communication Law (FSC).
97
  Prior to 1990, 
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mass communication was monopolised by the state owned television station, Cameroon 
Radio and Television (CRTV). Under the FSC Law of 1990, the freedom of audiovisual 
communication was guaranteed subject to the conditions regulating the granting of 
licenses. At the time of its promulgation, the relevant regulatory instrument was to be 
enacted by decree.
98
 However, the decree was not enacted until April 2000,
99
 in effect 
delaying the exercise of that right for another ten years. Under that decree, licences are 
granted on a renewable five year basis for radio stations and ten years for television.
100
 It 
also vests final decisional powers for granting licences on the Minister of Communication 
who is not guided in that respect by specific criteria.
101
 The practise therefore is to refuse 
the renewal of licenses to those organisations usually critical of the government or to 
issue temporal licenses which can be suspended or revoked at the behest of the 
Minister.
102
 This helps to censure the information provided by the media such that those 
that are apprehensive of having their licenses revoked or suspended tend not to be critical 
of the government.
103
 
 
An illustrative case is Open Society Justice Initiative (on behalf of Pius Njawe Noumenie) 
v Cameroon
104
 a complaint before the African Commission. In that case, the complainant 
applied to the Ministry of Communication for a broadcasting licence for the Messager 
Group
105
 to operate Radio Freedom FM. The Ministry failed to respond to this 
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application within the statutory period of six months. The complainant alleged that ‘the 
Ministry was in the habit of processing applications for operational licences in an 
arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory manner’. They also alleged that temporary licences 
were usually issued which did not provide any legal cover to operators of radio stations 
and could be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, the Ministry ‘tends to ban, in an 
arbitrary, discriminatory and politically motivated manner, existing operators from 
continuing to operate’. 
 
In view of the above circumstances, the complainant proceeded to announce a date for 
the commencement of broadcasting. Ahead of the announced date, the Ministry banned 
the radio station, sealing its premises and confiscating the property of the complainant. 
The complainant faced further criminal proceedings initiated by the Ministry for 
operating a broadcasting station illegally. In fact, in a domestic civil claim in the same 
saga, the complainant had requested provisional measures to unseal the premises of the 
station and the return of its property. It took the Court of First Instance in Douala five 
months to declare that it had no jurisdiction and that it was to be referred to the 
Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court.  
 
The Complainant alleged that the above facts constituted a breach of articles 1, 2, 9 and 
14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, the Commission did 
not decide on the merits of the case
106
 as the parties eventually agreed to settle the 
matter.
107
 
 
Further, with regard to presidential legislative powers, in other instances, the exercise of 
CPR is facilitated by institutions that are dependent on presidential decrees for their 
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establishment, regulation and appointment of personnel. The provisions of such decrees 
can be used to undermine the ability of those institutions to contribute positively to the 
realisation of CPR, for example, the national electoral commission, Elections Cameroon 
(ELECAM) which was created by an act of Parliament.
108
 The law provides that 
ELECAM shall be an independent body responsible for organising, supervising and 
managing elections and referendum operations.
109
 The date of its effective operation, 
remuneration of chief executive officers and appointment of its members depended on a 
presidential decree.
110
 In 2008 the statutory twelve members of that institution were 
appointed
111
 ten of whom were members of the ruling party.
112
 The appointment was 
inherently inconsistent with the ELECAM Law which provided that membership of that 
institution was inconsistent with membership of a political party or supporting group.
113
 
Given its partisan composition and its dependence on the executive, the independence 
and impartiality of the institution appeared doubtful. Under those circumstances, 
ELECAM could not be relied upon as an institution capable of promoting democratic 
participation in Cameroon. Following repeated criticism, the law was amended to 
increase its membership to eighteen purportedly to reflect a broader representation.
114
 In 
July 2011, prior to presidential elections scheduled to take place in October, six new 
members were appointed by presidential decree although the earlier ruling CPDM 
members were maintained.
115
 Not unexpectedly, the incumbent President Biya won the 
election extending his twenty nine year rule for another seven years. The election was 
criticised by national and international observers for a number of reasons including the 
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ineffectiveness and lack of independence of ELECAM.
116
 Given the central role of that 
institution in conducting free and fair elections in Cameroon, its institutional dependence 
militated against its ability to act impartially. The Commonwealth Expert Team that was 
invited to observe the election process emphatically recommended that concrete steps 
should be taken to enhance the independence of ELECAM.
 117
  
 
In addition to residual legislative powers, presidential dominance of the legislature and 
the legislative process can be gleaned from the regime of delegated powers. The 
Constitution states that: 
 
…with regard to the subjects listed in Article 26 (2) above,118  Parliament may 
empower the President of the Republic to legislate by way of ordinance for a 
limited period and for given purposes.
119
 
 
Ordinances promulgated under that provision enter into force on the day of their 
publication and remain so as long as Parliament has not refused to ratify them.
120
  Like 
the residual domain, the scope of delegated legislation is extensive. It does not indicate 
what the ‘given purposes’ may be. Arguably, the Constitution cannot contemplate all the 
possible circumstances under which delegated legislation may be necessary. Yet in the 
particular context of Cameroon where the President formulates government policy, has a 
disciplined parliamentary majority and substantial control of its party, it is unlikely that 
without specific criteria guiding the delegation of legislative powers, Parliament can be 
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relied upon to ensure that delegated powers are not used to promote policies which may 
inhibit the exercise of CPR.  
 
Moreover, the Constitution provides no guidelines or standards regulating the exercise of 
delegated power. For the purpose of minimising the potential for abuse of that power, the 
provision of a structure within which delegated powers are exercised is important. In the 
absence of a constitutional provision to that effect, it presumably will be determined by 
the enabling legislation. The danger is that, that legislation will be enacted by a 
Parliament subject to the President. As such, it is possible to envisage a situation where 
Parliament will merely endorse a structure proposed or imposed by the President. That 
lacuna combines to create extensive capacity for the President to usurp legislative powers 
to pursue objectives that can be detrimental to the enforcement of CPR. This is the case 
with the Cameroonian Penal Code promulgated by an ordinance which dates back to the 
era of former President Ahidjo.
121
 That Law has been amended through the years but has 
substantially preserved the original provisions some of which undermine the exercise of 
CPR. For instance, section 347 which criminalises acts of consensual sexual relations 
between adults of the same gender. A number of people have been arrested and 
imprisoned on the basis of that provision.
122
 The Law will remain in force until it is 
repealed by Parliament. 
 
Although delegation of legislative power is not unusual, exercise of such powers should 
be circumscribed by the provision of clear limits on their exercise.
123
 In Germany for 
instance, the legislature is required to provide clear guidelines for the content of 
regulations.
124
 Caroline Morris and Ryan Malone assert that the ability of the executive to 
utilise delegated powers to implement its policy preferences without parliamentary 
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oversight is particularly inimical to the exercise of fundamental rights.
125
 This is partly 
due to the fact that governments may seek to maintain their hold on power and if that 
objective can be achieved through policy facilitated by delegation, then individual 
liberties which conflict with those policies may be undermined as a result of their 
implementation.
126
  
 
In the case of Cameroon, both the residual and delegated powers of the President serve to 
further alter the balance of power to his advantage and undermine the extent to which 
Parliament can use its legislative powers to enhance the realisation of CPR.  
 
2.2.2. The Legislative Process and Admissibility Criteria 
 
In addition to residual and delegated legislative powers, the President is given priority in 
the introduction of bills for consideration by Parliament. The admissibility criteria give 
pre-eminence to the consideration of government bills and private member bills accepted 
by the government, while bills initiated by the President override all others in terms of the 
order of consideration.
127
 Any other private member bills are considered subsequently 
and this may only occur three subsequent sittings after a bill was originally admitted.
128
 
This is a formidable tool in the hands of the government as it has been used tactically to 
prevent the consideration of bills from the opposition by interminably postponing 
consideration.
129
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A case in point is the opposition’s proposals for the adoption of a harmonised electoral 
code. That proposal had been made repeatedly by the opposition since 1991 on the 
supposition that it was necessary for promoting the democratisation process.
130
 Lacking 
support from the government and Parliament, consideration of the reform bill was 
persistently postponed and was eventually rejected.
131
 One of the important arguments 
made by the opposition to support the need for a harmonised electoral code was the 
bewildering legislative landscape that characterised the election process.
132
 There was a 
vast array of legislative instruments and institutions with contradictory and confounding 
responsibilities.
133
 This made the electoral process opaque and difficult to navigate. 
 
 It has been argued that the multiplication of legislative instruments and institutions is a 
deliberate government strategy to undermine the ability of the opposition to have equal 
access to and participation in the electoral process.
134
 By making the electoral landscape 
complex and indeterminate to the opposition, the government would be at an advantage 
by virtue of the fact that it is conversant with the relevant laws and their various 
requirements. So, government officials can tactically reject the candidacy of opposition 
candidates for some obscure reason or fail to register or provide voting cards for 
electorates by referring to some law which is largely unknown or perhaps prescribes non-
existent or ambiguous requirements. A case in point is Benz Enow Bate v ELECAM
135
  an 
electoral petition decided by the Supreme Court. The facts, briefly were that, the 
candidacy of the petitioner in the 2011 presidential election was rejected on the ground 
that the declaration of his candidacy failed to provide a legalised signature as required by 
section 52 of the Law Laying Down the Conditions for Presidential Elections. The 
Supreme Court upheld the initial decision of ELECAM to reject the candidacy on the 
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basis that the word ‘legalised’ should have appeared in the document to indicate the 
signature was legalised. However, section 52 of the relevant law did not specifically state 
that.
136
 
 
The debate on a harmonised electoral code was subsequently revived in 2005 and partly 
as a result of growing international and domestic pressure, one was finally adopted by 
Parliament in April 2012.
137
 It is worthy to note that the bill was introduced by the 
President. The Code has already come under criticism for entrenching the system of 
granting electoral advantages to the ruling party.
138
 
 
The system of admissibility of bills further exposes the weaknesses of Parliament as it 
seems incapable of directing the legislative process. According to a report issued by the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2012, the legislature in Cameroon was described as weakened by 
overwhelming presidential influence.
139
 The report further stated that, the overwhelming 
majority held by the ruling party ensured that Parliament was subject to the wishes of the 
executive and almost no initiative originated from Parliament.
140
 Matthias Nguini has 
also argued that Presidential control of Parliament facilitates the government’s ability to 
limit the exercise of CPR while appearing to be liberalising the political space to allow 
for their more effective exercise.
141
 With reference to the 1990 Liberty Laws, Nguini 
argued that while the government purported to provide various CPR unavailable in the 
Ahidjo regime, the incumbent President Biya’s ability to control the legislative process 
meant that the provisions of the Liberty Laws were used to limit their exercise for public 
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policy reasons.
142
 Two examples will be noted here with regard to the laws, first, on 
public assembly and, second freedom of communication. 
 
A brief examination of the law regulating freedom of assembly demonstrates how some 
of its provisions grant wide discretion to executive officials to restrict the exercise of that 
right.
143
  Section 3 of that law requires the relevant administrative officials to be informed 
through a declaration of intent, three days in advance of the intention to organise a public 
gathering. The official is required to acknowledge receipt of the declaration.
144
 Although 
the law does not explicitly require that approval be granted, officials have interpreted the 
requirement to issue receipts as constituting authorisation such that a failure to issue 
receipts amounts to a prohibition of the intended meeting.  
 
A fairly recent event demonstrates how the receipt requirement can constitute a weapon 
to suppress free assembly. On 30 November 2011, the Minister Delegate in the Ministry 
of Justice (Maurice Kamto) made an exceptional move by resigning from the 
government.
145
 His resignation was announced through a letter published by several press 
organisations. On 19 January 2012, Kamto made a declaration of intent to organise a 
press conference on 25 January, to explain the reasons for his resignation.
146
 The relevant 
administrative official, the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) for Yaoundé V, refused to grant 
a receipt on the ground that the letter on 30 November provided sufficient explanation 
and therefore no further explanations were necessary. Moreover, according to the SDO, 
an attempt by Kamto to revisit those reasons through a press conference could only 
constitute ‘une menace à l’ordre public que je ne saurait cautionner’147 Through an 
administrative order he went further to ban all public assemblies within the Yaoundé V 
area and called on the forces of law and order to ensure enforcement.
148
  No further 
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explanations were provided as to how the press conference would indeed constitute a 
threat to public order. Kamto, however, subsequently circulated another letter through the 
press in which he indicated some of the reasons which precipitated his resignation. 
Essentially, he was displeased with government inertia, tribalism and the level of 
corruption amongst government officials and failure of the leadership to impose adequate 
sanctions. Given the Cameroonian context in which criticism of the regime is untenable, 
the SDO seemed compelled to prohibit the press conference.
149
  
 
The FSC Law grants similar discretionary powers to administrative authorities who can 
apply those powers to restrict its exercise.
150
 For instance the law provides that an 
administrative authority may order the seizure of publications of a press organisation 
which is deemed to have violated public policy principles.
151
 Alternatively, the sale of 
such publications may be banned by the Minister of Territorial Administration.
152
 Owing 
to the ambiguity of the law in terms of distinguishing the ‘press’ from the ‘media’ 
administrative authorities interpret both to fall under the same category. Consequently, 
there is interference with media organisations broadcasting information containing 
criticism of government officials.
153
 The discretionary power provides one of the most 
formidable mechanism by which administrative authorities restrict press freedom. It is 
used to prevent the dissemination of information exposing corrupt practices of 
government officials or publications criticising government officials or policies.
154
 In 
2008, for instance,  the Paris based Rapporteurs sans frontiers reported that on June 8, 
government officials had ordered that a TV program (which focused on a corruption 
scandal involving senior government officials like the PM) broadcast by Canal 2 
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International be taken off the air.
155
 In 2003, twelve independent broadcasting 
organisations that were usually critical of the government were either closed down or 
were denied the right to renew their licences.
156
  Again, on April 14, 2003, security forces 
raided the offices of a local press organisation Mutations, seizing equipment and a disk 
containing that day’s edition of the paper which was alleged to have contained an article 
critical of the President.
157
 
 
By and large, though Parliament has the principal responsibility to legislate on 
fundamental rights issues, constitutional provisions, and the fact of the ruling party’s 
disciplined overwhelming majority make Parliament more an instrument for the 
consolidation of government policies as directed by the President, than a legislative 
institution that can be relied upon to enhance the realisation of CPR.
158
   
 
2.2.3. Dissolution Powers 
 
In addition to the above, presidential omnipotence is intensified by powers to dissolve 
Parliament. The Constitution provides that: 
 
The President of the Republic may, if necessary and after consultation with the 
Government, the Bureaux of the National Assembly and the Senate, dissolve the 
National Assembly…159 
 
There are at least three problems that can be identified with that provision with regards to 
checks and balances. Firstly, the President merely consults the relevant institutions rather 
than acquire their assent. It is doubtful that any objection on their part would be complied 
with.
160
 Secondly, the circumstances under which dissolution can occur are vaguely 
defined. Any situation unfavourable to the President can qualify as ‘necessary’ given that 
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it is solely his responsibility to determine the qualifying circumstances. Thirdly and 
perhaps more problematic is the fact that, such a decision is unlikely to be subject to 
judicial review.
161
 That is so because it falls within the spectrum of what is known as 
‘acts of the government’ which under the French doctrine of actes de gouvernement 
cannot be reviewed by any court.
162
 Those three weaknesses make dissolution an absolute 
and potent weapon which further undermines whatever scope of oversight Parliament 
could have on the President. Although the fact of the current parliamentary majority may 
provide no incentive for the President to invoke that power, its availability can have a 
pre-emptive effect on parliamentary initiative.
163
 
 
Dissolution can be a latent weapon to control a legislature that would otherwise exercise 
effective oversight on the executive.
164
 In Niger, President Mamadou Tanja dissolved 
Parliament in 2009 following a failed attempt to amend constitutional provisions which 
prevented him from running for a third term.
165
 While presidents in highly presidential 
semi-presidential regimes may be vested with some dissolution powers, these are usually 
circumscribed.
166
  For instance the Namibian provision on dissolution power limits the 
discretion of the President. He may dissolve Parliament ‘on the advice of Cabinet if the 
Government is unable to govern effectively’.167Moreover, it creates a form of constraint 
which may diminish incentives to resort to its use. If Parliament were to be dissolved, the 
President will equally be subjected to re-elections at the same time that a new Parliament 
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is elected.
168
 This may prove detrimental where he has lost popularity and the threat of 
losing elections may inhibit any aspiration to dissolve Parliament for unconstitutional 
reasons. 
 
2.3. Decree Powers and Constitutional Exceptionalism 
 
Another contributory factor to the imperial presidency is the presidential monopoly over 
the control of states of emergencies. As discussed below, the Constitution grants wide 
powers without sufficient oversight from the legislature or the judiciary thereby failing to 
protect against the threats to CPR in the event of a state of emergency. In order to 
understand the weaknesses of the system, a brief examination of some normative 
standards provided by the Human Rights Committee, under article 4 of the ICCPR is 
deemed relevant. The ICCPR has been incorporated into domestic law in Cameroon and 
as per the Constitution overrides national laws.
169
 It seems appropriate that it should form 
part of the standards by which to assess the emergency regime in Cameroon. 
 
2.3.1. The ICCPR and States of Emergencies  
 
Although constitutionalism requires the imposition of limits on governmental powers, 
governments also have to be empowered to deal with certain emergency situations which 
may threaten the existence of a state and the ordinary functioning of its institutions.
170
  
So, it has become customary for national constitutions to include provisions granting 
exceptional powers to the executive or other institutions to address contemplated 
exigencies
171
 for the ‘conservative’ purpose of restoring the proper functioning of the 
state’s institutions and protecting CPR.172 However, the exercise of exceptional powers is 
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prima facie in tension with constitutionalism as it requires a partial suspension of the 
legal order existing under ordinary times. This is a particularly precarious situation from 
a CPR perspective because suspension of the legal order threatens the rule of law as 
dealing with the emergency requires the introduction of new legislation which ostensibly 
curtails the exercise of CPR.
173
 It is through the exercise of such powers that executive 
authorities can engage in massive violations of CPR in the guise of containing an 
emergency.
174
 Their exercise should therefore be stringently regulated.  
 
International law provides some normative benchmarks for regulating states of 
emergency. In so doing it can fill   gaps in domestic law which can provide wide powers 
to restrict CPR during emergencies.
175
 Although the effectiveness of international law 
may be constrained for reasons related to its reliance on state compliance,
 
it still provides 
a useful means to limit unjustified recourse to the use of emergency powers.
 176
 
 
The U.N. Human Rights Committee
177
 provides some normative standards to be observed 
by states in pursuance of exigencies under article 4(1) of the ICCPR:  
 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
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The ICCPR does not specifically define a state of emergency. But as per the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), before an emergency is proclaimed, ‘the situation must 
amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of a nation’.178 The Siracusa 
Principles
179
 have gone further to substantiate on the characteristics of an emergency. 
Thus, a state must be faced with ‘a situation of exceptional and actual or imminent danger 
which threatens the life of the nation’.180 With respect to a threat, it must be of a nature 
that it: 
a) Affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of the territory 
of the State, and 
(b) Threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political independence 
or the territorial integrity of the State or the existence or basic functioning of 
institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the rights recognised in the 
Covenant.
 181
 
 
Further, internal conflicts or unrest which do not constitute a threat as described above do 
not justify derogations under article 4(1).
182
  
 
The criteria developed by the HRC and under the Siracusa Principles reflect the earlier 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights under article 15 (1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
183
 In Lawless v Ireland,
184
 the Court described 
an emergency as:  
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[A]n exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of 
which the state is composed. 
 
The above criteria were developed further by the European Commission on Human 
Rights in the Greek Case.
185
 The Commission held that an emergency must be actual or 
imminent, must affect the whole population, the continuance of the organised life of the 
community must be threatened and the normal measures permissible under the 
Convention to maintain public order and safety were inadequate to deal with the 
emergency.
186
 
 
Under the ICCPR, in addition to satisfying the conditions discussed earlier, a state of 
emergency must be officially proclaimed.
187
 That is important to preserve the principles 
of legality and the rule of law.
188
 Once a proclamation has been made, other normative 
standards apply. Resort may be had to the principle of proportionality which requires 
measures undertaken to be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigency in 
question.
189
 For instance it is necessary that states of emergency be short-lived and last 
only as long as the emergency and be limited in material scope and the geographical 
regions under threat.
190
 The ICCPR also prohibits the suspension of non-derogable rights 
such as the right to life and freedom from torture, genocide and arbitrary detention.
191
 
Other freedoms such as movement, association and expression may be limited but only to 
the extent that is strictly necessary for containing the state of emergency.
192
 Judicial 
review of executive actions should be available, as well as the necessity for the 
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observance of due process guarantees and the independence of the judiciary.
193
 A system 
so designed, is intended to mitigate the transformation of an emergency into a perpetual 
state of executive tyranny where CPR could be subject to massive violations ostensibly 
authorised by law.  
 
It is against this legal background that the Cameroonian Constitution can be judged. 
 
2.3.2. The Emergency Regime in Cameroon 
 
The emergency regime in Cameroon is provided for by the Constitution which vests the 
President with power to legislate by decree in case of emergencies or a state of siege. 
Article 9(1) and (2) respectively state that: 
 
The President of the Republic may, where circumstances so warrant, declare by 
decree a state of emergency which shall confer upon him such special powers as 
may be provided for by law. 
 
In the event of a serious threat to the nation’s territorial integrity or to its 
existence, its independence or institutions, the President of the Republic may 
declare a state of siege by decree and take any measures as he may deem 
necessary. He shall inform the Nation of his decision by message. 
 
Three fundamental issues arise from the above provisions which render the emergency 
regime a ‘recipe for constitutional dictatorship’;194 the definition of an emergency 
situation or state of siege; the powers conferred on the President and the absence of 
sufficient checks and balances during these exceptional periods.  
 
The Constitution is silent on the potential circumstances that constitute a state of 
emergency. However, there is a regulatory instrument on states of emergency and it is 
therein defined as: 
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[A]n occurrence which, by its nature and gravity, is considered a national 
disaster, or a series of disturbances undermining public order or the security of the 
state, or a foreign invasion.
195
  
 
On the face of it, the provision appears to contemplate circumstances which may 
transcend ordinary disasters or public disturbances, to the extent that they affect the 
security of the state. However, besides ‘foreign invasion’, a missing element which is a 
fundamental consideration is the idea of a ‘threat to the life of a nation’ which is 
overshadowed by the lesser conditions provided. An event may be so great as to 
constitute a national disaster that can undermine state institutions without necessarily 
imperilling their normal functioning. Further, a series of disturbances can undermine 
public order and security but may still be dealt with by ordinary means of law 
enforcement albeit with increased resource capacity. With regards to the state of siege, 
the Constitution appears to reflect the severity contemplated by international law as it 
permits a declaration when the nation’s territorial integrity, existence and independence 
are under serious threat.  
 
Charles Fombad however asserts that there is no indication as to what constitutes a 
‘threat’ and how ‘seriousness’ is determined.196 In that respect, he opines that the 
provision potentially accommodates unjustified invocation of emergency powers due to 
its vagueness. Although that may be the case, it is as Fombad himself concedes, 
impracticable to specifically anticipate the myriads of perilous circumstances that a 
country might be confronted with.
197
 As such, it is not unusual that the Constitution does 
not outline the specific circumstances that constitute a threat or count as serious. The 
more significant issue though, is as discussed below the failure of the law to pre-empt 
potential abuse by vesting the power to make such considerations solely in the President. 
 
 In both cases (state of emergency and siege), the determination of the circumstances 
under contemplation is in the subjective opinion of the President who is under no 
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obligation to consult any other institution. This is, indeed, a threat to constitutionalism as 
the President is empowered to act without regard to the other institutions that would 
otherwise provide objective appreciation of the perceived circumstances. In the absence 
of parliamentary oversight and more stringent conditions to determine emergency 
situations, it is probable that emergency powers could be invoked for purely political 
reasons to suit the personal whim of the President.
198
 The situation is even more 
precarious in the light of the fact that he is vested with powers to ‘take any measures as 
he may deem necessary’. Again, it is subjective and the President has no obligation to 
consult any institution with regards to measures undertaken or contemplated, to ensure 
they are strictly necessary in the circumstance. This is, as Fombad has remarked, a ‘carte 
blanche’ for arbitrary presidential action.199 It fails to take cognisance of the principle of 
proportionality, by virtue of which measures taken must be strictly limited to the extent 
required by the exigency.
200
 Such a broad statement allows for egregious and 
unjustifiable violations of CPR.  
 
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the emergency law vests 
administrative and security officers with wide powers which are susceptible to abuse. 
Section 5(6) permits the detention of persons without charge for seven days by  the 
Prefect, fifteen days by the Governor and two months (renewable once) by the Minister 
of Territorial Administration. These are lengthy periods for which the law provides little 
safeguards by way of justifying their necessity. A victim may be subjected to detention 
for up to, or longer than four months, even beyond the subsistence of the emergency. The 
law imposes a time limit of three months for a state of emergency to last although it can 
be renewed once for an additional period of three months.
201
   
 
In the absence of legislative oversight, the only alternative is judicial review. As will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the mechanisms for judicial review are ineffective. 
Worthy of note here is that ordinary citizens whose rights are likely to be affected by the 
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emergency regulation do not have access to constitutional review.
202
 Moreover, under the 
doctrine of actes de gouvernement,
203
 it is unlikely that a presidential decree 
promulgating a state of emergency would be subject to review. With regard to review of 
administrative acts, there are physical, economic and procedural difficulties associated 
with access to the Supreme Court which, until March 2012 had exclusive jurisdiction in 
that respect. But more fundamentally, the judiciary lacks independence and therefore 
unlikely to provide sufficient restraint on authorities exercising power under an 
emergency regime. Thus in effect, in the absence of adequate judicial or legislative 
oversight, the emergency regime appears to be a recipe for a constitutional dictatorship.  
 
In some jurisdictions, emergency regimes are more robustly structured to pre-empt 
arbitrary exercise of emergency powers. Moreover, some indication may be provided as 
to what constitutes an emergency, accompanied by provisions stipulating which 
institution(s) can determine whether particular circumstances fulfil the criteria for a state 
of emergency.
204
 The South African emergency regime appears to provide a balance 
between exceptional powers and checks and balances. For instance, a state of emergency 
may be declared only on the basis of an Act of Parliament when the nation is threatened 
by war, national disaster or other public emergency and a declaration is vital for the 
restoration of order.
205
 Any legislation or measures taken in that respect may only be 
effective prospectively and for no longer than twenty one days from the date of the 
declaration. However, the National Assembly may extend this period for no more than 
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three months at a time. Nevertheless such extensions must be arrived at in the first 
instance by a resolution adopted with a supporting majority vote and subsequently by a 
60% vote of the majority of parliamentarians.
206
 Further oversight is provided by the 
courts which have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a declaration, its extension or any 
subsequent legislation or measures taken in pursuance of the declaration.
207
 Again, any 
derogation from the Bill of Rights is only permissible to the extent that it is ‘strictly’ 
necessary and that it is not inconsistent with South Africa’s obligation under the 
international law applicable to states of emergency.
208
 
 
In Cameroon, since the 1996 constitutional amendments, emergency powers have not 
been used. As opposed to the Ahidjo regime which thrived under a perpetual state of 
emergency, the Biya regime has declared a state of emergency twice only (in 1984 to deal 
with the coup d’etat and in 1992 following the declaration of results of the presidential 
election of that year).
209
 The case of Wakai v The People
210
 which originated from the 
1992 declaration will be used to highlight some of the difficulties that the emergency 
regime can pose with respect to the exercise of CPR. Although it is pre-1996, as the 
analysis of the Constitution demonstrated earlier, the scope of presidential emergency 
powers has not been substantially altered from the position under the Unitary 
Constitution.  
 
The prelude to Wakai v The People is that, in 1992 incumbent President Biya was 
proclaimed winner of the presidential election of that year amidst allegations of massive 
electoral irregularities. A series of demonstrations subsequently occurred in the 
Northwest Region, the political base of the main opposition party (SDF) which was 
alleged to have won the elections. Following the demonstrations, a state of emergency 
was declared by presidential decree and confined to that Region as required by section 2 
of the Emergency Legislation. Pursuant to the Constitution, that declaration was made 
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without the involvement of any other institution neither was there any apparent criteria to 
determine if the circumstances warranted such a declaration.  
 
Nevertheless, the applicants (mostly close supporters of the defeated opposition leader) 
were arrested under arbitrary circumstances. Some were arrested at night, others without 
warrants (although warrants were later issued by the respective administrative authorities 
and backdated to validate the arrests).
211
 Again, some were arrested pursuant to banditry 
laws which had no relevance to the state of emergency and yet others were arrested in 
different jurisdictions and brought to the Northwest Region to be made subject to the 
emergency law. To further demonstrate contempt for the rule of law, the applicants were 
confined in a detention centre notorious for torture
212
 and some were detained for longer 
than the four month limit imposed by the emergency legislation.  
 
The applicants applied for bail in the Mezam High Court, pending any charges that might 
have been preferred against them. The respondents argued that the administrative 
authorities had exercised their administrative powers under the emergency legislation as a 
result of which the Mezam High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain an application for 
bail. In the respondents’ view, having exercised their administrative powers, the court 
with jurisdiction to entertain any matter arising from the detention was the Administrative 
Bench of the Supreme Court.
213
 The applicants however relying on the principle of voies 
de faits
214
 challenged the administrative character of the acts, as they had been marred by 
gross irregularities. The Court affirmed that the emergency law did not oust its 
jurisdiction to deal with gross violation of CPR. It considered the circumstances of the 
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arrests and detentions arbitrary and ordered the release of the applicants.
215
 Nevertheless, 
the applicants were not released. The government instead transferred them to Yaoundé, 
the capital city of Cameroon.
216
 
 
The case highlights a number of issues. Firstly, as per the Constitution, the declaration 
was made without consulting any other institutions. There were no objective means of 
determining if the circumstances constituted a threat to the nation or its institutions. 
Rather, it appeared as an attempt by the President to legitimate the regime by suppressing 
protests against the allegedly rigged elections. Secondly, administrative authorities were 
able to make use of their wide powers to perpetrate massive violations in an attempt to 
further the President’s ambition of suppressing political opposition. Thirdly, the Court 
had no jurisdiction in constitutional review. It stated that, it had no jurisdiction to review 
the legality of legislative or regulatory instruments taken under the emergency regime.
217
 
Although the Court took a decisive stance against arbitrary executive conduct, its ability 
to actually ensure the release of the applicants was undermined by the judiciary’s lack of 
capacity to enforce judgments against the executive.
218
 
 
Although emergency powers have not been used under the 1996 Constitution, the regime 
is structured in such a way that it appears to be the proverbial ‘loaded weapon ready for 
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need’.219 
 
3. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The foregoing sections have discussed the array of powers vested in the President of   
Cameroon. Because those powers are broad, there is need for a robust system of checks 
and balances to enhance their effective exercise and pre-empt possible abuse. However, 
as seen above Parliament is not in a position to exercise the requisite oversight. The 
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framework for checks and balances is further enfeebled by provisions on immunity and 
impeachment. These are considered below.  
 
3.1. Immunity from Prosecution 
 
Immunity from prosecution is an important principle of public law and may be supported 
by the supposition that it can promote the consistent functioning of public power and 
continuity of the state. It is supposedly for the benefit of the public that immunity is 
granted to public officials such as presidents to enable the discharge of their duties 
without unnecessary distractions or impediments emanating from law suits. While that 
may be the case, there is also the necessity to consider presidential accountability. 
Presidential immunity provisions are a common feature in various regime types, be they 
presidential or semi-presidential
220
 and even in parliamentary systems some senior 
executive officials and parliamentarians enjoy a certain level of immunity. Yet, it should 
not be the case that immunity provisions are drafted to ensure absolute immunity from 
prosecution. That does not augur well for accountability and indeed goes against a basic 
tenet of the rule of law – that no one is above the law.221 
 
In Cameroon, prior to 2008 there was no constitutional provision ostensibly dealing with 
presidential immunity. Therefore, in theory it may have been possible for prosecution to 
be initiated in domestic courts for gross violations of CPR. That position was altered in 
2008 following a constitutional amendment.
222
 Article 53(3) of the Constitution provides 
that: 
                                                 
220
 See for instance, French Constitution, art 68; Nigerian Constitution, s 308; Zambian Constitution, art 
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221
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 Law No. 2008/001 of 14 April 2008 to amend and supplement some provisions of Law No. 96/6 of 18 
January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972.  
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Acts committed by the President of the Republic in pursuance of Articles 5, 8, 9 
and 10 above shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable for 
them after the exercise of his functions.
223
 
 
There are at least two major aspects of this provision which can be deemed inconsistent 
with the need for accountability.  
 
First, there is uncertainty as to the scope of the President’s immunity.  The provision 
simply states that the relevant acts are covered by immunity. It is not clear that these acts 
are limited to criminal or civil or both. Given that the amendment followed a string of 
amendments that had the effect of further consolidating the presidency of the 
incumbent,
224
 the inference can be made that article 53(3) intended to cover both civil 
and criminal acts in which the President may be implicated in pursuance of his 
constitutional functions. So, he cannot be held accountable in any domestic court for acts 
which result in the violation of CPR.  
 
Secondly, presidential immunity covers the period after the expiration of his term of 
office. This is a case of absolute immunity which has the potential to turn an already 
authoritarian regime into outright dictatorship. In the absence of any form of 
accountability during and after the expiration of his term, the President is left with free 
reign to use his powers excessively. 
 
The Cameroonian position seems to reflect that of France where traditionally the head of 
state is reputed to be inviolable.
225
 Yet in France, the President can be prosecuted after 
                                                 
223
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the expiration of his tenure.
226
 That position has been reaffirmed by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel
227
 and the Cour de Cassassion
228
 respectively which ruled that a serving 
president could not (except for high treason) be charged, prosecuted or forced to testify in 
court proceedings for the duration of his term. But that it did not preclude any criminal 
proceedings against him once his term expired.
229
  
 
In the African context, as is the case in Cameroon, presidential immunity appears to be 
gaining prominence as an inducement for long term presidents to relinquish power.
230
 
Some members of the parliamentary opposition in Cameroon seemed to have been 
influenced by that argument and did not object to the government’s proposal to introduce 
an immunity clause in the Constitution on that basis.
231
 They, however, acknowledged 
that immunity functions well in a situation of checks and balances and therefore did not 
constitute a recipe for constitutional dictatorship.
232
 That latter point is disputable with 
regards to Cameroon in the context of a powerful President operating within a framework 
devoid of adequate checks and balances. Had those members of the opposition 
considered broader political implications beyond the interest of inducing the President to 
step down, it might have been clearer that an immunity clause further empowers the 
President and may provide comparably little incentive to step down. In relation to the 
immunity debate, it may be that there was less concern with accountability as the 
President can be made accountable through an impeachment process. Yet, as 
demonstrated below that too, leaves a lot to be desired. 
                                                 
226
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3.2. Impeachment 
 
Impeachment can provide a useful means of enforcing accountability, if well conceived. 
Its very existence and the probability of its use can act as a source of pressure to induce a 
president to respect the rule of law. In Cameroon, it is doubtful that the impeachment 
procedure can be considered an effective system of accountability.  
 
The current provision on impeachment is an amended version of article 53 (amended in 
2008) which vested the Court of Impeachment with jurisdiction to try the President for 
High Treason. It provided further that the organisation, composition, conditions of 
reference and the applicable procedure before that Court shall be laid down by a 
subsequent legislation. That legislation is still being awaited. However, the 2008 
constitutional amendments shed further (albeit restricted) light on the impeachment 
procedure. The new article 53 provides that: 
 
The Court of Impeachment shall have jurisdiction, in respect of acts committed in 
the exercise of their functions to try:  
-The President of the Republic for high treason; …233 
 
The President of the Republic shall be indicted only by the National Assembly 
and the Senate deciding through an identical vote by open ballot and by a four 
fifth majority of their members.
234
 
 
In terms of what constitutes high treason, the Constitution is silent and there is no case 
law illuminating that point given that that procedure has never been invoked. Thus, 
attempting to infer what high treason constitutes is a matter of speculation. However, the 
silence provides the basis to adopt a wide or narrow interpretation, depending on 
whichever best exculpates the President at the material moment. Although it might be 
unrealistic to require an exhaustive list of circumstances, it is important that as a 
                                                 
233
 Constitution of Cameroon, art 53(1). 
234
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mechanism for accountability, particularly of a President who exercises such broad 
powers, there should be some carefully defined guidelines.
235
 Granted, in some systems 
impeachment provisions are similarly vague,
236
 while others attempt to provide what 
might be considered starting points.
237
 However, that does not imply that they are 
commendable or sufficient. Lack of clarity can provide scope for subjective 
interpretations to enhance the personal objectives of the interpreters.
238
  
 
Further, with respect to Cameroon, the procedure contemplated by subsection (2) renders 
impeachment practically a nullity. Firstly, the President can only be indicted by 
Parliament consisting of the National Assembly and Senate. In the absence of the Senate, 
that responsibility rests solely with the National Assembly. That in itself is not an 
obstacle. What is more problematic though is the extraordinary majority that is required 
to get the process started.  A successful vote requires a four fifth majority which is 
unlikely to be achieved under the current dynamics in Parliament. If the entire opposition 
were to form a united front they will hardly obtain a fraction of the required majority. 
Any effort to succeed at initiating the impeachment process will depend largely on the 
cooperation of members of the ruling party who are unlikely to assist in bringing down a 
regime from which they benefit. The parliamentary opposition unsuccessfully objected to 
that amendment when the bill was presented in Parliament.
239
 They were of the view that 
it amounted to a requirement for unanimity which can never be achieved under the 
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circumstances in Parliament and therefore stifled any possibility of ever impeaching the 
President.
240
 
 
Moreover, the votes are required to be in open ballot implying that there is no 
confidentiality. For such an extreme mechanism which can precipitate regime change, 
dispensing with confidentiality potentially compromises the process as parliamentarians 
particularly from the ruling party are likely to be reluctant to expose themselves as the 
‘renegades’ of their party. Given the patronage networks that exist within these 
institutions, concurring to a motion to impeach the President can expose a 
parliamentarian to possible loss of favours from the system and even more drastic 
consequences.
241
 The requirement of ‘transparency’ in the voting system is perhaps 
deliberate and intended to compromise the impeachment process by deterring any 
prospective vote in favour of the President’s impeachment. The opposition specifically 
requested an amendment to the government bill with respect to the open ballot, to be 
replaced with secret ballots. They argued that: 
 
The impeachment of the President of the Republic is a serious matter and must 
not be left to be influenced by the fact that the vote is open as to enable some of 
the voters to be influenced or intimidated by the voting pattern of some other 
voters and thus cause them not to vote according to their conscience.
242
 
 
The inadequacy of the impeachment system is compounded by the fact that the Court of 
Impeachment is yet to be established since it first appeared in the 1972 Constitution and 
was re-enacted in the 1996 Constitution. Article 53(4) states that the organisation, 
composition and the conditions under which matters shall be referred to, as well as the 
procedure applicable before the Court shall be laid down by law. When this law will be 
enacted, is a matter of speculation.
243
 There is a distinct possibility that failure to ensure 
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the creation of that Court or the temporary delegation of its jurisdiction is deliberate. This 
assertion is reinforced by the fact that the jurisdiction of other institutions such as the 
Constitutional Council (which is yet to be created) is temporarily exercised by the 
Supreme Court.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the scope of presidential power in Cameroon, and associated 
accountability measures under the 1996 Constitution. It has demonstrated that, the 
arrangements have continued to be influenced by the French colonial heritage, introduced 
in the previous constitutions. Despite being based on a separation of powers model which 
is deemed to provide an additional separation of executive powers and potentially more 
accountability, the current system has developed a more potent variant which obscures 
any benefits that can accrue to that system. Thus, presidential power continues to be 
excessive, reinforced by a feeble accountability framework. As such, the President is in a 
position to unilaterally control executive authorities, security forces and the legislature, 
undermining their ability to contribute positively to the realisation of CPR. Although 
some of the powers have not been used, their mere availability is menacing to other 
institutions which would otherwise provide oversight on the President. 
 
Moreover, as a fragile democracy, with feeble or inexistent vertical accountability 
mechanisms, there are no alternative avenues for presidential accountability. As the next 
chapter shall demonstrate, the situation is further compounded by extensive presidential 
control of the judiciary, a position which undermines judicial independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Moreover, in the event that the law is enacted, there is reason to suspect that, like the other institutions 
examined in this study, the Court will be a ‘paper tiger’. 
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Chapter 4 
Judicial Independence in Cameroon 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the subject of judicial independence in Cameroon, against the 
backdrop of the framework of constitutionalism presented in Chapter 1. As was discussed 
there, an independent judiciary is an important part of the system of checks and balances, 
providing scope for the judiciary to exercise oversight on the other institutions of 
government.
1
 The courts can provide an ‘indispensable link in the machinery’2 for 
protection against states’ violation of CPR.  
 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, the civil law model that was transplanted to Cameroon 
at independence was oriented towards executive control over the judiciary. The current 
1996 Constitution purports to alter that position by introducing a system of equitable 
balance and separation of powers through which presumably the judiciary would be 
accorded greater scope to exercise its constitutionally guaranteed independence. Its status 
was augmented from that of an ‘authority’ to a ‘power’ as is the case with other 
governmental powers. However, as will be demonstrated, its institutional structure and 
the conditions for securing judicial independence under that Constitution continue to be 
influenced by the inherited model. As such, judicial independence has continued to be 
undermined. A consequence that has ensued is the inability of the judiciary to effectively 
secure the protection of CPR. 
 
To develop the above assertions, this chapter is divided into four major sections. The first 
section builds on the principle of judicial independence which was briefly stated in 
Chapter 1. The second section provides a brief structural framework of the judiciary in 
Cameroon. This is considered important because the judiciary is characterised by a 
                                                 
1
 See ch 1, s 3.2 at 42-46. 
2
 Linda Keith Camp, ‘Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection around the World’ (2002) 85(4) 
Judicature 195.  
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complex structure with features which may be unfamiliar particularly to a non-civil law 
reader. That section further discusses the constitutional status of the judiciary, to provide 
the background for understanding the problem of lack of judicial independence in 
Cameroon. In Section three, the conditions for securing individual and institutional 
independence of the judiciary are discussed. Section four examines the mechanisms for 
judicial accountability and how they affect judicial independence. The chapter concludes 
with a summation of the discussions in the previous sections. 
 
1. REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
Judicial independence is a concept which evades a consensual definition. As asserted by 
Diana Woodhouse, it has been subjected to ‘vagaries of interpretation and usage’.3   
Building on the principle as briefly stated in Chapter 1, three related analytical 
dimensions may be distinguished. Firstly, autonomy and power; secondly, individual and 
institutional independence and thirdly, accountability.  
 
Autonomy and power are important for the judiciary in its role of limiting governmental 
power. Autonomy implies freedom from undue interference, particularly interference by 
the executive which is usually party to disputes concerning CPR violations.
4
 It is an 
important dimension as it provides scope for the courts to adjudicate such disputes fairly 
and impartially without being under constraint to unduly favour the executive. Power 
complements that by enhancing the enforceability of decisions. Autonomy and power 
combine to promote an independent judiciary with the capacity of subjecting the 
executive to the rule of law. 
 
                                                 
3
 Diana Woodhouse, ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability’ in Andenas and Fairgrieve (eds), Judicial 
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4
 Christopher Larkins, ‘Judicial Independence: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis’ (1996) 44(4) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 605, 608. 
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Judicial independence should operate both at the individual and institutional level. The 
former refers to a judge’s autonomy from undue external influence (from the political 
branches as already mentioned) and internal pressures such as control from higher court 
judges or other hierarchical structures. Control from higher court judges by way of 
appellate review is not prima facie at variance with individual independence.
5
 However, 
independence may be compromised in circumstances where lower court judges may be 
inclined to, or feel compelled to reflect the wishes of senior judges particularly where 
internal administrative hierarchies make their career progression dependent on senior 
judges. Moreover, other hierarchical structures may be designed in ways that vest the 
control of the judicial tenure on executive officials who can use that position to influence 
a judge’s decisional independence.  
 
To promote individual independence, a number of conditions or structural mechanisms 
are desirable. As discussed in Chapter 1 these include the method of appointment, 
securing the judicial tenure, promotion, transfers, discipline and remuneration.
6
 The 
guiding criteria for regulating generally the judicial tenure are objectivity and 
transparency. The method of appointing judges contributes to how judges may perceive 
their loyalties. Any appointment process should ideally be transparent and objective and 
based on such aspects as the integrity, ability and experience of individual candidates.
7
 
Similarly, the judicial tenure can be enhanced by objective and transparent criteria for 
promotions and transfers. Security of tenure is also an important determinant of a judge’s 
ability to exercise autonomy. In the absence of a secured tenure, judges may be 
                                                 
5
 Owen Fiss, ‘The Limits of Judicial Independence’ (1993) 25 University of Miami Inter-American Law 
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predisposed to submit to pressures emanating from external sources. This can be 
enhanced through guarantees of a mandatory retirement age secured by law.
8 
 
 
With regards to removal and discipline the same objective and transparent criteria should 
be employed based on gross misconduct, incompatibility with office or physical and 
mental incapacity which prevent judges from undertaking their duties.
9
 Further, 
disciplinary procedures should guarantee a fair hearing and decisions in that respect 
should be subject to independent review.
10
 Individual independence can also be 
compromised where judges are not financially secured, as insecurity can throw judges 
open to corruption.
11
 More particularly with regard to executive influence, where 
remuneration is not guaranteed by law and protected against diminution, it may similarly 
lead to financial insecurity.
12
 There is however a caveat to diminution of salaries which is 
that it may be acceptable where it is done as part of a broader economic measure which 
affects all public services.
13
 The rationale for stringent measures to secure financial 
autonomy is to ensure that judicial salaries are not altered as a means of exerting 
influence on the judges or as a punitive measure.
14
 
 
At the institutional level, independence requires that the judiciary as a collective has a 
secured source of funding, is adequately funded, free from interference from the 
executive in terms of its administration, and has the power to secure the enforcement of 
its decisions. Institutional independence has an important correlation with individual 
independence.
15
 Judges need to be able to exercise their independence within a broader 
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context of an independent judiciary.
 16
  Individual judges are unlikely to have the capacity 
to exercise independence where the institution as a whole lacks that quality. 
 
Given that financial allocations usually involve the political branches, it is also clearly 
desirable that that position is not used to influence the judiciary. The judiciary should 
have an autonomous judicial budget as that allows scope for it to function without the 
external threat of alteration of its financial status. This implies, at least, that the 
judiciary’s budget is secured by charging it to a consolidated fund or determined as a 
fixed percentage of the state’s budget.17 In addition, funds should be sufficient to meet 
daily running costs.  
 
There are a number of approaches to securing financial autonomy while also ensuring 
that the judiciary is provided with adequate funds. Some approaches favour exclusive 
judicial responsibility in the preparation of the judicial budget
18
 while others lean towards 
increased judicial participation in conjunction with either the executive or parliament.
19
 
Although there may not be an ideal approach, the importance is to ensure that funding is 
adequate and the judiciary is not dependent either on the goodwill of the executive or the 
legislature. 
 
In addition to financial autonomy, institutional independence also requires that the 
executive refrain from controlling the administration of the courts.
20
 So, for instance, case 
assignment is considered an internal matter which should be dealt with by the courts.
21
 
However, executive supervision of some administrative processes of the courts is not 
inherently inconsistent with judicial independence as the government is generally 
responsible for the effective provision of public services in the country.
22
 This is perhaps 
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a necessary interface between the two branches and resonates with the empowering role 
of constitutionalism. If the judiciary is expected to safeguard CPR, it should be provided 
with the basic administrative requirements that can enhance its functioning. Nevertheless, 
executive control is only legitimate to the extent that it enhances the administrative 
performance of the courts in order to allow other judicial processes to be effectively 
carried out.  
 
In terms of judicial power, although the courts may be able to make independent 
decisions, enforceability lies beyond their powers. In accordance with the strict 
separation of powers principle, enforceability of court orders is the responsibility of the 
executive. So, the courts rely on executive officials to execute or comply with their 
decisions.
23
 This position limits the extent to which individual independence may 
positively influence the protection of CPR if executive officials cannot be compelled to 
comply with a court order. Reverting to the empowerment perspective of 
constitutionalism,
 24
 the judiciary should have both the capacity for independent judgment 
and the authority to limit governmental action through the enforceability of its decisions. 
Judicial power can be enhanced by endowing the courts with additional clout to deal 
assertively with contempt of court by executive authorities. Alternatively, or in addition, 
judicial power can be enhanced through vesting the courts with some responsibility over 
enforcement to be exercised in conjunction with the executive. This is not per se 
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers as the latter allows for some 
shared responsibility where necessary to enhance effectiveness or to reduce the incidence 
of usurpation of powers.  
 
The idealistic expectation is that properly conceived, the measures for securing 
independence can preserve the requisite level of autonomy of the judiciary to secure 
individual as well as institutional independence.
25
 Independence is not always possible to 
determine as institutional guarantees may exist but in practice judges are unable to 
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exercise independence. According to Christopher Larkins, where the scope of the courts’ 
authority is so circumscribed that judges cannot reach decisions without the fear of 
jeopardising their career, their independence may be said to be compromised.
26
 Similarly, 
where the scope of the judiciary to function effectively is limited due to its reliance on 
external sources for funding and other administrative matters it is lacking in 
independence. 
 
Independence is, however, not an absolute value. While judges should enjoy a degree of 
insularity, it is also desirable that some degree of accountability exists to prevent the 
abuse of judicial authority.
27
 So, it is in line with the purport of checks and balances that 
appellate review of decisions is carried out by superior courts.
28
 Moreover, judges can be 
submitted to disciplinary measures for professional misconduct particularly where that 
may undermine, or appear to undermine their independence.
29
 However, individual 
independence is potentially threatened where judges can be made subject to disciplinary 
measures for decisions in particular cases. Anticipation of a disciplinary measure from 
the institution responsible for accountability, for deciding a case against the latter’s 
interest may inhibit individual independence. For accountability to complement 
independence, accountability mechanisms should be transparent, and guided by fair and 
objective criteria. Similarly, the personnel or institutions responsible for accountability 
should be vested with the relevant powers, be independent and have no personal interests 
in undermining or enhancing the autonomy of judges.  The objective of accountability 
should be to enhance the judges’ ability to promote the values that, as discussed above, 
judicial independence is said to promote.  
 
As discussed earlier, given that the relationship between independence and accountability 
may be potentially tenuous, achieving the right balance is often problematic.
30
 To ensure 
that both concepts can be complementary to enhance the enforcement of CPR, 
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accountability should not entail undue subjugation to external parties.
31
 The potential of 
accountability encroaching on judicial independence is translated into concrete 
manifestations when the mechanisms designed to secure independence are conceived in 
ways that render the judiciary excessively accountable to the same institution that 
guarantees independence. A possible scenario obtains in terms of political accountability 
by virtue of which judges are accountable to the executive for such aspects as tenure, 
terms and conditions of service. As Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg note, judges who 
are accountable to the same institution that appoints them and determines the subsequent 
path of their career cannot be reasonably relied upon for independent and impartial 
decision making.
32
 Independence can be further undermined in the absence of objective 
or transparent mechanisms by which judges can be held accountable. Although political 
accountability may involve some aspects of legal accountability (such as the provision of 
sanctions for conduct specifically outlined as being subject to disciplinary procedures) 
the political character of such systems undermines the transparency and objectivity that 
inheres in legal accountability measures. 
 
With the conceptual analysis and conditions for judicial independence conceived as 
above, the position in Cameroon is now examined. 
 
2. THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF 
THE JUDICIARY IN CAMEROON 
  
The constitution as discussed in Chapter 1, is the document that embodies the 
institutionalisation of the basic tenets of constitutionalism. It should establish 
governmental institutions and confer powers on them taking into account the context in 
which the constitution is to operate. The Cameroonian Constitution should therefore set 
the tone for the legal framework for judicial independence.  
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 Stephen Burbank, ‘Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Inter-branch Relations’ (2007) 95 
The Georgetown Law Journal 909, 913. 
32
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This subsection will discuss the judicial structure and the constitutional status of the 
judiciary in Cameroon. 
 
2.1. The Judicial Structure 
 
There are two main categories of judicial authorities in Cameroon - judges ‘of the 
bench’33 and prosecutors.34 Generally judges of the bench provide the conventional 
function of presiding over cases. In addition, there is a juge d’instruction (a judge of the 
bench) responsible for conducting preliminary investigations in criminal matters.
35
 While 
prosecutors all form part of what is called the Legal Department (LD). There is one LD 
attached to a Supreme Court, Appeal Court, High Court and Court of First Instance.
36
 
This department is also considered a department in the Ministry of Justice and facilitates 
the overseeing of the judiciary by the Ministry of Justice.
37
 The LD is headed by the 
Procureur Général in the Supreme and Appeal Courts (Directly responsible to the 
Minister of Justice)
38
 and a State Counsel in the lower courts (directly responsible to the 
Procureur Général of the Court of Appeal within its geographical jurisdiction).
39
 Its role 
is to enforce laws, regulations and judgments and in criminal matters to investigate, issue 
warrants and carry out prosecution.
40
  
 
The two categories of judicial personnel begin their career as magistrates and 
subsequently rise to the position of judges. They can serve either at the bench or the LD 
at various points in their career. This is based on the concept of le magistrat polyvalent 
                                                 
33
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35
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(adopted from the French judiciary) which implies that judges of the bench or the LD 
may be able to prosecute, preside over cases and conduct preliminary investigations. As 
such, they can be appointed to serve interchangeably in these different functions and even 
to the Ministry of Justice.
41
 Those arrangements as will be discussed below, are crucial to 
the problem of the absence of judicial independence. 
 
Against the brief background of that structure, the constitutional status of the judiciary is 
now discussed. 
 
2.2. Constitutional Status 
 
A root cause of the absence of judicial independence is associated with the constitutional 
status of the judiciary in relation to the other governmental powers. The judiciary 
occupies a subordinate position to the legislature and the executive. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Federal and Unitary Constitutions referred to the judiciary as an authority 
rather than a power, unlike the executive and the legislature. This followed the French 
model in which the judiciary is referred to as an authority.
42
 However, the current 1996 
Constitution of Cameroon purported to elevate the status of the judiciary from an 
authority to a power, partly as a measure to establish ‘the balance and separation of 
power’.43 Article 37(2) of the Constitution further appears to enhance the position of the 
judiciary by providing that ‘The judicial power shall be independent of the executive and 
legislative powers’. That recognition is commendable particularly in view of the fact that 
the audacious statement appears neither in the Federal nor the Unitary Constitutions. 
 
However, the actual transformation of that status is doubtful. This is partly evident in the 
provisions of article 37(3) which maintains the requirement that ‘The President of the 
Republic shall guarantee the independence of the judicial power’. Certainly, that in itself 
                                                 
41
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does not indicate a prima facie case of judicial subservience as it may be a positive duty 
imposed on the President to ensure that the necessary conditions exist for the judiciary to 
function independently. However, for that obligation to be meaningful, it should 
necessarily be backed by a mechanism to ensure that the President fulfils that obligation. 
Regrettably the Constitution is silent on that.
44
  
 
Arguably, the 1996 constitution altered the normative reference of the judiciary from an 
authority to a power. However, substantively, the judiciary remained under the control of 
the executive. Maurice Kamto for one argues that if the change of judicial status was an 
attempt to introduce a system of balanced power, there is no justification (at least in the 
Cameroonian context) for making one power the guarantor of the independence of 
another power, without a reciprocal obligation.
45
 A justification ‘may’ exist in France 
where this model developed in response to historical issues peculiar to the French 
judiciary.
46
 According to Kamto, the Cameroonian case is different particularly because 
the judiciary does not have a history of obstructing government activities and public life 
as was the case with the judiciary in France under the Ancien Regime.
47
 The adherence to 
a model that ensures the subjugation of the judiciary does not accord with the purported 
intention of enhancing the balance and separation of powers. Moreover, as demonstrated 
below, the conditions for securing judicial independence do not provide much scope for 
the exercise of actual judicial autonomy or power. 
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3. CONDITIONS FOR SECURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
CAMEROON 
 
This subsection examines the conditions adopted to secure judicial independence in 
Cameroon. Drawing from the discussion in Section 1 above, judicial independence will 
be discussed from the individual and institutional dimensions.  
 
3.1. Individual Independence 
 
According to Shimon Shetreet individual independence is composed of two essential 
elements - substantive and personal independence.
48
 The specific features that fall 
generally under the rubric of personal and substantive independence are somewhat 
interrelated warranting a less rigid classification of these elements. The approach adopted 
here reflects a more liberal adherence to these dichotomies where necessary to achieve 
clarity and coherence. In particular, examination of the mechanism for remuneration and 
the internal hierarchical control (which affects substantive independence) will be 
discussed under the institutional dimension. These two aspects cut across both the 
individual and institutional dimensions. 
 
3.1.1. Substantive Independence 
 
The requirement that in discharging his duties, a judge is subject only to the law and his 
conscience is what is referred to as substantive independence.
49
 This requirement is 
essential to enhance the impartiality of the judge and his freedom to act without pressures 
which might influence the course of his decision.  
 
The Constitution of Cameroon recognises substantive independence. It provides that 
‘Magistrates of the bench shall, in the discharge of their duties, be governed only by the 
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 Shetreet (n 13) 598. 
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 159 
law and their conscience’.50 With regards to the LD, prosecutors are not bound by that 
obligation given that their duty is prima facie prosecutorial. They are rather under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Justice.
51
 This latter aspect will be explored further with 
regard to the way it impacts on judicial independence.  
 
Substantive independence is an affirmation of a standard but not a sufficient guarantee of 
judicial independence. It can be complemented by mechanisms to ensure judicial 
autonomy. In Cameroon, with regards to the substantive independence of the judges of 
the bench, ordinary legislation as discussed below does not appear to provide adequate 
conditions to support the constitutional guarantee.  
 
3.1.2. Personal Independence 
 
Besides substantive independence, a judges’ individual independence is also buttressed 
by the level of personal independence. The latter relates to the method of appointment, 
transfers, promotions, discipline
52
 and remuneration. These aspects (with the exception of 
remuneration) are discussed below. 
 
a. APPOINTMENTS 
 
The Cameroonian judiciary is a career judiciary and the process of appointment is 
regulated primarily by the President and the Higher Judicial Council (hereafter HJC). The 
Constitution provides that judges of the bench and the LD shall be appointed by the 
President who shall be assisted in that capacity by the HJC.
53
 It is not exactly clear if the 
inclusion of the HJC is a mechanism to diversify control of the judiciary in order to 
enhance the President’s ability to guarantee judicial independence. The more probable 
position is that being modelled after the French judiciary under the Constitution of the 
Fifth Republic it was an inevitable pattern for Cameroon to follow as the French Conseil 
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Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM) was vested with similar responsibilities.
54
 The 
government of Cameroon has however described the HJC as part of the ‘balancing 
mechanism’.55 According to the government, the HJC is composed of distinguished 
personalities and characterised by broad representation and balance, which it argued, are 
unique characteristic that provide the necessary balance to pre-empt exclusive executive 
control of the judiciary.
56
 That position however is doubtful.
57
 
 
The process of qualification for appointment as a judge begins with a competitive 
examination after acquiring a master’s degree in law or maitrise en droit.58 Successful 
candidates are then admitted into the School of Administration and Magistracy 
(henceforth ENAM) in the Magistracy section to study for a two year period.
59
 They are 
trained as judges without any distinction as to trial judges, prosecutors or investigating 
judges. At the end of the qualifying period they are appointed by presidential decree to 
serve either as judges on the bench, prosecutors, investigating judges or even to the 
Ministry of Justice.
60
 Additionally, the eligibility criteria accommodates persons with 
adequate professional experience of a minimum of five years obtained in Cameroon in 
the field of economics, finance or law (for instance as lecturers, bailiffs, court registrars 
or notaries).
61
   
 
The initial appointment process perhaps does not pose much of a challenge to 
independence given that the judiciary is career based. Moreover, once appointed, judges 
are guaranteed a measure of security of tenure. They are integrated into the civil service 
and enjoy a fixed tenure until retirement
62
 although this does not preclude disciplinary 
                                                 
54
 French Constitution, art 64. 
55
 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Fourth Periodic Report of Cameroon’ (19-
20 July 2010) CCPR/C/CMR/Q/4/Add.1, p 62, para 176-177. 
56
 ibid p 62, para 177.  
57
 That will be discussed further below. 
58
 SOM, art 11(1) & (2). 
59
 SOM, art 11(1) (b). 
60
 SOM, art 11 (1) (a) (b) as amended. See also SOM, art 6(1). 
61
 SOM, art 11(3). 
62
 Judges retire at various ages; 58 years for 1
st
 and 2
nd
 grade judges, 60 for 3
rd
 grade judges and  65 for 4
th
 
grade, and judges ‘hors hiérarchie’. See SOM, art 71(2) as amended. 
 161 
sanctions that may warrant dismissal.
63
 However, the retirement age limitation may be 
dispensed with by presidential decree where the nature or peculiarity of certain functions 
warrants the extension of a judge’s term of office.64 The law does not provide any 
objective basis upon which such an extension would be applicable nor does it provide 
safeguards by way of legislative or other independent oversight in the exercise of that 
power. That creates room for arbitrariness. The power is also a potential instrument for 
the reward of conformist judges who lean on the side of the executive further 
compromising judicial independence.
65
  
 
Although extension of a judge’s retirement age is not uncommon, it should not be done in 
a way that allows scope for that power to be misused. The purpose should clearly be to 
facilitate the administration of justice. The Cameroonian approach can be contrasted with 
that of Botswana where the President is vested with a similar power. The Botswana 
President can extend the tenure of office of a high court judge for such period as may be 
necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or to discharge other duties in relation to 
proceedings that were commenced before him prior to the expiration of his term.
66
 
However, this is done in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission.
67
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Although the initial appointment process may not necessarily compromise judicial 
independence, subsequent appointments by way of transfer or promotions are more 
susceptible to undue executive control. 
 
b. PROMOTIONS 
 
Like the appointment process, the President is responsible for promotions and in that 
respect is ‘assisted by the Higher Judicial Council which shall give him its opinion on all 
nominations’.68  
 
Promotions are purportedly based on the evaluation of individual judges and subsequent 
recommendations for promotion. Senior judges
69
 of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal 
and the Ministry of Justice are evaluated by the Minister of Justice who subsequently 
recommends the judges for promotion on the advice of the Secretary General and 
directors at the Ministry of Justice.
70
 Evaluation and recommendation of other judges in 
the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal is done by the Presidents of the Supreme Court 
and Courts of Appeal respectively.
71
 For judges in the High Courts and Courts of First 
Instance responsibility lies with the President and Procureur Général of the Court of 
Appeal for that geographical jurisdiction,
72
 acting on the advice of the presidents of the 
respective courts.
73
 Individual judges not recommended may submit a personal request to 
the Minister through their hierarchical superior (Procureur Général or President of the 
court).
74
 A list comprising the names of judges recommended for promotion is submitted 
by the Minister to the HJC together with reports from the evaluation.
75
 The final list is 
drawn up by the HJC
76
 on the basis of the number of votes accorded individual judges by 
                                                 
68
 Constitution of Cameroon, art 37(3). 
69
 That category includes the Procureur Général of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal and judges 
appointed to the Ministry who have attained the level of directors or secretary general in the Ministry.  
70
 SOM, art 31(1) (a)-(f), (2) – (4). 
71
 SOM, arts 32(2), 34(1). 
72
 SOM, art 34(1). 
73
 SOM, art 34(2). 
74
 SOM, arts 36 & 39. 
75
 SOM, art 40. 
76
 SOM, arts 30 (1)-(3), 42(2); HJC Law, arts 12, 18(1) & 19(1). 
 163 
members of that institution.
77
 The recommendations are transmitted to the President of 
the Republic who makes the final decision on promotions and appointments by decree.
 78
 
 
On the face of it, the process appears rigorous as it seems to involve a number of stages 
and different institutions/personalities. However, there are at least three important points 
worth noting. The first is that, the Minister and other executive authorities in the Ministry 
control the initial stages of the evaluation process (at least for the most senior judges). 
This is not entirely satisfactory as it is inconceivable to expect that executive authorities 
would be aware of the necessary details of the performance of judicial officers to be able 
to undertake an objective assessment.  
 
Secondly, there is no distinct separation of responsibilities between the personalities 
responsible for evaluation and nominations, and the institution responsible for 
recommendations and final appointment. The HJC is composed of the President of the 
Republic as chair, the Minister of Justice as deputy chair, three parliamentarians, an 
independent personality appointed by the President, the President of the Supreme Court 
and three senior judges.
79
 It can be seen that (with the exception of the parliamentarians 
and independent personality) the institution which makes recommendations to the 
President is composed of the same personalities responsible for evaluation and 
nomination. This is an objectionable situation as it makes the evaluation and 
recommendation process almost exclusively in the hands of executive officials or 
appointees.  
 
A third aspect which negates the process is the fact that there appears to be no objective 
criteria upon which evaluations are based. That is inherently at odds with judicial 
independence. A system controlled by the executive and lacking objectivity potentially 
provides the executive with the means of exerting pressure on judges. Some judges have 
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expressed dissatisfaction with the situation in Cameroon asserting that the system is 
neither transparent nor objective and inhibits their individual independence.
80
  
 
c. TRANSFERS 
 
Another aspect of the career development process includes transfers which may be 
functional or geographical and are made by Presidential decree.
81
 In practice, judges may 
be transferred to different geographical locations. With respect to functional transfers as 
noted earlier, judges can be transferred at various points in their career to serve on the 
bench, in the LD or the Ministry of Justice. There appears to be no specific criteria for 
transfers
82
 although presumably it may be guided by the promotion process discussed 
above. According to Epuli SCJ (Supreme Court Judge), ‘There are no clear-cut and 
binding criteria for postings, transfers…’.83 He questions how judges can be independent 
under those circumstances.
84
 It is asserted within the judicial circle that transfers from the 
bench to the LD are used as disciplinary measures against judges who exercise decisional 
independence against the interests of the executive.
85
 The measure is also seen as 
providing the opportunity for activist judges to be subjected to the control of the 
Minister.
86
 Similarly, transfers to remote parts of the country are also said to be made as 
disciplinary sanctions on judges who assert their independence against the executive.
87
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As with appointment and promotions the HJC is required to provide its opinion on 
transfers.
88
 However, that too is an ineffective means to guarantee objectiveness and 
transparency. Given that the HJC can only provide an opinion rather than binding 
recommendation, the President retains ultimate control. Moreover, the indeterminacy and 
opacity of the system for transfers provide a subtle means by which judicial 
independence can be interfered with. A fairly recent example is illustrative of that point. 
 
In 1997, a former government Minister (Titus Edzoa) and his aid (Thierry Atangana) 
were charged with embezzlement of public funds and were handed a fifteen year 
custodial sentence which should have ended in May 2012.
89
 There was wide suspicion at 
the time that the victims were merely political prisoners.
90
 The basis for that view was 
attributed to the fact that three months prior to his arrest, Edzoa had resigned from the 
government to run for Presidential elections and his co-accused had been his campaign 
manager. Another dimension of that saga occurred when at the end of 2009, further 
charges of embezzlement were brought against them with the effect that they were further 
deprived of their personal liberty after the expiration of the initial 15 year term. The trial 
for the latter charges had been ongoing in the last three years with frequent 
adjournments.
91
 The court was expected to reach a decision on 18 July 2012.
92
 However, 
on that date, the Mfoundi High Court announced that it was unable to deliver a decision. 
The reason provided was that one of the judges in the panel of three, who had been 
hearing the case, was summoned the previous night by the Minister of Justice to take up a 
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position in the Ministry with immediate effect.
93
 The purported transfer had been made 
by the President of the Republic in April 2012. The Court announced that the case was to 
be adjourned until the constitution of a new panel.
94
  
 
The abrupt summoning of the judge was questionable given that the said appointments 
were made in April. Why for instance, had she not taken up that position since April and 
what urgent need was there for her to be moved twenty four hours before the verdict in 
that case? The circumstances continued to render suspect the motives of the executive 
and fuel suspicions about the political motives surrounding the case. Executive 
interference in that way led to a delay, and therefore a denial, of justice to the accused. 
They were eventually handed another custodial sentence of twenty years on 04 October 
2012.
95
 During a visit to Cameroon on December 16, Amnesty International described 
them as political prisoners and called for their release.
96
 
 
d. DISCIPLINE 
 
Like the other processes discussed above, the President of the Republic is responsible for 
deciding disciplinary sanctions against judges and is assisted in that respect by the HJC.
97
 
Unlike the other processes, the law is more explicit on conduct that constitutes the basis 
for disciplinary action. They include lack of professionalism, lack of integrity, 
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impropriety, failure to adhere to the law, breach of duty to the state
98
 and breach of the 
judicial oath.
99
  
 
The disciplinary procedure is triggered by the Minister of Justice who upon receipt of a 
potential disciplinary file, transfers such to the HJC.
100
 Upon receipt, the HJC informs the 
President who appoints an ad hoc investigatory commission from among the members of 
the HJC.
101
 The report ensuing from the investigation is made available to the HJC and 
the judge in question.
102
 Based on the report, a disciplinary hearing is conducted by the 
HJC during which the judge under investigation must be present and may be represented 
by a colleague or counsel.
103
 After the hearing, the HJC undertakes further deliberations 
which are secret and held in the absence of the judge or his counsel.
104
 The 
recommendations are subsequently transmitted by the Minister to the President
105
 who 
ultimately sanctions the judge by decree.
106
 The sanctions range from elimination from 
the promotion list, a freeze on promotion for a maximum of two years, declassification, 
early retirement, temporary suspension for a maximum of two years and dismissal with or 
without pension.
107
 Lesser sanctions include a reprimand or caution dispensed by 
presidential order on the advice of the HJC.
108
  
 
The disciplinary system has a number of features which have the potential of infringing 
on judicial independence. Firstly, some of the conducts that are susceptible to disciplinary 
action are very broadly defined without some form of objective criteria to identify them. 
For instance, it is not clear what constitutes a ‘breach of duty to the state’. Secondly, 
although disciplinary sanctions and conducts have been outlined, the law is silent on the 
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possible corresponding sanctions to be applied to particular misconduct. The assessment 
is left to the discretion of the HJC, the Minister and ultimately the President. This creates 
scope for wide discretion and possible arbitrariness as a severe sanction may be imposed 
on a rather minor misconduct. Thirdly, given that the decision on a disciplinary conduct 
cannot be appealed against, there is no scope for a judge to challenge the objectiveness of 
a disciplinary procedure, a sanction or the severity of it in relation to an alleged 
misconduct. 
 
Another weakness in the system can be gleaned from the actual role of the HJC in 
regulating the disciplinary procedure. Members of the institutions are charged with the 
initial process of investigation, preparation of reports, as well as the later stages of the 
hearing and formulating recommendations. There appears to be little scope for objectivity 
as the HJC is ‘prosecutor’ and ‘judge’ in the disciplinary process. Although it may be 
argued that the investigatory commission is made up only of a few members, it is also the 
case that the investigation is undertaken on behalf of the entire institution and is 
particularly commissioned by the President. Assuming that the HJC had scope for a 
measure of objectivity, in any case, the impact of its recommendations is limited. It is 
endowed with the nominal responsibility of providing its ‘opinion’ rather than a binding 
recommendation to the President.
109
 That institutional design is objectionable given that 
the HJC sits as an institution which includes the President as chair, deliberates and arrives 
at recommendations as an institution. Yet, the Minister transmits the same 
recommendations to the President to unilaterally decide whether or not to proceed with 
the recommendations arrived at by the institution. The President can disregard the 
recommendations and rely on his personal opinion guided (or not) by the facts as 
presented in a particular case. In 2005 for instance, the HJC met as an institution and 
made recommendations for disciplinary sanctions against thirteen judges for professional 
misconduct ranging from partiality, corruption and abuse of office. Yet, the President, not 
entirely adhering to the recommendation of the HJC only sanctioned two of the judges.
110
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No explanation was provided as to why the others were not sanctioned as per the HJC’s 
recommendations. 
  
Further, the composition of the HJC obviates against its independence given that it is 
composed predominantly of presidential appointees. In addition, the President retains 
discretion to select the rest of the membership as they are appointed by presidential 
decree from amongst nominees originally designated by their peers.
111
 For instance, the 
three parliamentarians are appointed by the President from a list of twenty nominees 
voted by Parliament, while the judges are appointed from a list of ten nominated by the 
Supreme Court.
112
 Thus, assuming that their initial nomination was objective and 
therefore some measure of independence could be envisaged, the final appointment 
process dominated by the President undermines that possibility. Given the nature of its 
composition, it is doubtful that such an institution would be more inclined to protect the 
independence of the judiciary than to protect the interest of the President.  
 
Epuli SCJ has in fact condemned the structure of the HJC and the absence of adequate 
judicial representation.
113
 The independence of the HJC and the judiciary in general was 
raised in Kevin Mgwanga Gumne et al v Cameroon,
 114
 a complaint before the African 
Commission. The complainants, who were members of the Southern Cameroons National 
Council (SCNC) and Southern Cameroons Peoples’ Organisation (SCAPO),115 alleged 
the violation of a number of CPR
116
 by the government of Cameroon and violation of 
article 26 of the African Charter.
117
 Cameroon was found in breach of the rights to life, 
personal liberty, physical integrity and assembly. The Commission stated with respect to 
article 26 that, the role of the President and the Minister of Justice as chair and vice chair 
                                                 
111
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of the HJC respectively, ‘is manifest proof that the judiciary is not independent’.118 It 
stated further that, ‘The composition of the Higher Judicial Council by other members is 
not likely to provide the necessary “checks and balance” against the Chairperson, who 
happens to be the President of the Republic’.119 It recommended that the executive (in 
particular the President and the Minister of Justice) cease to be members of that 
institution.
120
 The Commission also recommended that there should be an amicable 
dialogue between the government of Cameroon, SCAPO and SCNC. Howerver, because 
the Commission has no means of ensuring the enforcement of its decisions and 
recommendations it has not been able to compel a change of the law on the HJC or to 
ensure dialogue between the parties. Thus, the HJC continues to be under the influence of 
the executive. 
 
Although it is not uncommon for a member of the executive to be present in judicial 
appointment committees, it is incongruous with the guarantee of judicial independence 
for the President to chair such a committee, more so be assisted in that respect by the 
Minister of Justice. That inherently undermines the principle of separation of powers.  
 
In France, the President and Minister of Justice were members of the CSM
121
 although 
recent reforms have now altered that position to the effect that they are no longer 
members.
122
 According to the First President of the Cour de Cassation that move was 
intended to reinforce the independence of the judiciary which had appeared
123
 to be 
compromised by the presence of the President and the Minister of Justice.
124
 Although 
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the majority of CSM in Francophone Africa have maintained the traditional composition 
of that institution, there appears to be support for reforms excluding the president, 
minister of justice and other executive members.
125
 On the other hand, in Commonwealth 
Africa it is more customary for the membership of Judicial Service Commissions to be 
predominantly independent of the executive.
126
 Moreover, they play a more influential 
role in regulating the judicial career.
127
 In Nigeria for instance, judicial appointments are 
made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council and with 
confirmation by the Senate.
128
  The President is not a member of the National Judicial 
Council.
129
 
 
In Cameroon, it can be seen that the judicial tenure is left in the unfettered control of the 
executive and the supposed ‘balancing’ role of the HJC is a myth rather than reality. The 
absence of objectivity and transparency and the political nature of the HJC are 
fundamental inadequacies which provide the executive the potential to control the 
outcome of cases and the career of judges. As Epuli SCJ and Carlson Anyangwe have 
acknowledged, various aspects of the judicial tenure (appointment, promotions, transfer 
and discipline) are used as punitive measures against judges.
130
 A judge being aware of 
his precarious terms of office or being interested in advancing his judicial career is 
unlikely to completely fail to reflect the interest of the executive in his decisions 
irrespective of what effect that may have on the protection of a litigant’s CPR.131 This is 
particularly so where the executive has a vested interest in a matter before the courts. The 
apprehension of executive backlash has been witnessed in some politically sensitive cases 
where some judges have applied creative interpretations of the law ostensibly to unduly 
protect the executive. Others who have erred on the side of the executive to protect rights 
have been subjected to reprisal from the latter. 
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The case of The People v Nya Henry
132
 is particularly illustrative. In that case, the 
respondents, mostly members of the SCNC, were arrested on 01 October, 2001 during 
peaceful celebrations commemorating the end of British colonial rule in Southern 
Cameroons. They had applied for and were granted bail by the Magistrates Court in 
Bamenda, but that order was defied by the LD.  Consequently, they were not released. In 
fact the Procureur Général, had instructed the LD not to comply with the bail order.
133
 
The LD instead brought further charges against the respondent before the same judge 
who considered defiance of the bail order to be a breach of the applicant’s right to the 
presumption of innocence. In consequence, he stayed the proceedings before the Court 
and ordered the immediate release of the respondents.
134
 
 
The LD appealed that decision before the Bamenda Court of Appeal.
135
The Appeal Court 
held that the decision to grant bail was wrong as the respondents had not been charged 
prior to the decision to release them on bail and particularly because the prosecution had 
asked for more time to prepare a counter-affidavit.
136
 It was curious how the Appeal 
Court arrived at that position given that the law applicable at the time provided a 48 hour 
limit for filing a counter-affidavit in urgent applications.
137
 The LD had had over five 
days to prepare that counter affidavit and yet it needed more time to do so. The trial judge 
found that to be very irregular as it would have meant that the respondents would 
continue to be in detention in breach of their right to personal liberty. Thus, the bail order 
was to prevent further breaches of that right and their right to the presumption of 
innocence. The Appeal Court, mindful of those facts was of the opinion that the case was 
‘serious’, without outlining the circumstances that made it ‘serious’ or exceptional to 
warrant more than the mandatory time to prepare a counter-affidavit.
138
 It did not address 
the issue of the violation of the respondents’ CPR. Rather, it seemed to align more with 
the LD and was of the view that by staying the proceedings in the trial Court, the judge 
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deprived the LD of the opportunity to present its evidence against the respondents. In 
arriving at that position, the Appeal Court relied neither on legislation nor any judicial 
authority to support that position.
139
 Meanwhile, the trial judge had based his decision on 
the applicable law
140
 and the well established principle in Connelly v D.P.P.
141
 that the 
court had inherent powers to protect its process from abuse.
142
 As an appellate Court 
which should provide decisional accountability by way of reviewing the lower Court’s 
decision, its failure to refer to the law or judicial authority to challenge the decision of the 
lower Court is disappointing. It seemed rather more interested in protecting the interest of 
the executive regardless of serious breaches of CPR. It even failed to condemn the 
Procureur Général’s conduct (the instructions to disregard the bail order) as a breach of 
duty
143
 and that it perpetrated rights violations.
144
 The Appeal Court did not hesitate to 
reverse the trial court’s decision. The trial judge had anticipated that outcome. In his 
judgment, he called on interested observers to ‘keenly follow-up the outcome of this case 
before the superior courts’.145 
 
Given the political context of that case, it is not difficult to understand why the LD and 
the judges in the Appeal Court went to extreme lengths to protect the executive. Their 
careers were at stake and in order to pre-empt possible negative repercussions they 
seemed compelled to engage in appalling judicial conduct despite the perpetration of 
CPR. Their position can be understood more in the light of the outcome of the trial 
judges’ career. The latter was aware of the potential repercussion from the executive as 
he called on the national and international community and ‘those who cherish the status 
of this country as a state of law [to] keenly follow-up… any developments in the career 
of this magistrate after this case’.146 It therefore came as no surprise when he was 
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eventually transferred from the bench to the LD in another jurisdiction.
147
  In the light of 
the sanction imposed on the trial judge, could the judges in the Appeal Court be 
reasonably expected to exercise their independence? 
 
A similar outcome on the career of some judges was registered in Wakai v. The People
148
 
a case concerning a bail application made to the Mezam High Court. The applicants were 
supporters of the main political opposition party the Social Democratic Front (SDF) 
arrested following demonstrations in protest of the results of the 1992 presidential 
elections which were allegedly rigged in favour of the incumbent President Paul Biya. 
The proclamation of the results sparked widespread demonstrations in Bamenda, the 
geographical base of the SDF. A State of Emergency was proclaimed in that area, leading 
to the arrest of a large number of people including the applicants. They had been arrested 
under very irregular circumstances, incarcerated in a detention centre notorious for 
torture and were held for longer than the four month limit imposed by the emergency 
legislation.
149
 The Court noting the irregularities condemned the arbitrariness of the 
government and admitted the applicants to bail. However, the government failed to 
release the applicants and instead transferred them to Yaoundé, a different jurisdiction 
from the Court which ordered their release.
150
 With regards to the judges, their 
independence was sanctioned. The lead judge was transferred from his position as 
President of the High Court to the LD, while the other two judges were dispersed to 
remote areas.
151
 
 
The above cases have demonstrated how the scope of the judges’ individual 
independence is so circumscribed that they cannot exercise their substantive 
independence without the apprehension of reprisal from the executive. Fonachu JA 
(Appeal Court Judge) explained that, ‘In Cameroon, it is the sole prerogative of the 
president to appoint, promote and transfer judges without the restraints of transparent and 
                                                 
147
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objective selection procedures’.152 That position not only undermines individual 
independence, but as discussed below, also affects the judiciary as an institution.  
 
3.2. Institutional Independence 
 
According to Lord Phillips, for a judge to be impartial, he must be personally 
independent and also ‘institutionally independent, that is free of pressure from the 
State’.153 The collective independence of the judiciary contributes enormously to the 
individual independence of a judge. If the judiciary as an institution lacks independence, 
it is unlikely that individual judges would have the level of independence requisite for 
their impartiality in adjudication. Moreover, institutional independence can enhance the 
judiciary’s ability to be responsive to the public, provide access to justice and efficient 
and expeditious administration of justice.
154
  Institutional independence requires that the 
judiciary as a collective has secured funding, is adequately funded, is free from 
interference from the executive in terms of its administration, and has the power to secure 
the enforcement of its decisions.   
 
In Cameroon, the judiciary is dependent primarily on the executive at the institutional 
level, a situation which adversely affects its independence. The situation emanates from 
the fact that the judiciary is perceived as a department in the Ministry of Justice.
155
 As 
such it is reliant on the executive for funding, hierarchically subordinated to the latter and 
liable to interference with the internal administration of the courts and judicial processes.  
 
These different components of institutional independence as they relate to Cameroon are 
discussed below. 
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3.2.1. Funding 
 
In Cameroon the judicial budget is neither a fixed percentage of the State’s annual budget 
nor is it charged to a consolidated fund. It relies on the executive through the Ministry of 
Justice for its funding. That position also affects the mechanisms for providing the 
remuneration and allowances of judges which are determined by the executive through 
decrees that are susceptible to change at any time.
156
 That arrangement does not provide 
financial security as would be the case were judicial budgets, salaries and allowances 
were charged to a consolidated fund which cannot be reduced at the will of the executive. 
That inadequate framework for guaranteeing financial autonomy provides an additional 
avenue through which independence can be compromised.
157
 Judges in Cameroon 
perceive the current arrangement as objectionable and assert that it may be used to exert 
undue influence on the judiciary.
158
 Such a scenario was witnessed in 1997 prior to 
legislative elections when the financial status of the judiciary was unexpectedly improved 
through an increase in administrative budgets and the salaries and allowances of some 
senior judges particularly those in the Supreme Court.
159
 Although augmentation is 
important to promote personal independence and effective judicial administration, the 
motive of the executive was questionable for a number of reasons. Firstly, judges at the 
time were heads of Divisional Elections Supervisory Commissions and the National 
Commission for the Final Counting of Votes and therefore could have some influence on 
the election process.
160
 Secondly, the Supreme Court had the duty to confirm and declare 
the results of the elections and exclusive jurisdiction in electoral petitions.
161
 Thirdly, the 
salary increases came at a very auspicious time for the government. They were made in 
January prior to elections scheduled in May and did not include the entire judiciary. 
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These factors combined to give the impression that the President was attempting to 
influence the judges.
162
 According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung
163
Supreme Court judges 
who partly regulate the electoral process receive regular salary increases.
164
 
 
In addition to the method of funding, the judiciary is not adequately funded. As discussed 
earlier, adequate funding is particularly important in terms of the empowering potential 
of constitutionalism. It requires that the judiciary is provided with the necessary 
conditions to perform its oversight function, which according to Joseph Raz includes 
accessibility of the courts.
165
 If the courts are considered as avenues through which the 
population can assert their rights against the government, then they should be accessible. 
Accessibility also entails a prohibition on adverse factors such as undue delays and 
excessive cost which may prevent the discharge of justice in a timely manner.
166
 
Inadequate funding is an aspect that can inhibit the courts’ accessibility  
 
In Cameroon some judges have noted that inadequate funding of the judiciary inhibits 
their ability to be independent of executive influence and hinders effective administration 
of justice.
167
 Until recently, the financial paucity of the judiciary was so great that judges 
lacked offices and were forced to work in overcrowded environments devoid of basic 
hygienic conditions.
168
 Court buildings had been neglected and were dangerously in 
disrepair and court sessions had to be cancelled during turbulent weather conditions.
169
  
CPR (such as personal liberty, access to justice, fair trial) are likely to be adversely 
affected if adjournments have to be made due to insecurity of court infrastructure 
resulting from turbulent weather conditions. Although some efforts have been made to 
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improve on infrastructural facilities,
170
 according to some judges they still do not address 
other underlying issues relating to daily running cost.
171
 Fonachu JA, for one, notes that 
the absence or insufficiency of basic facilities such as computers, ink and papers, preempt 
rapid access to information which could otherwise lead to more timely access to 
justice.
172
 She specifically highlighted the impact on the investigative role of the juge 
d’instruction who is prone to delay and ineffectiveness due to the absence of the above 
mentioned resources, including the absence of transportation facilities for the purpose of 
conducting investigations. Owing to the juge d’instruction’s pivotal role in preparing 
evidence for the prosecution, delay tends to affect the length of a suspects pretrial 
detention. Moreover, the juge d’instruction under certain circumstances may be able to 
make the decision to remand a suspect in custody or to grant bail and that decision may 
depend on available evidence which if absent might tend to prolong a suspect’s stay in 
pretrial detention.
173
  
 
Admittedly, economic conditions in Cameroon make it difficult for the judiciary to be 
paid salaries comparable to private sector workers for instance. Nevertheless, their 
relatively lower status also affects their financial status as they are accorded fewer fringe 
benefits in comparison with executive officials of equivalent ranking and members of 
Parliament.
174
 If the judiciary continues to be under-funded and to persistently rely on the 
executive for funding, its financial autonomy will be compromised.
175
 As shown above, 
some CPR may be compromised by that dependence. 
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3.2.2. Judicial Administration and Executive Interference 
 
In addition to financial dependence, the judiciary is not completely free from excessive 
administrative control. As a department in the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary is 
susceptible to similar administrative supervisory processes accorded other 
departments.
176
 For that reason, the Ministry supervises court processes,
177
 schedules 
dates and times for court sessions (with the exception of the Supreme Court) pursuant to 
non-binding recommendations from the presidents of the various courts,
178
 organises and 
oversees training of judicial personnel.
179
 Executive interference is also demonstrated 
through the provision mandating the First President of the Supreme Court and Procureur 
Général to submit annual reports to the President of the Republic on the activities of that 
Court.
180
 It may be argued that such executive controls are necessary to ensure the 
effective and efficient administration of justice, a public duty for which the government is 
responsible. As Shimon Shetreet argues, executive supervision of administrative aspects 
of the courts is a facet of the checks and balances system and does not inherently 
undermine independence as it is the duty of the executive to maximise the effectiveness 
of public services in the country.
181
 However, that supervisory role is only an acceptable 
facet of the checks and balances system to the extent that it does not impede on the 
independence of the judiciary.
182
 In the Cameroonian case, that administrative connection 
to the Ministry further exacerbates the subjection of the judiciary to the executive.  
 
The supervisory role of the executive is a nebulous one which provides scope for 
executive interference in the guise of enhancing the effective administration of the 
judiciary. It is not often clear if the executive is exercising a supervisory role or 
attempting to influence the judiciary. This aspect was raised in a media report published 
on 13 August 2012 by Mutations (one of the leading independent press organs in 
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Cameroon).
 183
  The President was reported to be interfering with the judiciary in the 
guise of exercising his supervisory duties as the supreme magistrate of the State and 
guarantor of the independence of the judiciary. It was alleged that through the Secretary 
General at the Presidency, the President requested the Minister of Justice to provide 
information on the conduct of judges involved in a case where some senior government 
officials were charged with the embezzlement of funds earmarked for the purchase of a 
presidential plane. Some of the accused were eventually acquitted on the basis of 
insufficient evidence. It was widely believed that the prosecution was politically 
motivated.
184
 The question being asked in the press now is whether the executive is 
actually exercising a supervisory role to ensure the proper administration of justice or 
preparing to sanction the judges.
185
 Were they to be sanctioned, given the absence of 
objective criteria for discipline as discussed earlier, it will be difficult to uphold the 
legitimacy of their sanctions in the context of an allegedly politically motivated case 
where the executive appears not to have been favoured. The President would appear to be 
attempting to influence the judges
186
 rather than exercising a supervisory role. The First 
President of the Supreme Court of Cameroon, Mouelle P, once stated in the context of 
discussing the independence of the judiciary that, the ‘disciplinary organs’ have to 
exercise their powers objectively so as to avoid any situation where the integrity of 
judges would be put to doubt.
187
  
 
A further institutional dimension through which independence can be compromised is 
through the hierarchical relation that exists between the judiciary and the Ministry. As a 
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department in that Ministry, the judiciary is hierarchically linked through the LD which is 
headed by the Procureur Général.
188
 The law provides that, ‘Members of the Legal 
Department and Legal Assistants shall be subordinate to the Ministry of Justice’.189 Thus, 
judges in the LD, who are prosecutors, are answerable to the Minister of Justice, through 
the hierarchy of the Procureur Général.
190
 Unlike judges of the bench who are required 
to render justice according to the law and their conscience, those in the LD are required 
to act in accordance with the dictates of the Minister of Justice, as would be required of 
an ordinary public servant.
191
 That point was emphatically stated by the government of 
Cameroon in its Fourth Periodic Report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee. The 
government reiterated that ‘Given that Legal Officers represent the Executive in the 
Judiciary, they are bound to respect the principle of subordination to hierarchy’.192  
 
That relationship is particularly tenuous in view of the implication of the concept of le 
magistrat polyvalent. Judges of the bench can be transferred to the LD (and vice versa) at 
any point in their career. While in the LD, prosecutors become accustomed to acting on 
the directives of the Minister and may not pursue independent initiatives without prior 
authorisation from the latter.
193
 If subsequently transferred to the bench, a former 
prosecutor, now judge, is expected to exercise independence after having been trained to 
revere executive hierarchy. Moreover, the Minister still retains tremendous influence over 
his career. Anyangwe asserts that a judge in that position cannot ‘suddenly become 
independent and fearless’, and is more likely to act as a prosecutor than an impartial 
judge.
194
 Similarly, the transfer of an activist judge from the bench to the LD under the 
circumstances of control and supervision of the Procureur Général and ultimately the 
Minister provides opportunity for the judge to be ‘cowed’ into passivity. Fonachu JA, 
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asserts that, ‘With the judiciary under the Ministry of Justice, a judge feels compelled to 
respond positively to the dictates of he or she who has the power to determine the rise or 
fall of his or her career’.195 Further, being away from the bench implies that the judge is 
kept at a distance from adjudication thereby pre-empting any activism on his part. That 
perception of the ‘repressive effect’ of the LD on prosecutors explains why transfers to it 
are considered as punitive measures against judges of the bench who exercise decisional 
independence against the executive.
196
 The Nya Henry and Wakai cases discussed earlier 
demonstrated how judges who appeared to be taking a firm stance against executive 
violation of CPR were transferred to the LD. 
 
The position of the juge d’instruction is even more controversial. He is a judge of the 
bench and at the same time closely connected to the LD. He is in charge of preliminary 
investigations - in other words he assists the state through the LD to prosecute criminal 
cases. Though he is a judge of the bench who should act independently, he receives 
instructions from the LD. By virtue of section 143(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, he 
can only investigate on instructions from the LD. Fonachu JA, asserted that in practice 
the juge d’instruction can only proceed to investigate executive officials on the 
instructions of the Ministry of Justice acting through the LD.
197
 It may be conceptually 
easy to switch from one position to the other. However, in practice it would probably be 
more difficult. In addition, the position is inherently conflicting and may appear to put a 
juge d’instruction under persistent pressure to submit to hierarchy even when he is 
presiding over a case. In 2003 the International Bar Association while reviewing the draft 
Criminal Procedure Code of Cameroon raised concerns about the inter-changeability of 
judicial functions.
198
 It observed that although that practice accorded with aspects of the 
French system (which Cameroon has adopted), it created insecurity in the judicial 
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tenure.
199
 It stated that, ‘An unintended consequence of this insecurity is to … 
compromise severely the independence of judges’.200 
 
Jacqueline Hodgson in reference to the French position states that the juge d’instruction 
is sometimes thought to be the most powerful judge in France given his powers in the 
prosecution of offences and the fact that as a judge of the bench he is independent from 
executive control.
 201
 Yet, as stated by a prosecutor in a legal department in France, that 
view ‘is a joke, because we know that we control much of what he does’.202 Further, with 
reference to the alternating nature of their functions, some French judges also find it 
difficult in practice to determine their actual status.  According to a juge d’instruction 
interviewed by Hodgson: 
 
Our problem is based on having multiple functions coming out of the same 
school… Even I question myself: Do I work as a judge, investigator or partner of 
the police and Gendarmerie? I do not know.
203
 
  
In Cameroon, with regard to the LD, it may be argued that given that it is made up of 
prosecutors, they are not judges per se and may appropriately be treated as 
representatives of the executive. In which case, their subordination to the executive is not 
inconsistent with judicial independence. Nevertheless, in the particular context of 
Cameroon where judges can perform both functions, that subordinate position may affect 
(albeit) indirectly the independence of judges of the bench. If the executive showed 
particular interest in a specific case through for instance giving specific instructions to the 
LD through the Minister, it may indirectly affect how a judge presiding over that case 
perceives of his responsibility. Although a judge should be guided only by the law and 
his conscience, in a context where the judge relies entirely on the executive for 
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appointments, promotions, transfer and discipline, it is possible to expect that a timid 
judge may be apprehensive of executive backlash if he exercised his independence. If the 
circumstances are such that a judge cannot decide a case without fear of reprisal, his 
independence is potentially compromised.  
 
In addition, where the executive interferes with prosecutorial functions as discussed 
above, it can undermine the subjective independence of the judiciary. The African 
Commission whose mandate is partly to monitor the implementation of the African 
Charter and the rights and freedoms it guarantees,
204
 has reiterated with respect to the 
Cameroonian judiciary that it must be seen to be independent.
205
 In Gumne et al, as 
discussed earlier,
206
 the complainants were members of two political organisations 
advocating secession of the English speaking parts of Cameroon from the Francophone 
section. They complained inter alia that the government of Cameroon was in breach of 
the right to life, personal liberty, equality, physical integrity, assembly and the right to 
have one’s cause heard. They also alleged the violation of article 26 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which entrusts on state parties, the duty to 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary. The African Commission was clear that the 
presence of the executive in the judiciary was manifest proof that the judiciary was not 
independent.
207
 It stated further that, ‘The executive branch must be seen to be separate 
from the judiciary’ and that ‘the judiciary must be seen to be independent’.208 Although 
the Commission made some recommendations on reforming the Cameroonian judiciary, 
the recommendations have not been implemented.
209
 
 
The intricacies involved in the different facets of the Cameroonian judiciary may not be 
immediately obvious to an ordinary person who may see executive interference as an 
affront to judicial independence.
210
 This was the situation in Me Eyoum et Cie v État du 
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Cameroun,
211
 a habeas corpus application to the Mfoundi High Court. The applicant was 
a lawyer formerly acting for the government. She was arrested and charged with 
embezzlement of public funds in complicity with former government officials.  She 
challenged the legality of her detention on the ground that her arrest and detention had 
been ordered by executive authorities in violation of the principle of separation of 
powers, as it is the duty of the juge d’instruction or the court to order arrest and remand 
in custody.
212
 She argued further that she was being detained on charges formulated by 
the executive whereas by law, ‘preferring of a charge [is] the exclusive prerogative of the 
[juge d’instruction]’.213 Her arguments were based on an alleged administrative 
correspondence between the Secretary General at the Presidency and the Minister of 
Justice in which the Secretary addressed the Minister stating that: 
214
 
 
j’ai l’honneur de vous notifier l’Accord du chef de l’État à vos propositions 
tendant à faire déférer Maîtres Eyoum Yen Lydienne… au Parquet du Tribunal de 
Grande Instance du Mfoundi en vue de l’ouverture d’une information judiciaire 
contre eux, avec mandat de détention provisoire, du chef d’accusation de 
détournement de deniers publics et Complicité.
215
 
 
The respondent argued that the letter was written to the Minister and not to the juge 
d’instruction and did not therefore constitute encroachment on judicial independence.216 
Moreover, embezzlement constituted a criminal offence for which the applicant was 
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being lawfully prosecuted. The respondent maintained that the applicant had been 
lawfully arrested and detained as the procedures were ordered and carried out by the 
prosecutor. The Court upheld the legality of the detention.
217
 
 
In the Eyoum case, although as argued by the respondent, the alleged letter was written to 
the Minister and not the judiciary, as a matter of administrative hierarchy, the Minister is 
responsible for the LD through which the instructions were to be carried out. Of course, 
the admission of the existence of the letter does not ostensibly imply interference with the 
independence of the presiding judge. However two observations relating to subjective 
independence can be made from the circumstances of the case.
218
 
 
Firstly, executive interference with the prosecution could have indirectly compromised 
the independence of the presiding judge. The executive appeared to have demonstrated 
particular interest in that case in the light of the fact that specific instructions were given 
to the prosecution. Moreover, not only did the instructions come from the official closest 
to the President, the latter was to be informed of the progress of the case pursuant to the 
instructions. This was contained in the correspondence which further instructed the 
Minister as follows: 
 
Vous voudrez bien me faire connaître, pour la Très Haute Information du chef de 
l’État, l’exécution de ces diligences.219 
 
That may have appeared to indicate that the Minister should pay close attention to the 
development of the case in order to be able to give an account to the President. It should 
be recalled at this point that the Minister and the President control the career of the 
presiding judge and have the possibility of reprimanding him particularly in the event of 
failure to advance the interest of the executive. Although the correspondence was not 
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addressed to him, it is possible to assume that at some point the fear of jeopardising his 
career might have preoccupied him. In which case, irrespective of the fact that he may or 
may not have succumbed to any pressures, his independence had been interfered with.
 220
  
 
The second point relates to public perception of the integrity of the judicial process. That 
case was one of several in the context of a current government clamp down on 
corruption, a campaign which is widely believed to be politically motivated.
221
 The 
integrity of the judicial process was reportedly questioned by the public as the 
interference of the executive gave the impression that the independence of the judiciary 
had been interfered with. As a result, it was impossible to expect that the applicant would 
be accorded a fair hearing. So, irrespective of the legal basis of the decision to uphold the 
legality of the applicant’s detention, the public believed that the executive had applied 
pressure on the presiding judge.
222
 
 
Despite the adverse effect on judicial independence resulting from the hierarchical link 
with the LD, it is sometimes perceived as a good accountability mechanism.
223
 In 
Cameroon Kamto has argued that the system of subordination acts as a form of 
accountability ensuring the consistent and impartial application of the law.
224
 He is keen 
to highlight the excessive executive dominance of the judiciary. Yet, he argues that the 
link between the LD and the Ministry needs to be preserved to enable the government to 
exercise its duty of maintaining law and order and to prevent a system of ‘government of 
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judges’ which can be disruptive to public order.225 It is submitted that his views obscure a 
fundamental feature of constitutionalism - the separation of powers. In the absence of the 
latter, it is difficult to develop a robust checks and balances system through which the 
judiciary can enhance the protection of CPR. As already seen in the case of Cameroon, 
the indistinct separation of powers deprives the judiciary of its independence. As a 
consequence, the ability of the judiciary to deal assertively with executive violation of 
CPR is undermined.
226
 
Epuli SCJ, questioned how judicial independence can be enhanced when the ‘Executive 
branch of government, through the legal department, is a member of all the courts, 
including the Supreme Court, co-equal with the Bench, with which it shares the dais in 
court, though it is a party?’227 
 
3.2.3. Judicial Power 
 In spite of all those factors discussed above which militate against the exercise of 
judicial independence, occasionally, some judges assert their independence by ruling 
against the executive in favour of victims of CPR violations. But even in those cases the 
rights of the victims are still not fully protected because the courts decisions against the 
government are often not enforced. As in other jurisdictions, the judiciary in Cameroon 
depends on executive officials such as the police for the enforcement of its decisions. The 
Ministry of Justice is vested with powers to supervise and control the execution of 
judgments pronounced by criminal courts.
228
 This is achieved through the LD which, 
among other things is responsible for supervising the enforcement of judgments.
229
 
                                                 
225
 ibid. 
226
 In August 2012, a judge presiding over a number of the anti-corruption cases resigned from his position 
allegedly due to enormous pressures from the executive. Jacques W. Ntoual, ‘Affaire Nguini Effa: Le 
président de la collégialité dessaisi du dossier’ Le Messager (Douala, 17 August 2012) <www.cameroon-
info.net/stories/0,36825,@,affaire-nguini-effa-le-president-de-la-collegialite-essaisi-du-dossier.html> 
accessed  17 August 2012. 
227
 Epuli SCJ (n 80). 
228
 OMJ, art 32(1) para 3. 
229
 CPC, s 11. 
 189 
Through that supervisory role, the LD acts in collaboration with security forces to ensure 
that the court orders are enforced.  
 
However, in the context of the subordination of the LD to the Ministry, there is a limit to 
which the former can enhance enforceability. The LD and its members, judges 
(prosecutors) are bound to abide by the directives of the Minister and can jeopardise their 
career by failing to protect the executive. There is therefore some reluctance on the part 
of the LD to enforce judgments against the executive in favour of a victim of CPR 
violations. Given its subordinate position, the LD is sometimes under pressure not only to 
abstain from enforcement but to effectively frustrate enforcement.  In Nya Henry the trial 
judge confirmed that he was informed by the clerk of the court and the prosecution that 
the Procureur Général instructed the LD not to enforce the bail order.
230
  
 
In addition to the reluctance of the LD to enforce court decisions against the executive, 
other officials forming part of the executive such as the police and armed forces, who are 
required by law to assist in the enforcement of judgments
231
 are also unwilling to lend 
such assistance where enforcement is against the executive. There are at least two reasons 
for this. First, the armed forces and the police are subordinate to the President of the 
Republic who is their commander in chief.
232
 The President is responsible for their 
appointments and controls them through the Minister of Defence.
233
 Thus their career 
depends on these two executive officials and therefore affects the nature of the service 
they render. They would logically seek to preserve the interest of the executive in order to 
secure their career. The police and armed forces as executive officials have the tendency 
to showcase their political ascendancy by portraying themselves as being accountable to 
the executive hierarchy rather than the judiciary.
234
 Secondly, there is some innate 
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reluctance of executive officers (security forces) to enforce court orders against their 
colleagues. Thus enforcing a judgment from the court against an executive authority and 
in particular where this affects the interest of the state is an idealistic expectation given 
the normative pressures on the security forces. In the Cameroonian context adherence to 
judicial orders does not only offset the current imbalance of power between the executive 
and the judiciary but threatens the career of the enforcement officers who defy the odds 
to enforce court orders against the executive.  
 
Sadly, as a result of the foregoing, executive officials routinely disregard court orders 
especially with respect to unlawful detention.
235
 According to Evande J (a High Court 
judge), where a judgment affects the interest of the government, execution is only 
possible with the latter’s cooperation. 236 
 
The case of D. S. Oyebowale v. Company Commander Fako
237
 is illustrative of the 
executive’s disregard of court orders in the exceptional cases where the courts attempt to 
protect victims of CPR violations. In that case, a Nigerian sailor was arrested on the high 
seas en route to Cameroon by one Mr Leyi Prosper, the Company Commander of the 
Gendarmerie Company of Fako Division, Cameroon.
238
 There was no apparent reason for 
his arrest, neither were any charges read to him at the time of the arrest. He was later 
taken to Cameroon and detained at the Gendarmerie Brigade in Limbe. Even at this time, 
he was not made aware of the reasons for his arrest and detention. The applicant 
subsequently requested release on medical grounds due to his deteriorating health. 
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However, the respondent refused to grant that request. A further application was made to 
the State Counsel in Limbe for release on bail.
239
 This process was again hindered by the 
refusal of the respondent to report to the State Counsel for a bail hearing. The applicant 
then filed a motion on notice in the High Court of Buea for an order of habeas corpus. 
The Court ordered the respondent to appear before it together with the documents 
authorising the applicant’s detention. The respondent flouted this order by failing to 
appear in Court on the required date. The Court issued a further order for the immediate 
release of the applicant. Again the respondent failed to enforce this order. The applicant 
remained in detention for a further sixteen days after which he was released on bail, 
whereas the Court had ordered his immediate and unconditional release. The attitude of 
the respondent was clearly contemptuous and he was hardly daunted by the fact that the 
Court had ordered him twice. His arrogance was further compounded by the fact that he 
released the applicant on bail.  
 
In Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) Oku v. Shey Ndifon & Oku Rural Radio Association 
(ORRA)
240
, an action was brought against the S.D.O of Oku for repeatedly and 
unlawfully interfering with the operation of the Oku Rural Radio. He formed a 
commission to audit the accounts of the ORRA, appointed himself as chair of the 
commission with remuneration of 180.000CFA from the accounts of that association. He 
subsequently suspended the Board of ORRA and when a new Board was appointed by 
ORRA’s coordinating committee, the SDO issued an administrative order dissolving that 
and indefinitely suspending the Station Manager. Due to the repeated interference, the 
ORRA was pre-empted from its broadcasting service. The Court held that the SDO had 
no authority to interfere in the management of a private entity such as the ORRA and 
order him to desist from further interference. However, the SDO failed to respect the 
decision of the Court and had earlier failed to make an appearance when summoned by 
the Court. 
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Similarly, in Albert Chidi v. The People,
241
 a Nigerian, resident in Cameroon was 
arrested and detained by security officers and was allegedly tortured while in detention. 
His resident permit and passports were confiscated by these officers although they 
alleged that he was an illegal immigrant. He successfully applied to the Court for bail and 
the return of his documents. However, the security officers failed to release him.  
Despite the gravity of the problem,
242
 no conspicuous attempts have been made to 
sanction defiant executive officials. Epuli SCJ, once lamented why, ‘State officials who 
maliciously resist the enforcement of court decisions, are not brought to book?’243  
In a 2009 report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the government cited the Wakai 
case in support of its assertion that habeas corpus was available in Cameroon to enhance 
exercise of the right to personal liberty.
244
 It is rather peculiar that the government felt 
confident to cite this example despite the fact that it had failed to release the detainees 
and instead transferred them from the prison in Bamenda, a common law jurisdiction, to 
Yaoundé a civil law jurisdiction.
245
 The government’s apathy was further evident in a 
habeas corpus application cited in that same report.
246
 The facts briefly were that two 
Cameroonian citizens were arrested and detained in Ebolowa (Cameroon) for theft 
allegedly committed in Equatorial Guinea.
247
 The Mvila High Court considered that the 
remand warrant authorising the detention was invalid and ordered the immediate release 
of the detainees. The order was not enforced and the government in that report simply 
stated in relation to the detainees that ‘yet the suspects were not released’.248  The report 
should have provided an opportunity for the government to showcase its intolerance to 
those who undermine respect for the rule of law and CPR. It could have indicated that 
although the detainees were not released measures had been taken to release them or to 
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 Albert Chidi v. The People, Suit No. LM/98/M/2002 (unreported). 
242
 See (n 234) & (n 235) where other instances have been cited. 
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 Epuli SCJ (n 80). 
244
 U. N. Human Rights Committee, ‘Cameroon’s Fourth Periodic Report’ (n 55) 92, para 309. 
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procedure laws.  
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 Judgment No 19/CIV/LI/TGI of 19 July 2002 on the arrest and detention of Ngoa J. Bienvenue and 
Tachoula Jean in the Ebolowa prison cited in U. N. Human Rights Committee, ‘Cameroon’s Fourth 
Periodic Report’ (n 55)  92, para 309. 
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 U. N. Human Rights Committee, ‘Cameroon’s Fourth Periodic Report’ (n 55) 92, para 309. 
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 ibid. 
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pre-empt the recurrence of such incidents. That omission may be indicative of the true 
position which is that contempt for court orders is not seriously addressed by the 
executive and the courts’ powers are limited.  
The institutional independence of the judiciary is constrained by the organisational 
structure through which the judiciary has been made a department of the Ministry of 
Justice. According to Fonahcu JA it creates ‘an unbalanced state of affairs where the 
executive imposes its will and has significant control over the judiciary’.249 That context 
also affects the individual independence of judges as they tend to rely almost entirely on 
the executive for the conditions that should insulate them against undue influence from 
the executive. That situation of excessive executive dominance has further implication for 
judicial accountability as discussed below. 
4. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Judicial accountability is an important facet of a good checks and balances system. It 
complements independence to enhance the values that can be protected by an 
independent judiciary. In Cameroon, there are at least three forms of accountability - 
public, decisional and political. Political accountability poses the most formidable threat 
to judicial independence from the perspective of constitutionalism. That is not to say that 
the other forms of accountability are neither useful, nor are they free of controversies in 
the context of Cameroon. 
 
Recent denunciation of high corruption levels in the judiciary have led to increasing 
demands for public accountability.
250
 Existing mechanisms seem unsatisfactory. One 
                                                 
249
 Fonachu JA (n 80) 150. 
250
 The judiciary is ranked as the most corrupt institution in Cameroon. The government of Cameroon 
affirmed Transparency International’s world classification in 2009 which placed the judiciary as the most 
corrupt institution in the country. See Ministry of Justice, ‘Report on Human Rights in Cameroon-2009’ 
80-81 <www.spm.gov.cm/uploads/media/Rapport_Minjustice_Ang_2009.pdf> accessed on 12 March 
2011. The U.K. House of Commons confirmed that Cameroonon was rated 146 of 180 countries on the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 and that the judicial system is widely 
acknowledged as inefficient, leading to high levels of corruption. See House of Commons Hansard Index 
on ‘Cameroon: Corruption, 6 Jan 2010’ Column 408W < 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100106/text/100106w0018.htm#column_408> 
accessed 19 April 2011; OECD-DAC Secretariat, ‘Report of the Multi-Donor Governance and Anti-
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approach to enhancing public accountability is the transfer of cases between courts. The 
law provides that the Supreme Court may, on the basis of suspicion or in the interest of 
public policy withdraw a case from one court and transfer it to another, within the same 
jurisdiction or may appoint judges from a different jurisdiction to hear a case.
251
 In 
Nguemgne v the People & Ngasse
252
 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that reasonable 
suspicion can be established where there is reasonable ground to believe that a juge 
d’instruction or trial judge is unable to proceed with an investigation or deliver judgment 
respectively, due to their personal inclination or interests. The application for transfer can 
be made by any party to the case although only the LD can make a transfer on the basis 
of public policy.
253
 This provision can enable an individual litigant to challenge the 
impartiality of the court ensuring that injustice is pre-empted. This is very important 
where there is reasonable suspicion that a judge has received personal favours from a 
litigant. Nevertheless, it may not act as an effective measure in political cases where the 
judge is likely to be under pressure from the executive to protect its interest.
254
 In such 
circumstances, the litigant would be powerless irrespective of their legal right to request a 
transfer. The provision of section 604 of the Criminal Procedure Code may even be 
counterproductive in the sense that it creates scope for the transfer of cases for purely 
political reasons. Irrespective of the shortcomings, that provision accords albeit limited 
scope for the public to hold the courts accountable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corruption Mission to Cameroon’ (Paris, July 2006) 8 <OECD.org/dataoecd/40/51/37687235.pdf> 
accessed on 17 August 2012. 
251
 CPC, s 604. 
252
 Nguemgne  v the People & Ngasse Judgment No. 31/FCR of 15 April 2008, cited in Ministry of Justice,  
CF./OS (XXXIV)/ 332A of the ACHPR. 
253
 CPC, s 604. 
254
 As was the case in The People v Dr Martin Luma (2002) 1CCLR, 11, which was another dimension of 
the Nya Henry saga. The applicant had requested the recusal of the president of the Court of Appeal hearing 
the substantive appeal in the Nya Henry matter on the grounds that the latter had written to the judge during 
the proceedings in the trial court attempting to influence the course of his decision. The letter was alleged 
to have been read in court by the judge although it was not mentioned in the record of proceedings. Unable 
to produce the alleged letter, the applicant could not provide objective evidence that the impartiality of the 
Appeal Court judge had been compromised. The Court dismissed the recusal application (Dr Martin Luma, 
12). As stated in the Introduction to this thesis, systemic documentation of information is a problem in 
Cameroon. It was possible that that problem may have affected the manner in which the documents 
relevant to that case were filed. 
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Another approach to enhancing public accountability is the requirement of transparency. 
The law requires cases and judgments to be heard and delivered respectively in public
255
 
and for decisions to be written, setting out the reason upon which they are based in fact 
and in law.
256
 A judgment rendered in breach of the latter principle should be considered 
invalid.
257
 The requirement of transparency is an important means by which an individual 
judge may be exposed to public scrutiny. Further written and reasoned judgment should 
act as a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness and in addition provide the means by 
which judicial decisions can be commented on by other members of the public like the 
media and academics. However, this does not always provide the necessary 
accountability due in part to the fact that decisions are not published. The lack of 
adequate funding for the judiciary makes this problem even more severe. Although a 
number of private initiatives have been undertaken with respect to the publication of 
judicial decisions, they appear sporadically (due to lack of finance) and the publications 
are not necessarily affordable.
258
 As a result, the dual problem of inadequate information 
production and inaccessibility undermine the ability of the public to exercise its power of 
accountability over the judiciary. 
 
With regard to decisional accountability, in principle, judgments from lower courts are 
subject to review by appeal courts and the Supreme Court which has final appellate 
jurisdiction.
259
 For the purpose of appeal, a copy of the written judgment of the court is 
required together with record of proceedings and investigatory reports (where necessary) 
from the police or LD.
260
 However, the potential for accountability through appellate 
review is limited in part by the difficulty of obtaining written decisions (as discussed in 
the preceding paragraph) and other documents from the courts. Moreover, the general 
absence of judicial independence limits the extent to which appellate review can serve as 
an effective mechanism of accountability.  
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The orientation of the accountability system is such that judges are more accountable to 
the executive than the public. The public has no real powers to exercise accountability on 
the judiciary.
261
 The government has stated emphatically that ‘the court is not 
accountable to the public as far as its decisions are concerned’.262 As already discussed, 
the disciplinary procedure and administrative supervisory mechanisms through which the 
judiciary can be made accountable are entirely controlled by the executive and in 
particular the President. It is a classic illustration of the tension that can exist between 
independence and accountability. Epuli SCJ, Fonachu JA and Evande J, have condemned 
the accountability system which lacks objectivity and its punitive focus for which files 
are left interminably open.
263
 According to them, the system engenders a sense of 
constant apprehension, a fact which affects a judge’s ability to be independent.264 The 
emphasis on disciplinary sanctions was reflected in a speech delivered by President Paul 
Biya in which he emphasised that the State of Cameroon which empowers the judiciary 
to ensure compliance with the law is intolerant to error.
265
 
 
Having been modelled after the French judicial system, Cameroon’s executive centred 
accountability system appears to reflect the historic suspicion of the French judiciary by 
the executive. According to Antoine Garapon, that background has coloured the idea of 
accountability which he asserts has no equivalent in the French political lexicon.
266
 As a 
result it has been often equated with notions of responsibility which risk reducing its 
significance only to disciplinary sanctions or penal liability.
267
 Moreover, it justifies 
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political control of aspects of the judicial tenure (such as appointments and discipline).
268
 
Garapon is of the opinion that more significance needs to be accorded to public 
accountability which can be enhanced through more effective participation of the public 
in scrutinising judicial conduct and also through consolidating the role of the judiciary in 
disciplinary proceedings.
 269
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has analysed the constitutional status of the judiciary and the conditions for 
guaranteeing its independence. It has demonstrated that, the institutional design adopted 
under the 1996 Constitution continues to be influence by the French colonial legacy. As a 
result, the executive continues to be vested with extensive powers which undermine the 
individual independence of judges and the judiciary as an institution.  
With respect to individual independence, the methods of appointment, promotion, 
transfers, discipline and remuneration of judges is left almost in the unfettered control of 
the President of the Republic. Even though he should be assisted in the discharge of those 
duties by the Higher Judicial Council, that institution is almost powerless because the 
President retains substantial control over it. 
 
At the institutional level, the judiciary has been made a department in the Ministry of 
Justice. That position makes the judiciary dependent on the executive for its funding, its 
administration and the effective enforcement of its decisions. 
 
Given that context of subordination, the judiciary is not always in a position to deal 
assertively with executive violations of CPR. Where judges exercise their independence 
against the executive, they can be faced with possible executive backlash. Moreover, 
where judges attempt to exercise their independence, the lack of sufficient judicial power 
creates obstacles to the enforcement of decisions against executive officials. In the 
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 Garapon (n 266) 13-14.  
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circumstances, the judiciary’s ability to effectively protect CPR has been severely 
undermined. 
 
Judicial independence, as discussed earlier, is central to the separation of powers and 
checks and balances. In Cameroon, the absence of an acceptable standard of judicial 
independence is a fundamental weakness which affects the robustness of the entire 
constitutional framework for the protection of CPR. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, it undermines the effectiveness of judicial review. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Framework for Judicial Review 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter discusses the framework for judicial review in Cameroon. The analysis is 
based on the assertion in Chapter 1 that judicial review is an important element of 
constitutionalism which can contribute to a more effective protection and enhancement of 
CPR.
1
 As this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, judicial review continues to be 
influenced by the French colonial heritage. It will be argued that, the mechanisms 
provided under the 1996 Constitution are inadequate for the effective protection and 
enhancement of CPR in Cameroon. 
 
Judicial review will be discussed in terms of the review of legislation for compatibility 
with the constitution (constitutional review), review of legislation for compatibility with 
international instruments (conventional review) and the review of the legality of 
administrative acts (administrative review). With regard to constitutional review, the 
1996 Constitution provides for the establishment of a Constitutional Council (Council), to 
replace the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court exercised under the 1972 Unitary 
Constitution.
2
 However, the Council is yet to become functional. So the Supreme Court 
continues to exercise that jurisdiction, pending the creation of the Council.
3
 With respect 
to conventional review, article 45 of the Constitution of Cameroon, provides that, duly 
ratified international instruments are directly enforceable in Cameroon and following 
their publication, they override national laws. The Constitution appears to allow scope for 
the form of conventional review discussed below. 
 
This chapter is divided into four major sections. Section one provides a brief outline of 
the relevant court structure in Cameroon. Section two discusses constitutional review by 
                                                 
1
 See ch 1, s 3.3 at 48-54. 
2
 See ch 2, s 4.2.4 at 95. 
3
 Constitution of Cameroon, art 67(4). 
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the Constitutional Council. Although that institution is yet to become operational, it is 
important to analyse the jurisdiction of the Council in this respect since it is currently 
exercised by the Supreme Court. Section three explores the extent to which conventional 
review is practiced in Cameroon. Section four discusses the mechanisms for 
administrative review. 
 
 
1. COURT STRUCTURE AND JURISDICTION 
 
Not every court has jurisdiction to conduct each of the three types of review mentioned 
earlier. Constitutional review falls within the competence of the Constitutional Council 
(although currently exercised by the Supreme Court). Administrative courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction in administrative review. Whereas, jurisdiction in conventional 
review has not been expressly allocated to any particular court. Nevertheless, ordinary 
and administrative courts can exercise jurisdiction in conventional review. These courts 
are discussed below in turn. 
 
1.1. The Constitutional Council 
 
The Constitutional Council is vested with a tripartite jurisdiction, namely ensuring the 
regularity of presidential and parliamentary elections and referendum operations; settling 
of disputes between state institutions and the regions; and ruling on the constitutionality 
of laws, the standing orders of parliament and international treaties and conventions.
4
  
This chapter will only deal with the Council’s jurisdiction in the review of laws and 
international instruments. The Constitution makes provision for one Council with its seat 
in Yaoundé.
5
 The relevant provisions relating to constitutional review will be discussed 
below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Constitution of Cameroon, art 47(1), 48(1); Law No 2004/004 of 21 April 2004 on the Organisation and 
Functioning of the Constitutional Council (Constitutional Council Law), art 3(1) & (2). 
5
 Constitutional Council Law, art 5(1). 
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1.2.  Administrative Courts 
 
Prior to 2006, the Supreme Court was vested with both original and appellate jurisdiction 
in administrative review.
6
 However, a 2006 Law provided for the creation of Lower 
Administrative Courts in each of the ten administrative Regions in Cameroon, pending an 
implementing decree.
7
 That decree was passed by the President of the Republic in March 
2012.
8
 The Lower Administrative Courts are to assume original jurisdiction in 
administrative review.
9
 However, they are yet to become functional. Appeals from the 
Lower Administrative Courts should go to the Supreme Court.
10
 
 
In order to describe the appellate administrative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it may 
be helpful to describe its structure in general. The Supreme Court is the highest appellate 
court in administrative, audit and judicial matters.
11
 It is partitioned into three benches;
12
 
the Administrative Bench (with jurisdiction in administrative review),
13
 the Audit Bench 
(with jurisdiction in the auditing of public accounts)
14
 and the Judicial Bench (with 
jurisdiction in civil, criminal, commercial and social matters and those relating to 
customary law).
15
 Each of the Benches is composed of divisions
16
 which are both headed 
by presidents.
17
 The First President is the overall head of the Supreme Court.
18
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In the Supreme Court, there is also what is referred to as the Joint Benches which is 
composed of the Administrative, Audit and Judicial Benches.
19
 The Joint Bench has 
jurisdiction in constitutional review.
20
  
 
1.3. Ordinary Courts 
 
Ordinary courts that could have competence in conventional review include, Courts of 
First Instance, High Courts, Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
21
 The Courts of 
First Instance and High Courts have original jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters.
22
 
They are located in the administrative Sub-divisions and Divisions respectively.
23
 
Appeals from those courts go to the Courts of Appeal which are located in each of the ten 
Administrative Regions in Cameroon.
24
  
 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW  
 
Having presented a brief outline of the relevant court structure above, this section will 
examine in turn, the role of the Council and the Supreme Court in constitutional review. 
It will attempt to demonstrate that the framework provided for constitutional review is so 
inadequate that, it undermines the development of a practice of constitutional review in 
Cameroon. In particular, it will demonstrate that, the weaknesses relate to the limited 
scope of review, the effect of decisions on the constitutionality of a law and the limitation 
on the category of persons who have access to constitutional review. There are also 
specific institutional weakness with respect to the composition and independence of 
members of the Council and judges in the Supreme Court. As a result of these 
weaknesses, the practice of constitutional review in Cameroon is largely absent. 
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2.1. The Constitutional Council 
 
Although the Council is yet to be established, there is a law with respect to its 
membership and organisation.
25
 It is on the basis of that law and the constitutional 
provisions relating thereto that judicial review will be examined. The role of the Council 
will be analysed under four main categories – form of review, effect of review, access 
and institutional structure.  
 
2.1.1. Form of Review 
 
This subsection will discuss the form of review adopted under the 1996 Constitution to 
show that it is a restricted approach which does not allow scope for the review of enacted 
laws. 
 
The form of review envisaged by the law is the abstract model based on the traditional
26
 
French a priori system of judicial review. The Constitution provides that, ‘Laws as well 
as treaties and international agreements may, prior to their enactment be referred to the 
Constitutional Council’27  for determination of their constitutionality. This implies that 
the constitutionality of a law may be challenged in the absence of a specific case. 
Moreover, the challenge relates to bills that have been adopted by Parliament prior to 
their promulgation.
28
 It therefore indicates that, the scope of constitutional review 
precludes review of enacted legislation. 
 
Nelson Enonchong has argued however that, a closer reading of the Constitution 
indicates that the scope of review covers enacted legislation.
29
 His argument is based in 
part on article 47(2) of the Constitution which provides that ‘Matters may be referred to 
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 Constitutional Council Law (n 4) above. 
26
 The use of ‘traditional’ is to highlight the fact that, although the French system developed that way, since 
2010, post legislative review is practiced in France. 
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 Constitution of Cameroon, art 47(3); Constitutional Council Law, art 3 (1). 
28
 Charles Fombad, ‘The New Constitutional Council in a Comparative Perspective: Progress or 
Retrogression?’ (1998) 42(2) Journal of African Law 180, 171. 
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 Nelson Enonchong, ‘Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa: Is Article 42 of the OHADA Treaty a 
Problem?’ (2007) 51(1) Journal of African Law 95, 108. 
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the Constitutional Council’.30 In his view, ‘matters’ can be broadly interpreted to include 
enacted laws.
31
 Therefore, article 47(3) which states that laws may be referred to the 
Council ‘prior to their enactment’ is only an enabling provision which makes scope for 
early challenge but does not preclude post legislative challenge. He also argues that 
articles 46 and 47 which vest the Council with jurisdiction to review, refer to ‘laws’ 
rather than bills.
32
 Because bills are not laws until they have been enacted, the 
Constitution appears to extend the scope of review to enacted legislation.
33
 
 
It is the view of this author that in Cameroon that is not the correct position for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, articles 46 and 47 state in broad terms the competence of the Council 
in constitutional review and the regulation of state institutions. Subsequent provisions 
state in more specific terms the scope of its competence. So, in stating that laws or 
treaties may be referred ‘prior to enactment’, article 47(3) specifies the condition of 
referral under articles 46 and 47(1). Secondly, article 47(3) restricts the scope of the 
‘matters’ referred to in article 47(2). Article 47(3) goes further to state that, laws and 
treaties may be referred to the Council ‘pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (2) 
above’. The implication is that, the ‘matters’ to be referred to the Council under article 
47(2) are laws, treaties and international agreements ‘prior to their enactment’. Thirdly, it 
should be recalled that the Cameroonian system is modelled after that of the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel prior to the latter’s constitutional reforms in 2008.34 The position 
in France was that, the constitutionality of a law adopted by Parliament could not be 
questioned after its enactment.
35
 Though post legislative review is now practiced in 
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France, the Constitution had to be amended for that purpose.
36
 It is difficult to envisage 
the possibility of post legislative review by the Council in Cameroon without a 
constitutional revision. Enonchong himself acknowledges that, for the three reasons 
mentioned above, the more widely held view is that the scope of constitutional review in 
Cameroon is limited to pre-promulgated laws.
37
 
 
But what might be the implications of the a priori system from the perspective of 
constitutionalism as defined in Chapter 1? 
 
A number of advantages may be attributed to that system to the extent that they appear to 
accord with constitutionalism. Firstly from a general perspective not limited to 
Cameroon, a priori review can be said to promote CPR on the presumption that there is 
an assurance that the constitutionality of a law would have been determined prior to 
enforcement.
38
 According to Cynthia Vroom, that position can create a degree of 
certainty in the judicial system.
39
 Secondly, it can be seen as a mechanism by which 
parliament is made to ‘police’ itself by reviewing its legislation.40 Alec Stone Sweet 
asserts that the anticipation of review may cause majority parties to formulate bills in 
ways that are more constitutionally sound in order to avoid potential review.
41
 From that 
perspective, it can be considered an additional dimension of the checks and balances 
system. Thirdly, Louis Favoreu perceives this approach as one that accords a reasonable 
amount of cohesion within the legal order and its pre-emptive nature minimises the high 
incidence of litigation occurring in other systems which apply a concrete review approach 
(that is, post legislative review in concrete cases).
42
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However, the a priori form of review presents some disadvantages that can undermine 
the effective enforcement of CPR. Firstly, in a country like Cameroon, CPR can be 
potentially undermined once a law is promulgated as there is no scope for review. A 
promulgated law may manifestly or potentially infringe on CPR yet it will subsist in the 
legal order perpetuating arbitrariness. Thus, until such a time as the legislature may deem 
it necessary to amend or repeal that law, there will be no possibility of subjecting it to 
scrutiny. The absence of post-legislative review partly explains why oppressive 
legislative provisions such as those contained in the laws on freedom of communication, 
and assembly continue to be applied.
43
 These laws constitute a formidable weapon for the 
arrest of journalists who, while in detention, are often tortured and subjected to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.
44
  
 
Secondly, the a priori method also undermines the potential for review to promote the 
adaptability of legislation to reflect evolving conceptions of rights. Charles Fombad 
asserts that the a priori method amounts to a restriction on the Council’s ability to 
contribute actively to the adaptation of law to evolving conceptions of constitutional 
rights.
45
 That assertion can be supported by reference to the contemporary understanding 
of freedom from discrimination. In international law, the prohibition on discrimination 
has evolved to include discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.
46
 The 
Constitution of Cameroon prohibits discrimination.
47
 Yet, under the Cameroonian Penal 
                                                 
43
 See for instance the Law on the Freedom of Assembly and the incident involving Maurice Kamto 
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44
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were arbitrarily arrested, subjected to lengthy pre-trial detention, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment. See 
also the report of, Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Attacks on the Press in 2011: Cameroon’ (21 February 
2012) < http://cpj.org/africa/cameroon/> accessed 06 January 2012. 
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 Charles Fombad, ‘Protecting Constitutional Values in Africa: A Comparison of Botswana and 
Cameroon’ (2003) 36(1) The International and Comparative Law Journal of Southern Africa 83, 100. 
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 For instance the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), arts 2 (1) & and 26 which 
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opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. The U.N. Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) has held that the prohibition on discrimination under art 2(1) & 26 must be interpreted as including 
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No. 488/192 U.N.Doc. (CPR/C/50/D) 488/1992(1994); Young v Australia Communication No. 94/2000 
U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000). 
47
 Constitution of Cameroon, Preamble para 5 (1) (13) & (25).  
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Code which entered into force in 1967,
48
 consensual sexual relations between adults of 
the same gender is a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment for up to five years 
and a fine of up to 200.000CFA.
49
 Some members of the public have been arrested and 
detained for engaging or attempting to engage in homosexual acts.
50
 A mechanism for 
post legislative constitutional review would have provided scope for the Council to 
contribute to expanding the scope of the non-discrimination provision in the 
Constitution.
51
  
 
The absence of post-legislative review is regrettable, especially when considered against 
the position that existed in the former British Cameroons where post-legislative review 
was envisaged.
52
 As discussed in Chapter 2, that practice provided scope for individuals 
to stop the application of rights infringing legislation. Other Commonwealth African 
countries have preserved that practice which continues to provide scope for citizens to 
challenge the constitutionality of legislative provisions and also contribute to the 
development of the understanding of constitutional rights.
53
 That has been recently 
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49
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accessed 29 August 2012. 
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system where domestication and implementation of international instruments are dependent on an act of 
parliament.  See Franz Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford University Press 2007) 
18, 531- 536. For instance, in the Uganda case of Shabahuria Matia v Uganda [1999] UGHC1, the Court 
held that international law could be of persuasive authority but not binding until they have been 
incorporated into domestic law. 
52
 See ch 2, s 3.4 at 79-80. 
53
 See the Ugandan case of Akankwasa Damian v Uganda (Constitutional Petition No.5) UGCC7 (21 April 
2011) and the Kenyan case of Jesse Kamau & 25 Others v Attorney General [2010]KLR 1 (judgement of 
24 May 2010) discussed in Jamil Mujuzi, ‘Separating the Church from the State: The Kenyan High Courts 
Decision in Jesse Kamau & 25 Others v Attorney General (judgement of 24 May 2010)’ (2011) 55(2) 
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demonstrated in a decision delivered in April 2012 by the High Court in Nairobi (Kenya) 
in Patricia Ochieng & Two Others v. Attorney General & another.
54
 The petition 
concerned the application of the Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act 2008, which permitted the 
Commissioner to confiscate suspected counterfeit products. Section 2 of that law defines 
counterfeit products in such a way as to include generic drugs for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS. The Court held that in so far as that law and its enforcement limit or 
potentially limit the petitioners’ access to affordable and essential drugs for the treatment 
of HIV/AIDS, it infringed their right to life guaranteed under article 26(1) of the Kenyan 
Constitution.
55
 The Court went further to state that it was incumbent on the state to 
reconsider article 2 of that Act in the context of its constitutional obligations and to make 
appropriate amendments to ensure that the petitioners’ right to life was not jeopardised.56  
 
In France, the a priori method may have been justified for historical reasons.
57
 Its 
development there is attributed mainly to the notion of legislative supremacy a product of 
the French Revolution.
58
 Due to the atrocities to which citizens had been subjected by the 
parlements in the Ancien Regime, a major goal of the French Revolution was to restore 
sovereignty with the people and maintain a separation of powers (à la Montesquieu) 
between the three branches of government.
59
 Sovereignty was exercised through the 
elected representatives. The Conseil Constitutionnel was created in 1958 to resolve 
disputes relating to separation of powers between the legislature and the executive - to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of African Law 314. See also the Ghanaian case of New Patriotic Party v Electoral Commission 
[1993-94] 1Ghana Law Report 124.   
54
 Patricia A. Ochieng & Two Others v. Attorney General & another, Petition No. 409 of 2009 
(unreported). Judgment reproduced at <www.aidslawproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Judgment-
Petition-No-409-of-2009-Anti-counterfeit-case.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012.  
55
 Ochieng (n 54) 47-48. 
56
 ibid 48. 
57
 Louis Favoreu, ‘La Légitimité du Juge Constitutionnel’ (1994) 2 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 
557, 558. 
58
 Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press 1989) 
153; Martin Rogolf, ‘A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States’ (1997) 49 Maine 
Law Review 21. 
59
 The parlements attributed to themselves the power to review legislation, a power which was exercised in 
abusive and unpopular manner, fostering inequality and preventing proposed reforms intended for the 
benefit of the citizens. See Cappelletti (n 58) 153. See also Bailey Stone, The French Parlements and the 
Crisis of the Old Regime (University of North Carolina Press 1986) 3-15. 
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ensure the legislature did not encroach on the legislative domain of the executive.
60
 Again 
laws could not be challenged once they had been promulgated because these laws which 
were considered sacrosanct had been voted for by the elected representatives on behalf of 
the sovereign majority.
61
 Judicial review of legislation already in force was regarded as 
‘undemocratic’ and likely to orchestrate chaos and imbalance in the separation of 
powers.
62
 Given that historical background, the fact that France has now embraced post 
legislative review is perhaps a recognition that the a priori model is no longer 
sustainable. In fact, that new approach is said to provide greater scope for the protection 
of CPR in France.
63
  
 
Unlike France, in Cameroon, no similar historical conflicts existed between state 
institutions and a stronger case for a more effective system of constitutional review could 
be made on the basis of Cameroon’s history of excessive executive control of the 
legislature as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Given the context in which the 1996 
Constitution was revised and the purport of the government regarding its revision
64
 it is 
regrettable that the government did not seek to embrace a more effective form of review 
such as that practiced in the former Southern Cameroons. 
 
2.1.2. Effect of Review 
 
Another problem which may undermine constitutional review in Cameroon is the 
effectiveness of the Council’s decisions. A notable aspect with regard to the Council’s 
                                                 
60
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200. 
62
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64
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powers is that its decisions are binding. However, as discussed below there may be some 
reason to doubt the finality of its decisions. 
 
For the purpose of review, the Council must be composed of a minimum of nine of its 
eleven members.
65
 Its decisions are obtained through a simple majority and abstention 
from voting is impermissible.
66
 When a law is referred to the Council for review, its 
promulgation is suspended until the issue of constitutionality has been resolved.
67
 Where 
a law is declared to be in conformity with the constitution, the suspension on enactment is 
lifted and the statutory enactment deadlines become applicable.
68
 On the other hand, the 
law may be declared unconstitutional. There are two ways to declare a law 
unconstitutional. First, a provision in a law may be declared unconstitutional although the 
unconstitutional provision does not affect other provisions of that law. In such a case, the 
law may be promulgated with the exclusion of that unconstitutional provision.
69
 
Alternatively, the law may be referred to Parliament for a new reading.
70
 Secondly, if an 
unconstitutional provision affects the constitutionality of the entire legislation, it is 
declared unconstitutional and the prohibition on enactment or enforcement applies.
71
  
 
According to article 47(1) of the Constitution, the Council’s decision on the 
constitutionality of laws is final. A law declared unconstitutional may not be enacted or 
enforced.
72
 This is confirmed further by provisions which declare that the decisions of the 
Council are not subject to appeal and are binding on all public, administrative, judicial 
and military authorities as well as natural and corporate entities.
73
 There is a further 
provision to the effect that, the Council’s decisions are to be enforced without delay.74 
These provisions appear to firmly confirm that the Council’s decisions are final and 
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 Constitutional Council Law, art 13(1) 
66
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67
 Constitution of Cameroon, art 47(3); Constitutional Council Law, art 22. 
68
 Constitutional Council Law, art 23. The statutory enactment deadline is 15 days from the time a law 
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 ibid art 26. 
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binding on the above mentioned authorities. There is a sense of certainty which would 
appear to pre-empt any possible interference with the decision of the Council. 
 
Nevertheless, one aspect appears to dilute the finality of the Council’s decision. The law 
provides that a decision can be amended in the event of a ‘material error’.75 In such a case 
the Council will revisit the issue and if it determines indeed that the decision is tainted 
with a material error, the error may be rectified and the decision amended as the Council 
deems necessary.
76
 That process can provide scope for interference with the Council’s 
decision as it may be used for instance by an executive authority to force through the 
revision of a decision affecting a bill which it might have initiated. The risk is even more 
palpable because the law is succinct and fails to provide detail or clear guidelines on how 
to proceed in that aspect.  Moreover, if the decisions are not deemed final because of this 
provision, it might erode general confidence in that institution. Arguably, it may be said 
that the provision is not an inherent defect as it may indeed be viewed as an avenue for 
rectification of decisions which may have an adverse effect on CPR enforcement. By and 
large the provision is Janus faced, for on the one hand it seems to promote efficiency, 
while on the other, it provides scope for interference with the Council’s decisions.  
 
2.1.3. Access to the Council 
 
Individual access to constitutional justice is an important means through which 
individuals can assert their constitutional rights. According to Hans Kelsen, the method 
of introducing a procedure before a constitutional court is of paramount importance as it 
determines to a great extent the capacity of the court to accomplish its objective of 
safeguarding the constitution.
77
 
 
Another fundamental weakness of the review mechanism stems from the restriction on 
standing. The jurisdiction of the Council can only be invoked by the President of the 
                                                 
75
 Constitutional Council Law, art 16(1). 
76
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Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, one-third 
of the members of the National Assembly or Senate.
78
 Heads of regional executives also 
have access to the Council where the interest of their regions is likely to be affected by 
legislation.
79
 Two significant problems can be gleaned from this arrangement; the 
preclusion of individual access and the restricted category with standing. 
 
The absence of individual access can be seen as constituting a denial of access to justice, 
which in turn constitutes an affront to the rule of law.
80
 If the rule of law is perceived as 
requiring fidelity to principles on the supremacy of law and the prohibition of 
arbitrariness, a system that prevents individuals from having a stake in ensuring that the 
law actually prevents arbitrariness, is in itself founded on arbitrariness.
81
  In the particular 
Cameroonian context, the advantage of constitutional review from the perspective of an 
ordinary citizen is the potential of using that process to ensure that legislators take into 
account their commitment to CPR enforcement.
82
 In the light of discussions in the 
previous chapters, individual access would have provided the capacity to empower 
ordinary people with the ability to have greater influence in the way their rights are 
protected. It is therefore of little value to them if the Council can be seized only by the 
same state organs who have initiated those laws and are likely to breach CPR.  
 
The second problem is that the category of officials with standing is unlikely to challenge 
the constitutionality of laws. With regards to the President, it is improbable that a 
constitutionality challenge will be initiated by him, as he is unlikely to challenge his own 
laws.
83
 As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a general reluctance amongst members of the 
parliamentary majority to challenge their proposals or those specifically initiated by the 
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President.
84
 So, it is doubtful that the Presidents of the Senate or National Assembly who 
are from the ruling party,
85
 or that the parliamentary majority, would be inclined to 
request review of a law which they would have initiated and voted for or even more 
importantly laws which would have been initiated by the President.   
 
With respect to regional executives, they only have standing where the interest of their 
region is likely to be affected by legislation.
86
 This is unlikely to be the case with the vast 
majority of legislation concerning CPR which would be nationwide rather than region-
specific. The only possible avenue through which a challenge can be envisaged is through 
the parliamentary opposition where they can constitute one-third of the members of the 
National Assembly or Senate. But that is a difficult majority to achieve by the opposition 
in any democracy, the moreso in Cameroon.
87
 Currently, a coalition of all the opposition 
parties in the National Assembly will not amount to the requisite one-third. Moreover, 
some members of these parties have already been co-opted into the government, further 
reducing the numerical capacity of the opposition.
88
 The inability of the parliamentary 
opposition to use constitutional review to stop the enactment of a law which could 
potentially undermine CPR, was demonstrated recently in the context of the enactment of 
the new electoral code. The opposition was critical of several provisions in the code 
which granted unfair incumbency advantages to the President and the ruling party, and 
created scope for electoral rigging.
89
 Despite their fierce denunciation, they could not 
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apply for review prior to the promulgation of the code. Their best effort has been to 
organise a coalition with the aim of producing a draft bill to amend some provisions of 
the code and appealing to the democratic consciousness of the majority and the 
President.
90
  
 
In France prior to constitutional reforms in 2010, access to the Conseil Constitutionnel 
was restricted to the President, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the National 
Assembly and the Senate, or sixty deputies or senators.
91
 That restriction had been 
criticized as one of the defects that rendered the French approach less useful than 
alternative constitutional review approaches such as in the U.S. The position has now 
changed to allow ordinary citizens to challenge the constitutionality of laws and a 
challenge can be raised in the course of litigation in the ordinary courts.
92
 That reform 
was described by the Balladur Committee as a process of creating new rights for the 
citizens and involving them directly in review proceedings which were previously 
inaccessible to them.
93
  
 
Similar trends can be observed in some francophone African countries where there has 
been significant departure from the traditional French model. The Constitution of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo for instance allows ordinary citizens to challenge the 
constitutionality of laws by directly seizing the Constitutional Court and constitutionality 
questions can be raised during litigation in the ordinary courts.
94
 Individual access to 
constitutional courts in francophone Africa has had the most far-reaching effect in Benin 
where individuals as well as non-governmental human rights organisations can challenge 
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the constitutionality of laws or regulatory acts that are inconsistent with the exercise of 
constitutional rights.
95
 The Beninese Constitutional Court has played a fundamental role 
in protecting rights since Benin’s democratic renaissance in the 1990s. According to 
Anna Rotman, individual access ‘is the key feature that permits the Court to fulfil its 
mandate of guarantor of human rights’.96  
 
The new approach adopted in France and some former French colonies is more in tune 
with the practise in Commonwealth jurisdictions in Africa where individuals can 
challenge the constitutionality of laws.
97
 In the Ochieng petition in Kenya discussed 
earlier,
98
 individuals were able to access the court to assert their right to life against the 
government without having to wait for politicians to do so. By contrast, in the 
Cameroonian situation, individuals have continued to be subjected to oppressive 
legislation without the opportunity to challenge their unconstitutionality. Enonchong 
asserts that, because the few officials who have standing are unlikely to challenge their 
own laws, it may account for why there appears to be no reported instance where a bill 
voted by Parliament was referred to the Council for an opinion on its constitutionality.
99
  
 
2.1.4 Institutional Structure 
 
Like the scope of review and access, the institutional structure of the Council is not 
without controversy. There are a number of weaknesses relating to its institutional design 
that can be an impediment on its effectiveness in the protection of CPR. Three aspects 
will be highlighted here and they relate to the method of appointment, security of tenure 
and the competence of the Council’s membership. 
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a. APPOINTMENT 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, judicial independence is relevant to the effectiveness of 
juridical review.
100
 One aspect which enhances judicial independence is the method of 
appointment of judges (or members of the Council in this case). In Cameroon, the method 
of appointment of the Council’s members can undermine their independence and 
consequently affect their ability to effectively protect CPR. 
 
The Council is composed of eleven members appointed by the President of the Republic 
based on nominations by the President, the National Assembly, the Senate and the Higher 
Judicial Council.
101
 Each of these categories nominates three of the eleven members with 
the exception of the Higher Judicial Council which nominates two members.
102
 The 
President of the Council is selected by the President of the Republic.
103
 In addition, 
former Presidents are ex officio members for life.
104
  
 
A cursory reading of these arrangements might lead to the conclusion that there is a 
measure of objectivity in the method of appointment. For instance, the distribution of 
nominating capacity amongst various institutions appears to be an attempt to achieve 
equality between these institutions while ensuring the independence of the Council from 
the three arms of government. However, a more in-depth examination reveals a number 
of weaknesses which can undermine the independence of the Council’s members. Firstly, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the President is the de facto head of the other branches of 
government.
105
 Secondly, the method of nominating candidates for appointment is highly 
political. With the exception of the Higher Judicial Council the other institutions are 
political bodies that are likely to nominate candidates that empathise with their political 
agenda. The National Assembly for instance is composed of an overwhelming majority 
of the ruling party. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Higher Judicial Council itself is made 
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up of the President of the Republic and other presidential appointees who may be more 
inclined to nominate candidates deemed acceptable to the President. The obvious must be 
stated for the presidential appointees that they are more likely than any other to be 
persons with an interest in promoting the President’s agenda.106 Thus, the convergence of 
these would-be presidential empathisers signals not only the imminent over-politicisation 
of the review process but also the lack of independence of that institution.
107
 All the 
appointees are either directly or indirectly accountable to the President a fact which can 
militate against their objectivity and impartiality.   
 
b. SECURITY OF TENURE 
 
Like the method of appointment, security of tenure is an important determinant of the 
independence of judges. In Cameroon, the provisions for security of tenure may also act 
as an impediment to the independence of the Council’s members.  
 
The members are appointed for a renewable mandate of six years
108
 and are irremovable 
except for acts determined to be grossly inconsistent with their duties or by resignation.
109
 
As an additional measure of securing their independence, their membership in the 
Council is inconsistent with any other public office whether elected or by appointment.
110
 
They benefit from a number of immunities including immunity from civil or criminal 
prosecution.
111
 
 
It may be argued that the above provisions can provide members a certain degree of 
security and therefore enhance their independence from the executive. This may well be 
so in principle but unrealistic in practice. Although the law attempts to regulate 
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incompatibilities with other duties which may impair a member’s impartiality, experience 
in Cameroon has shown that such provisions are not always adhered to even at the 
highest levels.
112
 Furthermore, frequent executive disregard for the rule of law creates 
pessimism in the effect that laws may have, such that those aspects which appear to 
insulate the members from executive control are very volatile and could be repudiated at 
the behest of the executive when necessary to promote the latter’s interest. The recent 
lifting of parliamentary immunities for some members of Parliament, who had become 
very vociferous in denouncing executive manipulation of the political system to promote 
arbitrary practices, is indicative of the volatility of any arrangement for the conditions of 
office or security of tenure.
113
 Article 10(1) of the Law on the Status of the Members of 
the Constitutional Council casts doubts on the supposed immunity from prosecution by 
stating that a procedure for the arrest or detention of a member may not be carried out 
without the authorisation of the Council. This is an indication that there are circumstances 
where the Council itself may give its approval for the arrest of a member. In which case, 
his mandate may be suspended or terminated.  
 
Article 18 of the Law on the Status of the Members, further exacerbates that volatility by 
providing that a member’s tenure may be terminated at the request of the nominating 
authority or the Council itself for incompatibility of functions or abuse of office, and 
violation of the regime, although the termination must be approved by a two-third 
majority of the Council. While the first two bases for a termination are less contentious 
and potentially provide rigorous mechanisms for accountability, the third is quite obscure 
and could be broadly construed to include acts which amount to opposition to the 
incumbent. The Penal Code for instance sanctions the crime of ‘insulting the institution 
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of the presidency’.114 That provision has been used as the basis for arresting and 
detaining journalists and activists expressing an opinion on the health of the President or 
opposing a proposed government policy or programme.
115
 It can provide a formidable 
basis for construing a member’s opinion as a violation of the regime, thereby warranting 
the termination of his tenure as member of the Council. There is no implication here that 
members should be granted unqualified immunity as that will be inconsistent with the 
basic understanding of separation of powers and checks and balances. The point being 
made though is that the arrangements which may appear as providing conditions that can 
promote independence are so volatile that they cannot be relied upon to achieve that 
objective. 
 
c. COMPETENCE 
 
Another questionable aspect relating to composition of the Council is the competence of 
its membership. There are no specific criteria for determining the competence of 
members except that they are required to be persons of integrity with established 
professional reputation and renowned competence.
116
 Those are very vague requirements, 
which are at best minimalist compared to the complex mandate of that institution. There 
is no guarantee of judicial or other legal membership and in the event that judges are 
appointed they will be in the minority given that the Higher Judicial Council can only 
nominate two members. This essentially political setup does not necessarily guarantee 
competence in the review of legislation. Constitutional review in the hands of politicians 
stands at risk of being predominantly politicised with the rights element being 
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undermined. Whereas, judges can be deemed relatively more competent in terms of their 
legal training as well as experience acquired in the course of their career during which 
they would have been exposed to the practical interpretation and application of the law.
 
These two aspects give judges an edge over politicians in the review of legislation. Stone 
Sweet notes that unlike judges, legislators in the absence of a concrete case before them 
are not sufficiently aware of the specific constraints that may arise from the application of 
a bill being debated.
117
  
 
It is not suggested here that membership outside of the judiciary or legal profession is 
unwarranted. In fact, there is need for a range of perspectives to provide a wider view of 
the ways in which legislation can have practical effects beyond the confines of the written 
text. For Cameroon in particular broader judicial and legal membership can be useful for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, in addition to the reasons outlined above (on the special 
competence of judges) judges and legal practitioners have specialised knowledge and 
training in methods of legal interpretation and reasoning which are relevant skills for 
constitutional adjudication. Their presence will potentially enrich the proceedings of the 
Council.
118
 Secondly, although an attempt is made not to overstate the point, having 
noted the excessive executive influence on almost every aspect of the Cameroonian 
judicial and political system, it is not unrealistic to assume that the political appointees of 
the Council will be more inclined to promoting their political agenda and upholding the 
will of the executive rather than reviewing legislation to guarantee the protection of CPR. 
Admittedly, judges too being under executive influence will possibly be subjected to the 
same pressure. Yet, it is possible that a wider judicial and other legal membership may 
provide basic standards of constitutional adjudication which may well make a difference.  
The approach that accords predominant reliance on judicial membership is consistent 
with the practice adopted by some constitutional courts. The Beninese Constitutional 
Court for instance requires a high level of legal competence. It is composed of seven 
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members, three of whom are magistrates and two law professors or prominent jurists or 
legal practitioner, with a minimum professional experience of fifteen years.
119
 Similarly, 
the German Constitutional Court leans heavily on judicial membership. It is made up of 
two panels,
120
 each composed obligatorily of six Supreme Court judges and two other 
members either law professors and former politicians who in practice, have usually been 
regional or federal ministers of justice.
121
 Another extreme approach leans exclusively on 
legal competence. Notable examples are the Italian Constitutional Court which is made 
up of fifteen members selected from among serving or retired judges, lawyers and law 
professors; and the South African Constitutional Court made up of the Chief Justice and 
Deputy Chief Justice and nine other judges.
122
 What can be inferred from these 
approaches is the importance accorded to the competence of judicial personnel in 
constitutional adjudication. 
 
The preceding subsection has discussed the framework for constitutional review by the 
Constitutional Council. It has demonstrated that it is deficient in terms of its restricted 
scope of review, the questionable effect of its decision, the limited access to the Council 
and its inadequate institutional structure. These aspects undermine the extent to which 
constitutional review by the Council can contribute to the effective protection of CPR in 
Cameroon. In particular, they undermine the development of a practice of judicial review 
in Cameroon. As discussed below, the position is similar with respect to the Supreme 
Court while it exercises jurisdiction in constitutional review, pending the establishment of 
the Council.  
 
2.2. The Supreme Court  
 
The applicable provision vesting the Supreme Court (hereafter the Court) with 
jurisdiction in constitutional review is article 67(4) of the Constitution which provides 
that the Court ‘shall perform the duties of the Constitutional Council until the latter is set 
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up’. It is important to mention that, in terms of the scope of review, effects of review and 
standing, the provisions relating to the Constitutional Council are applicable to the Court 
while it exercises that jurisdiction.
123
  This subsection will examine the composition of 
the Court and specific weaknesses associated to it, which can undermine the effectiveness 
of constitutional review and therefore, the protection of CPR. 
 
2.2.1. Composition 
 
The Supreme Court Ordinance makes different provisions for the composition of the 
Court in constitutional review. The Court is specially constituted by a panel of the Joint 
Benches
124
 which includes the Presidents of the divisions within the Court, the Presidents 
of the three different Benches and the First President of the Court.
125
 The panel of Joint 
Benches is presided by the First President
126
 who has the discretion to appoint one or 
more additional advisers to participate in the proceedings.
127
 The law requires all the 
judges of the Joint Benches to be present for the Court to be regularly constituted for 
constitutional review.
128
 However, in the event that a judge is absent, he may be replaced 
by an adviser appointed by the First President.
129
 
 
Referrals for review are made to the First President of the Court by the persons or 
officials with standing.
130
 The Court would be required to deliver its decision within 
fifteen days from the date of referral.
131
 However, that period may be reduced to eight 
days at the request of the President of the Republic.
132
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2.2.2. Weaknesses 
 
Like the Constitutional Council, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in constitutional review 
is undermined by the restricted scope of review, the restriction on standing and the 
possibility of its decisions being subject to amendment on the ground of ‘material error’. 
In addition, as a Court in the judicial system, it is also affected by the wider problem of 
lack of judicial independence discussed in Chapter 4. In view of the discussion in Chapter 
3, relating to the fact that a significant proportion of legislation adopted have emanated 
from the President, it is difficult to see how assertive the judges can be in the event that a 
referral is made to the Court.  
 
The perceived lack of independence of the Court is also enhanced by the absence of 
transparency in the review proceedings. The law provides that hearings of the Court in 
this respect are not open to the public although its decisions are required to be read in 
public.
133
 The cynicism with which constitutional review is treated is evident in that lack 
of transparency, particularly when considered against the Court’s hearings in electoral 
disputes which are open to the public.
134
  
 
By and large, as seen above, the framework for constitutional review whether by the 
Supreme Court or the Constitutional Council (when it is established) is inadequate for the 
protection and enhancement of CPR in Cameroon. The restricted scope of review and the 
restriction on standing hinder the development of a practice of constitutional review in 
Cameroon. In the absence of an effective system or practice of constitutional review, 
laws which potentially or inherently inhibit the exercise of CPR continue to be applied.  
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3. CONVENTIONAL REVIEW 
 
The review of compatibility of national legislation with international instruments may be 
an avenue through which some form of post legislative review can be envisaged in 
Cameroon. In legal systems such as that of Cameroon and France which subscribe to 
monism, international treaties become directly enforceable once ratified through the 
applicable domestic procedures. An advantage of that system is that it immediately 
expands the range of rights available at the domestic level without having to wait for an 
implementing parliamentary act as would be the case in dualist systems.
135
 In France, that 
advantage has been stretched further by the courts to provide an alternative mechanism 
for the review of national legislation to determine their compatibility with international 
instruments.
136
 This practice is known as ‘le contrôle de conventionnalité 
(conventionnalité)’.137 
 
This section examines the extent to which conventional review is available in Cameroon 
as a mechanism for the protection of CPR. It will examine the constitutional context and 
the approach of the courts to conventional review in Cameroon. To do so effectively, it 
may be helpful first to consider how that practice has developed in France.  
 
3.1. The Position in France 
 
In France, the practice of conventional review was established by the Cour de Cassassion 
(Cour)
138
 in Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre.
139
 In that case, the Cour declined to apply 
section 265 of the Custom Code of 1966 on the basis of incompatibility with article 95 of 
the Treaty of Rome.
140
 The Cour referred to article 55 of the French Constitution which 
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provides that duly ratified international instruments once promulgated, have an authority 
superior to that of national laws, provided the other party implements the same.
141
 The 
Cour reasoned that, through that provision, the legislator intended to give precedence to 
the Treaty.
142
 It followed that, the Custom Code though enacted after the Treaty, could 
not be applied due to its incompatibility.
143
 
 
The Conseil d’État144 subsequently followed that position in the Nicolo case to review a 
legislative provision for compatibility with the Treaty of Rome.
145
  Although those initial 
cases were reviewed on the basis of that Treaty, the jurisprudence of the courts has 
developed to include other international instruments.
146
 The practice of conventionnalité 
is said to have effectively filled a gap in the system for the protection of rights in France 
where post-legislative review was previously unavailable.
147
 Moreover because the 
Conseil d’État and the Cour do not have the restriction on standing which applies to the 
Conseil Constitutionnel, conventionnalité allows ordinary citizens direct access to the 
courts. 
 
3.2. Conventional Review in Cameroon: The Constitutional Context 
 
In Cameroon, as is the case in France, the Constitution gives pre-eminence to duly 
ratified international instruments. Article 45 of the Cameroonian Constitution provides 
that, ‘Duly approved or ratified treaties and international agreements shall, following 
their publication, override national laws’. This appears to indicate that, domestic law 
should be compatible with duly ratified international instruments.  
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However, as discussed below it is not clear if the courts in Cameroon can go as far as the 
courts in France, to review the compatibility of domestic laws with international 
instruments on the basis of article 45 of the Constitution. 
 
3.3. The Approach of the Courts in Cameroon 
 
In Cameroon, the jurisprudence of the ordinary or administrative courts in conventional 
review is sparse and inconsistent.
148
  There is a tendency for the courts to recognise 
international instruments as part of domestic law and to refer to the constitutional 
provision affirming Cameroon’s attachment to some human rights instruments and other 
duly ratified treaties. For instance in Compagnie Commerciale et Immobilière
149
 the 
Court held that international instruments were a source of domestic law, the violation of 
which could form the basis of an action. Similarly, in The People v Nya Henry
150
 the 
Court stated that the presumption of innocence was a constitutional right as well as a 
human right protected under article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to 
which Cameroon affirms its attachment. However, these were cases where the complaint 
was about an administrative act rather than a legislative provision. It is therefore open to 
doubt whether the courts would have been prepared to declare national law incompatible 
with the international instruments mentioned. 
 
There is some reluctance on the part of the courts in engaging with contentious issues 
such as reviewing the compatibility of legislative provisions with international 
instruments.
151
 In Standard Chartered Bank v Paul Sinju et Autres
152
 the Supreme Court 
refrained from addressing an issue relating to the application of a provision of the Treaty 
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on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA Treaty)
153
 in Cameroon.
154
 
Although it concerned a procedural matter which could be dealt with under Cameroonian 
law, the Court referred the question to the OHADA Common Court of Justice and 
Arbitration in Abidjan.
155
 Similarly, in Mounchipou et Autres
156
 the defendants were 
charged with embezzlement and attempted embezzlement of public funds. They argued 
that, the provision under which they were charged conflicted with provisions of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.
157
 Although that 
argument was repeatedly raised by the defendants, the court did not address the issue of 
compatibility but decided the case on a different ground.
158
 In Wakai & 72 Others v The 
People
159
 the Mezam High Court missed an opportunity to express an opinion on the 
possibility of conventional review. It stated that: 
 
 It is settled law that when there is any action purportedly under local legislation 
 which conflicts with international conventions to which the country in question
 is a signatory, the action under local legislation must give way to the international 
 convention…160 
 
The Court appeared to be concerned only with the acts taken pursuant to the domestic 
legislation rather than the legislation itself. Though it ruled that the acts were arbitrary 
and therefore a violation of CPR, it was careful to emphasise that it was not concerned 
with the regulatory instruments under which the offending actions had been taken.
161
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The reluctance of the courts is particularly evident in the application of section 347 of the 
Penal Code which criminalises homosexual acts. Ironically, another provision of the 
Penal Code states that, ‘This Code and every provision of criminal law shall be subject to 
the rules of international law and to all treaties duly promulgated and published’.162 This 
is a clear indication that the legislator intended to give precedence to international law 
and therefore the provisions of the Code should be compatible with international law. 
This should provide perhaps an uncontroversial basis for declaring section 347 of the 
Penal code incompatible with international instruments such as the ICCPR which has 
been ratified by Cameroon.
163
 Yet, the courts have continued to apply the rights-
infringing provision of the Code.
164
 
 
However, two other decisions give some indication that there is scope to develop the 
practice of conventional review in Cameroon. In Maïramou Oumarou
165
 the Court of 
First Instance in Ngaoundéré in a matter on attempted forced marriage, stated that it was 
a negative traditional practice which violated the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.
166
 It went further to state that, Cameroonian law, in particular 
section 356 of the Penal Code which prohibits forced marriage was in conformity with 
article 16 (1) (b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).
167
 Although the complaint in this case involved an act which 
the Court condemned, it went further to declare that the relevant domestic provision was 
compatible with international law. 
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Similarly, in S.A. Ami Voyage v Ayisi Ndzana et autres,
168
 the Court of First Instance in 
Yaoundé stated that article 45 of the Constitution was in conformity with article 10 of the 
OHADA Treaty because it affirms the supremacy of international law in the domestic 
legal order, a normative requirement under the OHADA Treaty.
169
 The Court went 
further to state that: 
 
Tout juge national saisi dans le cadre de sa compétence a l’obligation 
d’appliquer intégralement le droit communautaire et de protéger les droits que 
celui-ci confère aux particuliers en laissant inappliquée toute disposition 
éventuellement contraire de la loi nationale, que celle-ci soit antérieure ou 
postérieure.
170
 
 
The Court seemed to be endorsing the possibility of conventional review in stating that 
provisions of domestic law inconsistent with the OHADA Treaty should be set aside to 
protect the rights that the Treaty confers on individuals. Although in this case, the Court’s 
statement is restricted to the OHADA Treaty, there is scope for conventional review to 
extend to other international instruments.
171
  The Court in Maïramou for instance referred 
to the CEDAW to determine the conformity of the relevant national law.
172
 
 
If the courts are assertive and develop an effective practice of conventional review, there 
is reason to hope that it will provide another mechanism in the framework for CPR 
enforcement in Cameroon, given the absence of post-legislative constitutional review. 
Moreover because in the case of conventional review, the relevant courts are those that 
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are accessible to ordinary litigants, it can alleviate the problem of standing affecting 
constitutional review as discussed earlier. However, it is not clear that the Courts in 
Cameroon will be quick to develop the practice of conventional review. As Brusil Metou 
argues, the courts are reluctant to assertively engage in conventional review because the 
only form of review of legislation expressly provided in the law is a priori constitutional 
review.
173
 Moreover, due to their constitutional position vis-à-vis the executive and 
legislature, judges are torn between upholding the sovereignty and independence of the 
State and upholding international law.
174
 They are more inclined to maintaining the 
coherence of national laws. She argues that the judges in the Maïramou and Ami Voyages 
cases, did not seem too daunted to express an opinion on compatibility because the 
relevant national laws were not inconsistent with the international instruments 
mentioned.
175
 In her view, if the domestic provisions appeared to be incompatible with 
the international instruments, it was unlikely that the judges would have made a 
declaration of incompatibility.
176
 That assessment seems to be supported by the approach 
of the courts to the homosexuality provision discussed earlier. Although there is some 
basis for declaring it incompatible with international instruments, the courts have 
continued to apply it. 
 
By and large, it is possible to assume that the courts can engage in conventional review to 
provide some form of post-legislative review to enhance the effective protection of CPR. 
Such a practice can provide scope for the review of legislative provisions such as those 
criminalising press offences or homosexuality, with international instruments ratified by 
Cameroon. Moreover, it will provide individuals more direct access to the courts to 
challenge rights-infringing legislative provisions. However, given the constrained 
institutional environment in which judges operate, their capacity to actively engage in 
constitutional review may be limited. 
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4. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
 
Having examined the mechanisms for the review of legislation, this section focuses on 
the review of the legality of administrative acts. It will attempt to demonstrate that 
although the law provides for a system of administrative review, it is not very effective 
and does not include all executive acts. As a result, CPR are not sufficiently protected 
against executive violations.  
 
In Cameroon, administrative review is modelled after the French system which 
distinguishes between ordinary courts and administrative courts. That system reflects the 
French approach to the doctrine of separation of powers whereby the judiciary is 
subordinated to the executive. Consistent with that doctrine is the notion that ordinary 
judges are precluded from reviewing administrative acts.
177
 Rather, as representatives of 
the executive, administrative officials can only be brought before special administrative 
courts.
178
 
 
Jurisdiction in administrative review is vested in Lower Administrative Courts which 
have original jurisdiction and the Supreme Court (Administrative Bench) which has 
appellate jurisdiction.
179
 As earlier mentioned, although there is a decree purportedly 
establishing Lower Administrative Courts, they are yet to become functional. So, the 
discussion will be focused primarily on the Supreme Court. 
 
This section is partitioned into three subsections. The first discusses the scope of review 
to demonstrate to what extent administrative authorities can be subjected to the rule of 
law. The second subsection will examine a category exempt from judicial review. This is 
known as actes de gouvernenment (acts of the government) a category which includes 
some regulatory acts of the executive. This is an important aspect with respect to 
constitutionalism given that, as was discussed in Chapter 3, the President is vested with 
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considerable legislative authority exercised in the form of decrees and ordinances. Yet, 
the exercise of decree powers under certain circumstances is exempt from review. The 
third subsection discusses some of the problems associated with administrative review 
and how they affect the realisation of CPR. 
 
4.1. Scope of Review 
 
 
While administrative authorities are vested with powers to exercise authority in their 
respective services that should be done within the limits of the law granting such powers. 
The administrative courts review administrative acts to ensure compliance with the law, 
including laws on CPR. Thus, they have competence to entertain petitions for the 
annulment of ultra vires or unlawful acts, claims for damages resulting from an 
administrative act, disputes emanating from contracts or public service concessions, 
disputes relating to state land and disputes emanating from the application of procedures 
on the maintenance of law and order.
180
 Ultra vires acts as defined by the law include acts 
that are bad in form, made without jurisdiction, infringe a legal provision or constitute an 
abuse of authority.
181
 The Supreme Court has affirmed that where an administrative 
authority justifies its actions on the basis of some reason which is materially inaccurate or 
based on an inaccurate interpretation of the law, that decision should be annulled on the 
basis of breach of authority.
182
 
 
The fairly recent decision of the Supreme Court in Cameroon Music Corporation (CMC) 
v Ministry of Culture
183
 demonstrates how its administrative jurisdiction can be exercised 
to restrict the abuse of power by administrative authorities. The events leading to that 
case began in 2007 shortly after Mrs Ama Muna was appointed Minister of Arts and 
Culture in Cameroon. She repeatedly interfered with the Cameroon Music Corporation 
(CMC), the organisation responsible for regulating copyright and related rights of 
musical artists in Cameroon. Subsequently, on the basis of incompetent management, she 
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dissolved the board of that organisation and appointed an ad hoc committee with a view 
towards appointing a permanent board for the CMC. Through a Ministerial Decision, 
CMC was officially dissolved in May 2008.
184
 The ad hoc Committee met on 08 May 
2008 and subsequently created Societé Civile Camerounaise de l’Art Musical (SOCAM) 
to replace the CMC.
185
 In 2008, the CMC challenged the Decision authorising its 
dissolution in the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court sitting at first 
instance held that the Minister’s Decision was not taken in an attempt to maintain public 
order or security and could cause irreparable damage to the CMC. Consequently, the 
Court annulled that Ministerial Decision.
186
 The Court’s decision was appealed by the 
Minister and on 07 September 2011, the Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision 
annulling the Ministerial Decision. 
 
Similarly, in Eglise Presbytérienne du Cameroun (EPC),
187
 the Supreme Court annulled 
an order issued by the Governor of the Centre Region, prohibiting meetings organised by 
the General Assembly and Legal Committee of the EPC. The Court held that, the 
Governor had no authority to issue that order. 
 
The jurisdiction of the administrative courts, is restricted to acts performed by an 
authority in his capacity as an executive or administrative official. Thus, an action will 
fail for want of jurisdiction if that criterion is not fulfilled.
188
 That does not however 
preclude that authority from judicial control. What it implies is that, if the acts are 
described as constituting voies de fait ordinary courts such as the High Court can exercise 
jurisdiction.
189
 Voies de fait is a doctrine of French administrative law which was first 
introduced in Cameroon in Nve Ndongo v. Ngaba Victor
190
 and incorporated into the 
legal order under the 1972 Supreme Court Ordinance.
191
 By virtue of that doctrine the 
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action of an administrative authority can only be challenged in the ordinary courts on the 
basis that it is so irregular or arbitrary that it loses its administrative character and 
therefore considered as the personal act of that individual. It is a formidable means by 
which executive arbitrariness can be curbed in order to protect CPR. This doctrine has 
been applied by the ordinary courts to attempt to provide redress for executive violations 
of CPR.
192
 Examples of the application of that principle were discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4 respectively in Wakai v The People
193
 and Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) Oku v. Shey 
Ndifon & Oku Rural Radio Association (ORRA).
194
  In the Wakai case, the High Court of 
Mezam held that the gross violations of CPR committed by administrative authorities 
could not be described as administrative acts and therefore it had jurisdiction to hear the 
application for bail made by the victims. Similarly, in Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) Oku, 
the Bamenda Court of Appeal held the SDO’s repeated acts of interference with the Oku 
Rural Radio to be manifestly arbitrary and that they undermined the ability of the Radio 
Station to function effectively. The actions therefore lost their administrative character 
and the SDO was held personally liable for damages caused to the ORRA.
195
 
 
While the scope of administrative review appears sufficiently wide to ensure that 
administrative authorities are subject to legal limits, as discussed below, other executive 
officials or acts may be exempt from judicial control. 
 
4.2. Matters Exempt from Review: Actes de Gouvernement 
 
By virtue of the doctrine of actes de gouvernement (acts of the government), some 
regulatory instruments emanating from the executive are exempt from review. The law 
provides that ‘Aucune juridiction ne peut connaître des actes de Gouvernement’.196   
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The doctrine of actes de gouvernement is an ancient French doctrine by virtue of which 
regulatory measures taken by executive officials such as the President, the Prime Minister 
and Minister of External Relations are exempt from judicial review.
197
 The acts or 
measures are those taken in the context of the constitutional relationship between the 
executive and the legislature and the government’s foreign or diplomatic relations.198 
Their essential characteristic is that they are politically motivated.
199
 The rational for 
jurisdictional immunity is the preservation of the state and the maintenance of public 
order.
200
 It follows that, if measures are taken to preserve the state or public order, 
submitting them to review can have severe consequences.
201
 There are no specific 
measures or acts which fall under that category. The Supreme Court of Cameroon
202
 
affirming a historical French categorisation has identified some of the measures relating 
to executive and legislative relations. They include; regulatory measures relating to 
parliamentary elections, convening of the electoral college prior to legislative elections, 
convening of Parliament, the introduction of bills in Parliament, requesting a second 
reading and withdrawal of a bill or failure to introduce a bill.
203
 
 
The Court in a later hearing considered that category incomplete and not specifically 
reflective of the discretionary powers of the President.
204
 The Court held that it did not 
take into account some powers which have no distinctive legal or political character such 
as discretional powers to award damages to victims of terrorism.
205
 Other measures 
which have been identified in the jurisprudence of the Court include the appointment of 
officials to government and other public institutions
206
 and measures taken in the context 
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of the suppression of terrorism.
207
 The French Conseil d’État has gone much further in 
identifying areas within the regulatory domain of the President which fall under the 
category of actes de gouvernement. They include measures taken in the exercise of 
emergency powers,
208
 organisation of referendums,
209
 dissolution of Parliament,
210
 a 
decision not to submit a law voted by Parliament to the Conseil Constitutionnel for 
constitutional review
211
 and the submission of a constitutional amendment bill.
212
 
 
With respect to dissolution and emergency powers which were referred to in Chapter 3,
213
 
because the Court has not been faced with such scenarios, it remains uncertain what the 
position is. The powers are inherently political in nature given that they fall within the 
spectrum of the constitutional relations between the executive and the legislature and are 
exercised for the preservation of the state and public order. Thus, if the test of their 
political character is applied and also taking into account the jurisprudence of the French 
Conseil d’État (which the Court has not hesitated to follow)214 it is possible to speculate 
that, measures taken in the exercise of those powers will be considered actes de 
gouvernement. 
 
That doctrine can be considered inconsistent with constitutionalism as defined in Chapter 
1, because it makes the President and other executive authorities exercising the relevant 
regulatory powers above the law. According to Léon Duguit, it is inherently authoritarian 
and arbitrary and provides scope for executive authorities to undermine the rule of law 
for political or public policy reasons.
215
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the President is vested with extensive regulatory powers 
which have been exercised to circumscribe some CPR and institutions such as ELECAM 
charged with the responsibility of overseeing the exercise of other rights.  Moreover, 
unlike the clearly defined scope of the legislative competence of Parliament, the 
legislative scope of the President is indeterminate such that he can assume competence 
over every aspect which is not under Parliament’s responsibility. Given the depth of those 
powers it is important that some oversight mechanism is available to regulate their 
effective exercise to ensure that decree powers are not used arbitrarily. The absence of a 
mechanism to review such acts further undermines the checks and balances system. It 
also threatens the effective protection of CPR to the extent that there is scope for the 
issuing of oppressive decrees and their continuous application without challenge. A fairly 
recent decision of the Court demonstrates that possibility. 
 
In Social Democratic Front v État du Cameroun
216
 the main opposition party (SDF) 
petitioned the Supreme Court to declare null and void the 2008 presidential decree 
appointing ELECAM members.
217
 The petitioner argued that the appointment of 
members of the ruling CPDM party to that institution contradicted the incompatibility, 
neutrality and impartiality safeguards provided in sections 11 and 13 of the ELECAM 
Law. The Court held that, the decree in question was issued by the President pursuant to 
the exercise of his regulatory powers. So, the decree constituted an act of the government 
for which no court was vested with powers of review.
218
 As a result, the petition was 
dismissed.
219
  
 
That decision is disappointing because, as discussed in Chapter 3, one of the weaknesses 
of ELECAM which undermines its ability to ensure the conduct of free and fair elections 
is its lack of independence.
220
 Had the decision of the President been subject to review, it 
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would have been possible to envisage the reappointment of more objective members 
without any political affiliation, who could contribute positively to establishing a more 
transparent and fair electoral system. 
 
Although the Cameroonian system is influenced by the French civil law system, in 
France however, due in part to judicial activism, some regulatory acts emanating from the 
executive can be challenged in the Conseil d’État and the Cour de Cassation where they 
adversely affect the exercise of fundamental rights.
221
 These courts have ascribed to 
themselves jurisdiction to review the conformity of regulatory acts with a series of 
general principles of law known as principes généraux du droit.
222
 The fundamental 
principles of human rights emanating from the bloc de constitutionalité (consisting of 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Preambles to the 1946 and 1958 
Constitutions) are considered general principles of law on the basis of which executive 
legislation breaching human rights could be challenged.
223
  
 
International standards also require that executive decrees be subject to review as a 
means of enhancing the protection of CPR. This issue was addressed in Civil Liberties 
Organisation v. Nigeria,
224
 a complaint made to the African Commission for breach of 
the right to have one’s cause heard, guaranteed under Article 7(1) of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The complaint originated from events in Nigeria during 
which the Nigerian Military government in pursuance of a practice established by 
previous military governments
225
 promulgated a decree prohibiting judicial review. The 
effect was that the validity of decrees promulgated between 31
st
 December 1983 and 26
th
 
August 1993 and thereafter could not be challenged in court even where they violated 
fundamental rights. The complainant argued inter alia that the decree amounted to a 
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threat on judicial independence and a breach of article 26 of the African Charter. Article 
26 provides that states have the duty to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and 
allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted 
with the protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. 
The African Commission firmly condemned the Nigerian government and described the 
prohibition as an ‘invidious attack on human rights’. 
 
The exemption of certain regulatory acts from judicial control constitutes a weakness in 
the framework for the protection of CPR. As seen in the SDF case,
226
 that exemption can 
provide scope for regulatory acts to inhibit the effective enforcement of CPR.  
 
4.3. Some Problems Associated with the Administrative Review Mechanism 
 
Although the delimitation of administrative jurisdiction may have the advantage of easing 
the work load of ordinary courts, that system has a number of disadvantages in Cameroon 
that undermine the effective protection and enhancement of CPR.  
 
Firstly, the administrative courts like ordinary courts are subjected to extensive executive 
control. As such, they face similar problems of lack of autonomy and power which 
undermine the extent to which they can curtail the arbitrary exercise of power by 
administrative authorities. In the Cameroon Music Corporation (CMC) case discussed 
earlier, the Minister of Arts and Culture failed to respect the initial decision of the Court 
and has continued to show contempt by flouting the decision delivered in September 
2011.
227
 SOCAM has not been dissolved and it continues to operate thereby undermining 
the effective operation of the CMC which should have been reinstated following the 
decision of the Court.
228
 In a Ministerial correspondence addressed to the President of the 
Société des Autuers, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM Paris) on 12 July 
2012, the Minister informed the latter organisation that CMC had been effectively 
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dissolved.
229
 She also indicated that any further cooperation with the industry in 
Cameroon should be carried out through SOCAM.
230
 This is clearly a flagrant contempt 
of Court and no further action has been taken to ensure that the Minister executes that 
decision.  
 
Secondly, the effectiveness of administrative review is undermined by difficulties 
relating to physical access to the Supreme Court. The Court is situated in Yaoundé the 
capital city of Cameroon.
231
  Geographically, Yaoundé is far removed from most parts of 
the country and there are cost implications which may deter an ordinary citizen with little 
financial means. Moreover, the transportation system is problematic in terms of the road 
networks which also tend to exacerbate the problem of cost.
232
 In those circumstances, an 
ordinary citizen is unlikely to have the capacity to make such financial commitments due 
in part to high levels of poverty.
233
 Hopefully, this problem would be resolved when the 
Lower Administrative Courts become functional. 
 
Thirdly, the effectiveness of the Court is impeded by excessive delays due in part to the 
diverse jurisdiction of the Court in the areas already mentioned.
234
  Examples of delays in 
that Court have amounted to twelve, seven and four years respectively.
235
 The African 
Commission in Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & INTERIGHTS v 
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Cameroon,
236
condemned the practice of excessive delay in the Administrative Bench of 
the Supreme Court. In that case, the complainants alleged to have suffered destruction of 
private property and physical injuries from the events that occurred after the declaration 
of the results of the 1992 Presidential election.
237
 They alleged that, the government had 
failed to take adequate measures to prevent the violence that erupted and to protect their 
physical integrity. In March 1998 the complainants initiated proceedings against the 
government for compensation. However, the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge 
receipt of their petition despite several attempts by the complainants to get the matter 
resolved by that Court. The matter remained pending until 2003 when the complainants 
brought their action to the African Commission.  The Commission held inter alia that, the 
delay of over five years constituted a breach of article 7(1) (d) of the African Charter 
which guarantees the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or 
tribunal.
238
   
 
Fourthly, the procedures before the administrative bench are quite complex and often 
result in a matter being inadmissible or rejected on technical grounds.
239
 A notable 
procedure is that of the exhaustion of internal remedies which requires that a complaint 
be lodged first with the administrative authority in question before seizing the Supreme 
Court.
240
 That requirement is fundamental to the admissibility of a petition and the failure 
to observe that procedure will result in inadmissibility.
241
 The requirement is particularly 
disadvantageous to an ordinary citizen because there is a general culture of lack of 
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cooperation from administrative authorities
242
 and poor administration which obviates 
against efficient record keeping.
243
 For those reasons administrative authorities tend to 
fail to respond to complaints made to them or when they do, the lack of efficient record 
keeping implies that the complainant would have little access to the required 
documentation to eventually follow up the complaint or commence proceedings in the 
Court. In the absence of the relevant documentation and failure to exhaust internal 
remedies, a petition to the Court is likely to be inadmissible on matters of technicality.  
 
This was the position in A. M. Feyou de Happy v Republic of Cameroon where a petition 
was declared inadmissible due to the failure to exhaust internal remedies.
244
 That 
provision can only be dispensed with in the event of a failure of the administrative 
authority to respond four years after the claim was made known to it.
245
 Four years is an 
excessively long period which in terms of CPR enforcement, may only perpetuate the 
violation that was caused by the administrative act or may cause other violations. That 
procedure and the time limit provision are unnecessary and mandate costly delays. A 
fundamental element underlying some rights such as the rights to personal liberty, fair 
trial and access to justice is the time factor. Complexities and delays of this nature are 
obstacles which are inclined to breach time restrictions thereby perpetuating violations. 
 
The cumulative effect of those obstacles is the restriction of access to justice and 
therefore a denial of justice to an ordinary litigant.
246
 Faced with such obstacles, an 
ordinary citizen may be dissuaded from seeking redress for the violation of their rights by 
an administrative authority.
247
 While the system of administrative review provides scope 
for the control of administrative authorities, it does not sufficiently guarantee the 
protection of ordinary citizens from executive violations of CPR.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the different mechanisms for judicial review in Cameroon and 
demonstrated some of their weaknesses. It has shown that, the mechanisms adopted under 
the 1996 Constitution have continued to be influenced by the French colonial heritage 
even though they do not provide scope for the effective protection and enhancement of 
CPR.  
 
The effectiveness of constitutional review is undermined in particular, by the limited 
scope of review and standing. The law does not provide scope for the review of enacted 
laws. This has made it possible for the continued application of some rights-infringing 
provisions of the law such as the Penal Code. Moreover, only an extremely limited 
category of officials in the country have standing to apply for review. As a consequence, 
an effective practice of constitutional review is largely absent. Other problems relating to 
the institutional structure of the Constitutional Council and the lack of independence of 
the judiciary further diminish the effectiveness of the system. The absence of an effective 
practice undermines the potential for constitutional review to contribute to a more robust 
system for the protection and enhancement of CPR in Cameroon. 
 
For its part, conventional review appears to be an avenue which can provide a useful 
means of ensuring that domestic legislation provides adequate protection for CPR. 
However, being largely unexploited in Cameroon, its potentials have not been realised. 
Certainly, conventional review cannot completely fill the gap created by the absence of 
post-legislative constitutional review. However, in the absence of the latter, conventional 
review assumes more significance as an alternative avenue through which ordinary 
citizens can challenge the application of rights-infringing legislative provisions. 
 
With respect to administrative review, although the law provides for a system to limit the 
arbitrary exercise of power by executive and administrative authorities, its effectiveness 
is undermined by a number of problems. Firstly, the wider problem of lack of judicial 
independence limits the capacity of the Supreme Court to effectively sanction executive 
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violations of CPR. Secondly, the problem of physical access to the Supreme Court makes 
it problematic for ordinary Cameroonians residing out of Yaoundé to view administrative 
review as a viable option to seek redress for executive violation of CPR. Thirdly, the 
practice of excessive delay in the Supreme Court tends to undermine access to justice for 
ordinary Cameroonians. Fourthly, due to complex court procedures, the prospects of 
successfully pursuing a claim against an administrative authority may be so illusive as to 
dissuade a victim of CPR violations from seeking redress in the Supreme Court. Finally, 
the exclusion of actes de gouvernement from administrative review undermines the 
effectiveness of the checks and balances system. Through that practice, some executive 
officials and in particular, the President, who exercises considerable regulatory powers, 
appears to be above the rule of law.  
 
In the light of the inadequacies in Cameroon’s constitutional framework for the 
protection of CPR discussed in this chapter and the entire thesis thus far, the question 
then is; how can the constitutional system be enhanced to secure a more effective 
protection and enhancement of CPR? The next chapter attempts to answer that question. 
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Chapter 6 
An Alternative Paradigm for Constitutionalism and Civil and Political 
Rights in Cameroon: The ‘Optimal Integrative Approach’ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 1, the basic elements of constitutionalism were presented as a framework to 
analyse the Cameroonian system. The point was also made that context was an important 
consideration in the development and application of those principles. Chapter 2 discussed 
the constitutional history of Cameroon and how it came to adopt a model of 
constitutionalism significantly influenced by its French colonial heritage. Chapters 3 to 5 
have demonstrated how the basic features of constitutionalism inherent in that system 
have been inadequately conceptualised to the point that their value as institutional 
features that can enhance the protection and promotion of civil and political rights (CPR) 
are considerably diminished. That model is weak both in terms of its constitutional 
conceptualisation and in its application in Cameroon.  
 
This chapter attempts to address that dual level of limitation by advocating for a 
contextualisation of constitutionalism in a bid to develop potentially robust institutional 
features that can more effectively contribute to the protection and enhancement of CPR. 
The aims are twofold. The first is to demonstrate exemplars of positive values embedded 
in the normative orders existing in Cameroon, which can be influential in contextualising 
constitutionalism. Secondly, the chapter aims to introduce an alternative paradigm for 
developing that contextualised approach by utilising some of the positive values 
identified. 
 
Recent literature on constitutionalism in Africa suggests the viability of contextualisation 
in seeking solutions that are relevant to the resolution of Africa’s CPR deficit (amongst 
other problems). There appears to be fairly broad consensus in the literature that one way 
to achieve contextual solutions is to revisit indigenous philosophies, concepts, institutions 
and mechanisms for governance and to evaluate their potential to contribute to the 
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modern features of constitutionalism. Drawing on this literature and against the backdrop 
of Cameroon’s CPR problems already exposed throughout this thesis, this chapter resorts 
to what is referred to here as the ‘Optimal Integrative Approach’ (OIA). The OIA is an 
approach to constitutional engineering which seeks to take the focus away from the 
excessive reliance on the French colonial legacy to explore innovative avenues that 
recognise the positive attributes of the other normative orders that have been largely 
undermined in the development of constitutionalism in Cameroon.
1
  
 
OIA is not presented here as a fully developed and refined theoretical framework, 
however. The discussion in this chapter is a preliminary but necessary step towards 
developing that framework for addressing the CPR problems examined in the previous 
chapters. Further research will be required into the intricacies of indigenous customs and 
the specific ways of integrating diverse constitutional features from the different legal 
traditions in Cameroon. Moreover, considerably more space than is available in this 
chapter would be necessary.  Such a task must therefore be left to future work.  
 
The analysis in the chapter is divided into three major sections. Section one looks briefly 
into the literature on constitutionalism in Africa. A synopsis of that literature was 
presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis. This section builds on that discussion to provide 
support for the proposition that contextualising constitutionalism in Cameroon is 
important. Section two begins to examine the idea of contextualisation by reviewing 
existing debates on the positive features of the British colonial heritage and indigenous 
customs and traditions that can contribute to reinforce the constitutional framework for 
CPR enforcement. In section three, the meaning of the OIA is discussed with some 
suppositions that are seen here as underlying the success of constitutional engineering 
                                                 
1
 For a similar view on Multilevel Constitutionalism and the components of the European Constitution see, 
Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’. Available at <http://whi-
berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0502.pdf> accessed on 30 May 2013. See also Richard Falk et al, for views 
on the prospects for a new global constitutional order. Richard Falk et al, ‘Global Constitutionalism and 
World Order’. Available at <http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/52633.pdf> accessed on 30 May 2013. 
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based on OIA. The chapter concludes with a summation of the discussion in the 
preceding sections.  
 
1. CONTEXTUALISING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA 
 
 
The search for an alternative paradigm for CPR enforcement in Cameroon is not an 
isolated quest in the struggle for constitutional government and better rights protection in 
Africa.
2
 For some scholars of constitutionalism in Africa, features of the Western models 
are simply not sufficiently robust to deal with Africa’s specific problems which include 
massive violations of CPR. As such, they advocate the need for the contextualisation of 
constitutionalism as a solution to enhancing the potential of that concept to deal with the 
problems faced. 
 
That quest for contextualisation in Africa is not premised on an ambitious notion that 
Western constitutionalism is irrelevant. African societies still need a system of 
government where power is organised in a way that enhances the realisation of CPR 
(among other objectives). Nonetheless, a persistent view expressed is that Western 
constitutional concepts can be enhanced by relying on indigenous elements which 
resonate more within the African context and reflect its distinctive experiences.
3
 Ali 
Mazrui for one contends that the success of constitutionalism in Africa is predicated on 
‘consultation with traditional culture, custom and legal precedents’ which have the 
potential of enriching constitutional engineering.
4
 He argues, for instance, that the 
Baganda community in Uganda has been able to advance its interests by the capacity to 
synthesise indigenous approaches with Western models of governance.
5
 For Mazrui, such 
a process should provide a guide to constitutional engineers in Africa when determining 
                                                 
2
 See ch 1, s 2.3 at 30-32. 
3
 Hastings W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Constitutionalism without Constitutions: The Challenge of 
Reconstruction of the State in Africa’, in Carla Zoethout & Piet Boon, Constitutionalism in Africa: A Quest 
for Autochthonous Principles (Sanders Institute: GQ-D 1996) 49-62; Ali Mazrui, ‘Constitutional Change 
and Cultural Engineering: Africa’s Search for New Directions’ in Joseph Oloka-Onyango 
Constitutionalism in Africa: Creating Opportunities Facing Challenges (Fountain Publishers 2001) 20-21; 
Richard Sklar, ‘On the Study of Constitutional Government in Africa’ in Okon Akiba, (ed), 
Constitutionalism and Society in Africa (Ashgate 2004) 46-49. 
4
 Mazrui (n 3) 20-21. 
5
  ibid 21, 35. 
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questions on how indigenous communities responded to issues of power and governance 
prior to colonialism.
6
 That background can possibly enrich the prospective development 
of constitutional institutions whatever model of Western constitutionalism is adapted. 
However, Mazrui fails to demonstrate the practical mechanisms through which the 
Baganda community were able to achieve that process of contextualisation. Thus, 
although he echoes the need for contextualisation he does not go far enough to 
demonstrate how that may be achieved in practice. 
 
Abdullahi An-Na’im makes a similar argument with regards to contextualising 
constitutionalism in Africa. He asserts that the Western notion of constitutionalism is not 
an unassailable and timeless concept which can be applied universally at all times 
without specific contextual adaptations.
7
 Western concepts of constitutionalism may still 
be appropriate through a process he calls the ‘dialectic of constitutionalism in Africa’.8 
He describes this as a process whereby the principles of constitutionalism progress from a 
state of abstraction to ‘the adaptation and indigenisation of the concept or principles to 
local conditions and context’.9 Such a process draws on indigenous and pre-colonial 
traditions of social, political and cultural thought and practices to provide an inclusive 
and contextually relevant conceptualisation of constitutionalism.
10
 That approach does 
not presuppose the existence of ‘an original, virgin African constitutionalism’ but 
emphasises the existence of pre-colonial antecedents which can provide guidance in the 
synthesis project.
11
  
 
A challenge for this approach is the difficulty of identifying what indigenous institutions 
are likely to advance constitutionalism given the heterogeneous nature of African culture. 
An-Na’im suggests that such a process again should be contextual as one approach that 
applies to a given African society may not be appropriate for another.
12
 Nevertheless, An-
                                                 
6
  ibid 20. 
7
 Abdullah A. An-Na’im, African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2006) 31. 
8
 ibid ix. 
9
 ibid. 
10
 ibid 27-28, 31 
11
 ibid 32 
12
 ibid 31. 
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Na’im and Francis Deng attempt to illustrate an example of a relevant indigenous 
philosophy of the Ashanti in Ghana.
13
 They refer to the philosophy of decision making by 
consensus,
14
 relying substantially on Kwasi Wiredu’s account of that philosophy. 15  Both 
authors assert that, in the Ashanti community, the village councils which represented 
various clans provided avenues for popular participation. Although a chief headed such 
councils, they had no overriding influence on the deliberation or decision making 
process.
16
 The representatives for different clans were provided the opportunities to 
articulate their opinion on matters relating to themselves, their clan and the community as 
a whole and to express reservations on aspects which in their view did not accord well 
with the interests they represented.
17
 Because each representative was accorded that 
opportunity, it enhanced representation and participation.
18
 That also enhanced the ability 
to reach decisions that were generally accepted.  
 
Consensus did not imply that differences were not respected. However, the process of 
dialogue enhanced the understanding of differing perspectives and the ability to negotiate 
and attain an outcome which was acceptable to all.
19
 Echoing Wiredu’s reservations, An-
Na’im recognises that that philosophy cannot be idealised as some features (such as the 
kinship network) which provided a basis for its operation cannot be sufficiently relied 
upon in contemporary Africa.
20
 Therefore, it should not be adopted uncritically.
21
 
However, in terms of its influence on contextualising constitutionalism, both authors 
assert that governance institutions based on some aspects underlying that philosophy can 
promote popular participation in governance and decision making.
22
 Popular participation 
                                                 
13
 The Ashanti are a subgroup of the Akan ethnic group in Ghana. Francis Deng, Identity, Diversity and 
Constitutionalism in Africa (USIP 2008) 88. 
14
 An-Na’im (n 7) 35-38; Deng (n 13) 88-90. 
15
 Kwasi Wiredu, ‘Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-party 
Polity’ in Emmanuel Eze (ed) Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (Blackwell Publishers 
1997). 
16
 An-Na’im (n 7) 36-37; Deng (n 13) 88. 
17
 Deng (n 13) 88-89. 
18
 An-Na’im  (n 7) 36; Deng (n 13) 88-89. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 An-Na’im (n 7) 36. 
21
 ibid. 
22
 An-Na’im (n 7) 37; Deng (n 13) 89-90. 
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can also enhance the capacity for people to hold their governments to account.
23
 In 
addition, it can provide scope for the representation of minorities that are often neglected 
by contemporary forms of majoritarian politics.
24
  
 
An-Na’im and Deng, however, do not go far enough to demonstrate how that philosophy 
can be applied in practice. There is no indication as to what form such a system might 
take or at what level of governance (local or national) the application of that philosophy 
would be relevant. Thus, while the idea of developing contextually relevant constitutional 
structures may have a general appeal, the absence of concrete examples of contextual 
models makes it difficult to appreciate the difference that they can make. That lacuna is 
perhaps why some reservation has been expressed about the contextualisation of 
constitutionalism. 
 
Carla Zoethout et al for instance, view constitutionalism as essentially a universal 
concept which can be applicable in Western liberal or democratic societies as well as 
those without a liberal tradition.
25
 They assert that: 
 
[T]he ‘force’ of constitutionalism is that the values and notions it incorporates are 
- so to say - transcendental. They are beyond time and place; the elements … are 
not related to a specific culture or situation, but they can – in practice – be 
enforced anywhere.
26
  
 
Two observations can be made here. Firstly, Zoethout et al’s assertions can be 
accommodated to the extent that they perceive the ideal of limited government, respect 
for the rule of law and fundamental rights as a universal project to which all societies 
should aspire. This point is underscored by most of the African scholars reviewed above 
who revere the values of constitutionalism as providing a framework that is more 
                                                 
23
 Deng (n 13) 90. 
24
 An-Na’im (n 7) 37; Deng (n 13) 89-90. 
25
 Carla Zoethout & Piet Boon, ‘Defining Constitutionalism and Democracy: An Introduction’ in Zoethout 
& Boon, Constitutionalism in Africa: A Quest for Autochthonous Principles (Sanders Institute: GQ-D 
1996) 15. 
26
 ibid. 
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conducive to rights enforcement. The second observation is that beyond that perspective, 
the views of Zoethout et al can be considered too idealistic in the sense that they assume 
a universal accommodative potential of all societies. They fail to recognise that beyond 
the universally accepted principles, there are specific features within each society which 
can influence the development of constitutionalism. Even within the three major Western 
models (French, Anglo-American and British) the values and elements of 
constitutionalism have a common identification but have been articulated to reflect the 
specific historical developments and traditions peculiar to these countries.  
 
With respect to Africa, Maurice Kamto and Alain Moyrand make the point that 
contemporary African societies are caught between modernity and tradition.
27
 They argue 
that although Western models cannot be privileged to the exclusion of tradition, 
traditional practices cannot wholly regulate society in their contemporary forms.
28 
An 
important step in enhancing constitutionalism would be to invest efforts in identifying 
those indigenous features which together with Western conceptions can advance 
constitutional engineering in Africa.
29
 According to Deng, African societies are now 
straddled between Western and ‘not so purely’ traditional African philosophies.30 
Therefore, ‘[t]he task that lies ahead is to find a way to synthesise these different 
perspectives to find common or at least complementary ground to give greater expression 
to… the cultural principles and norms that govern [African] people’.31 
 
With regards to Cameroon, the OIA is an attempt to develop a framework for 
contextualising constitutionalism by synthesising relevant features of the inherited 
models with indigenous antecedents. The next section discusses some of those features 
that can be applied in the context of Cameroon. 
 
                                                 
27 Alain Moyrand, ‘Réflexion sur L’Introduction de l’Etat de droit en Afrique Noire Francophone’ (1991) 
43(4) Revue International de Droit Comparé 853, 877-878; Maurice Kamto, ‘Une Justice entre Tradition et 
Mordenité’ in Gérard Conac & Jean Du Bois De Gaudusson (eds) La Justice en Afrique (Afrique 
Contemporaine, n° (spécial) 156, La Documentation Française 1990) 64. 
28
 ibid. 
29
 ibid. 
30
 Deng (n 13) 77. 
31
 ibid 83. 
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2.  CONTEXTUALISING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CAMEROON 
 
This section will discuss the idea of contextualising constitutionalism in Cameroon by 
evoking its legally pluralistic nature as a context within which CPR are enforced. The 
view of legal pluralism adopted here is that described by Gordon Woodman as a ‘state of 
affairs in which a category of social relations is within the fields of operation of two or 
more bodies of legal norms’.32 He distinguishes between ‘deep legal pluralism’ and ‘state 
law pluralism’, the former being a situation of coexistence of state law and customary 
law while the latter refers to the recognition and incorporation of customary law in the 
state legal system. Cameroon appears to fit within these two categories in the sense that 
customary law coexists with state law (received common and civil law) and has received 
some recognition in statute.
33
  
 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, during the colonial era, traditional custom, the 
common law and civil law applied in Cameroon in the respective colonial territories 
although the influence of traditional custom had already begun to wane. At independence 
and after reunification, further constitutional developments saw the gradual erosion of the 
influence of traditional customs and institutions and the British colonial legacy. Yet, as 
this section will attempt to demonstrate, those two systems possess features that can be 
influential in enhancing constitutionalism in Cameroon. With regards to traditional 
customs and institutions, it is acknowledged that their integration at the national level can 
be difficult to envisage. As will be argued below, they can be more useful at the local 
levels to encourage local participation in governance and in so doing empower people to 
hold governmental authorities to account. However, that is not to say that some aspects of 
the indigenous systems cannot be envisaged at the national level.  
 
In terms of the two Western influences, there is reason to presume that even though they 
are colonial impositions, they should not be jettisoned in their totality. The purpose of 
contextualisation is not just about breaking with the predicament of the past, but equally 
                                                 
32
 See Gordon Woodman, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice’ (1996) 40(2) Journal of African Law 
152, 157-158. 
33
 The extent to which customary law is applicable is discussed later in the chapter. 
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seeking better solutions for the realisation of CPR now and for the future. If the latter can 
be achieved more favourably by reforming what is already in place, is known and 
assumed by the people, then there is some value in looking more into the colonial legacy. 
This should not be seen as being paradoxically trapped by that legacy. Rather, another 
form of resistance occurs by rejecting what is divisive and selectively adopting and 
modifying those features that can be more productive in the realisation of CPR in 
Cameroon. That option of making selective choices is conceivably a mark of 
independence which deviates from the current position of being trapped in the excessive 
reliance on the French colonial legacy. 
 
The discussion in the next two subsections will begin to look into contextualisation in 
Cameroon in greater detail.  
 
2.1. Constitutionalism and the British and French Colonial Legacy 
 
Despite the disappointment with Western models of constitutionalism in Africa, it has 
been argued from a comparative perspective that the British colonial legacy is more 
supportive of constitutionalism and British colonies have better records in the protection 
of CPR
34
 than former French colonies.
35
 The arguments have focused on the institutional 
features of constitutionalism such as separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial 
independence and constitutional review. In all three areas, the British colonial legacy is 
said to be more in congruence with constitutionalism than the French. Although the 
arguments have sometimes been overstated, they do suggest a need for further 
examination. 
                                                 
34
 The literature in this debate has interchangeably referred to human rights and CPR.  
35
 Frank Moderne, ‘Human Rights and Postcolonial Constitutions in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Louis Henkin 
& Albert Rosenthal (eds), Constitutionalism and Rights: the Influence of the United States Constitution 
Abroad (Columbia University Press 1990); Sandra F. Joireman, ‘Inherited Legal Systems and Effective 
Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy’ (2001) 39(4) Journal of Modern African Studies 571, 573-4; 
Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner, ‘Francophone Africa in Flux’ (2001) 12(3) Journal of Democracy 35; 
Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193, 
1224; Sandra F. Joireman, ‘Colonisation and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common 
Law and Civil Law Countries’ (2004) 15 Constitutional Political Economy 315. See also Rafael La Porta et 
al, ‘The Quality of Government’ (1999) 15 Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 222; Rafael La 
Porta et al, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46(2) Journal of Economic Literature 
287, 298. 
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First, there is evidence to suggest that judicial independence is a distinct value associated 
with the common law system.
36
 In post-colonial Africa, it has been particularly advanced 
as a heritage that has contributed to more effective protection of CPR in former British 
colonies.
37
 Henry Carey et al for instance conducted empirical investigations into the 
correlation between judicial independence, levels of freedom and the British colonial 
influence. The examination was conducted using a time series cross sectional approach 
involving 123 countries from 1992 through 1999 relying on data provided by Freedom 
House.
38
 Freedom was expressed in terms of CPR which included freedom of opinion, 
expression, and association, participation in the political process, personal liberty and 
universal suffrage. With regards to judicial independence, evaluation was partially based 
on textual (constitutional) provisions focusing on variables such as institutional and 
personal autonomy, insulation from external influences and de facto judicial 
independence.
39
 The latter variable (de facto independence) was assessed with reliance on 
the U. S. State Department’s annual human rights reports and annual reports from 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
40
  
 
Three important observations were made. Firstly, judicial independence was seen to have 
a positive effect on political freedoms and civil liberties. Secondly, the British colonial 
influence increased the level of political freedom and civil liberties.
41
 Thirdly, a strong 
correlation was found to exist between British colonial influences and judicial 
                                                 
36
 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law (6
th
 ed, Macmillan & Co. 1902) 197; Maurice Vile, 
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Power (Clarendon Press 1967) 89; Anthony W. Bradley, ‘The 
Constitutional Position of the Judiciary’ in David Feldman (ed) Public Law (Oxford University Press 2004) 
333, 339-350; Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’ (2004) 112(2) Journal of Political 
Economy 445, 449. See also Lord Atkin in Eshugabi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662, 670, 
who affirmed that it was in accordance with British jurisprudence that the executive did not interfere with 
the judiciary and that the latter did not shrink from adjudicating fairly in the face of the executive. 
37
 Henry F. Carey, ‘The Postcolonial State and the Protection of Human Rights’ (2002)22 Comparative 
Study of. South Asia, Africa & Middle East 59, 63; Henry F. Carey and Robert H. Howard, ‘Independent 
Judiciaries and Democratic Rule’ (Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 
2002);La Porta et al, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 35); La Porta et al ‘Judicial 
Checks and Balances’ (n 36) 448, 452-453; Charles Fombad, ‘A Preliminary Assessment of the Prospects 
for Judicial Independence in post-1990 African Constitutions’ (2007) Public Law 233, 253. 
38
 Carey & Howard (n 37) 2, 3, 7. 
39
 ibid 8. 
40
 ibid 9. 
41
 ibid 16-17. British colonial influence is used by the authors to refer to former British colonies whose 
legal systems are based on the inherited common law system. 
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independence.
42
 Carey thus suggested that, former British colonies were more likely to 
develop independent judiciaries and that it may explain why former British colonies with 
independent courts are able to protect CPR more effectively.
43
 
 
Those findings have been corroborated by La Porta et al who conducted empirical 
examination into the correlation between political freedom, judicial independence and the 
common law.
44
 They collected a data set of constitutional provisions for judicial 
independence and constitutional review for seventy one countries around the world 
including civil, common and socialist law countries. Political Freedom was expressed in 
terms of democracy, political and human rights.
45
 To measure judicial independence the 
following were taken into account; security of tenure, method of appointment, case law 
and the role of stare decisis.
46
 For judicial review the following were considered; the 
hierarchy of norms within the legal system, the role of the constitution, the extent of its 
rigidity and the availability and scope of judicial review.
47
 They found that judicial 
independence was stronger in common law countries than the civil law.
48
 They also 
found strong support for the proposition that judicial independence is associated with 
greater freedom and that independence of the judiciary in common law jurisdictions, has 
a positive correlation with the level of freedom.
49
 
  
Keith and Ogundele, however, have contradicted that position arguing that the evidence 
is inconclusive.
50
 Their assertions were based on empirical examination into the relative 
influence of the colonial legacy, formal provisions for judicial independence and 
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 Carey & Howard (n 37) 16-17. 
43
 Carey (n 37) 63. 
44
 La Porta et al, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 35); La Porta et al, ‘Judicial Checks 
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 ibid 453. 
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 La Porta et al ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’ (n 36) 457; La Porta et al ‘The Economic Consequences of 
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 Linda C. Keith & Ayo Ogundele, ‘Legal Systems and Constitutionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Empirical Examination of Colonial Influences on Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly, 
1065-1097. See also Linda C. Keith, ‘National Constitutions and Human Rights Protection: Regional 
Differences and Colonial Influences’ in Sabine Carey & Steven Poe (eds), Understanding Human Rights 
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emergency powers, on states’ human rights practices from 1977 to 2001. Judicial 
independence values included independent and transparent appointment procedures, 
security of tenure, financial autonomy, finality of decisions, exclusive jurisdiction over 
conflicts of a judicial nature and availability of exceptional courts.
51
 The relevant 
provisions for emergency powers included a declaration by the legislature, dissolution of 
the legislature, duration and derogability of rights. Human Rights were expressed 
following the Personal Integrity Model which is a narrow set of rights including political 
imprisonment, torture, killing and disappearances.
52
 According to the authors, although 
this set is limited it represents the core rights which have to be fulfilled in order to 
guarantee the exercise of other rights.
53
 To measure abuse of these rights the authors used 
the Political Terror Scales relying on data provided by the U.S. Department of State 
Country reports and Amnesty International’s reports.54 They found civil law countries to 
have better human rights scores although evidence of the effect of the civil law system in 
that respect was limited.
55
 They found common law countries to have fewer safeguards 
against excessive executive powers during states of emergency.
56
 They also found that as 
opposed to French colonies British colonies had less provision for judicial 
independence.
57
 
 
Keith and Ogundele’s finding on judicial independence however seem to go against the 
general trend.
58
 Moreover, it was clouded by the fact that their examination involved 
empirical analysis of formal provisions for judicial independence without consideration 
as to how those provisions operated in practice. They in fact conceded that the formal 
provisions as outlined in the constitution may not actually be achieved in practice.
59
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Another point to note is that the constitutions of Francophone countries, (as demonstrated 
in Chapter 4 in the case of Cameroon) tend to formally acknowledge commitment to 
judicial independence whereas substantive provisions to guarantee that independence are 
left to subordinate legislation where potentially the president is granted extensive powers 
over the judicial tenure.
60
 Keith and Ogundele confirmed that a closer examination 
revealed that over sixty-five percent of francophone countries had no provisions for 
secured tenure.
61
 This was contrasted with former British colonies where only thirty five 
percent had no such provisions.
62
  
 
André Cabanis and Michel Martin observed that francophone African constitutions in the 
1960s and 1990s especially, resembled very closely the French model in which judicial 
independence is guaranteed in very abstract terms.
63
  Whereas, as Charles Fombad 
observed, the constitutions of former British colonies had more elaborate and potentially 
better provisions guaranteeing institutional and personal autonomy through the 
entrenchment of more stringent provisions for financial autonomy, security of tenure and 
transparent and objective appointment and disciplinary systems.
64
 
 
From the literature, it would seem on balance therefore, that in terms of constitutional 
provisions, the British colonial legacy appears to adhere more to arrangements that can 
promote judicial independence. In the case of Cameroon, as was demonstrated in Chapter 
2, the British colonial legacy in Southern Cameroons in fact had more entrenched and 
stringent provisions for securing judicial independence.
65
 On the other hand, the inherited 
French model and its subsequent development in Cameroon has adhered to a tradition 
which recognises judicial independence in the constitution, but undermines it in 
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subordinate legislation by granting the President excessive powers over the judiciary. 
One consequence as demonstrated in Chapter 4 has been the inability of the judiciary to 
effectively protect CPR. It is argued here that, given the potential of the British colonial 
legacy to develop more favourable institutions of judicial insulation, it should be 
preferred or at the very least considered seriously in terms of its benefits for protecting 
CPR through constitutional development.  
 
The British colonial legacy of constitutional review has also been said to contribute to the 
better performance of former British colonies in terms of the protection of CPR.
66
 Frank 
Moderne for one has argued that Commonwealth African countries have a better record 
in constitutionalism and the protection of CPR partly due to their system of constitutional 
review.
67
 Constitutional review in former British colonies is structured in such a way as 
to allow citizens access to ordinary courts with jurisdiction in that respect. Moreover, a 
court can actually make a declaration on the constitutionality of legislation already in 
force.
68
 Such a system, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2, was introduced and practiced 
in former Southern Cameroons.
69
 On the contrary, some Francophone African countries
70
  
have continued to adhere to the inherited French model
71
 in spite of its limitations as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5 in the case of Cameroon. Although, as Kwasi Prempeh 
cautions, socio-political realities of Commonwealth Africa such as ‘low levels of legal 
literacy and rights awareness’ can affect the extent to which people resort to 
constitutional review,
72
 the British colonial heritage is still worth exploring for the 
purpose of enhancing the realisation of CPR.  
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A further relevant aspect of the British colonial legacy is its supposed ability to limit 
executive power.
73
 Moderne has argued that constitutionalism is more prevalent in former 
British colonies due in part to the colonial experience with the parliamentary system 
which led to the establishment of constitutions with stronger checks on the executive.
74
 
Similarly, Ben Nwabueze has argued that a difference in the two systems can be gleaned 
from the discretionary powers that the executive has to act against citizens.
 
He asserts that 
in the common law system, the executive is under considerable constraint and depends 
largely on the legislature for its powers.
75
 The position is contrasted with the French civil 
law system where the executive is vested with wide ranging powers including residual 
legislative powers independent of the legislature, thus increasing the potential for 
arbitrary executive action.
76
 For Gonidec and Dubouis executive power in francophone 
Africa is excessive as the executive controls all other institutions (judiciary, legislature, 
other executive, para-public institutions, the civil society) and has developed far beyond 
that contemplated by the French to the extent of being uncontrollable, providing scope for 
arbitrary actions.
77
 Félix Bankounda-Mpele goes further to add that a decisive factor 
attributed to the failure of devising viable constitutional orders in francophone Africa has 
been the extent of executive power.
78
 He notes in particular that the 1990s constitutional 
revival was more rhetorical in that although modest efforts were made in opening the 
political space, meaningful change was hindered by continued executive supremacy.
79
 
Presidents in francophone Africa continued to wield uncontrolled powers over the 
electoral system, the legislature and the judiciary.
80
  
 
From the literature it would appear that the arguments on the British colonial legacy 
make uncritical assumptions about executive power. Nwabueze for instance fails to 
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recognise that the executive can be vested with discretionary powers – albeit not to a 
comparable extent as a corollary in a former French colony. As was demonstrated in 
Chapter 2 in the case of Southern Cameroons the executive was vested with a number of 
discretionary powers. Moderne and Nwabueze also note the accountability role of 
parliament on the executive but fail to acknowledge that in terms of separation of powers, 
there was no clear distinction between parliament and the executive. In fact as the 
Southern Cameroons Constitution demonstrated, the parliamentary system is 
characterised by a network of complicated arrangements which vests the same 
individuals with executive and legislative powers.
81
 Such a system, it may be argued has 
been able to operate constructively in Britain in part due to tradition, conventions and the 
democratic nature of the British society.
82
 In the African context with weak democratic 
institutions and no equivalent conventions and traditions associated with the 
parliamentary system, it can potentially lead to usurpation of power and tyranny if other 
restraint mechanisms are not robust. There is no intention to argue here that executive 
power is not subject to restraint under the British colonial legacy. The point being made 
is simply that the potential to do so should not be overstated.  
 
Admittedly, the executive, particularly the president in former French colonies as is 
exemplified in the case of Cameroon wields considerable powers over major aspects of 
the constitutional system a fact which has contributed to the problem of CPR violation. A 
factor which to an extent may account for the poorer performance of Francophone Africa, 
as Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer have argued is the fragility or absence of 
accountability mechanisms which is further undermined in civil law countries by 
excessive executive control over the judiciary.
83
 In their view that additional power 
leaves the president almost unaccountable as the judiciary would rather seek to reflect the 
executive’s wishes than protect the citizen. As a result of little accountability the 
president can more easily become authoritarian.
84
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The French colonial legacy as highlighted in the literature and perhaps confirmed by the 
Cameroonian case study certainly has a system of separation of powers that can be 
adverse to the effective enforcement of CPR. Nevertheless, the British legacy also has 
some inherent deficiencies which make the system not a viable option by itself. However, 
there are features of both systems that can be built upon potentially to develop a more 
functional separation of powers and robust checks and balances in order to enhance the 
realisation of CPR. An example would be the additional separation of executive powers 
in the French legacy and parliamentary control of the executive in the British legacy 
(although admittedly there should be a distinct separation of executive and legislative 
powers). 
 
The above discussion of the British and French colonial legacy was an attempt to analyse 
the systems in terms of their potential to contribute to a more robust foundation for CPR 
enforcement in the context of Cameroon. Given that Cameroon is supposedly bijural in 
that sense, it would be worthwhile considering what each system has to contribute and to 
consciously avoid those elements of the French colonial legacy which have already 
proved divisive. Like the French legacy, the British legacy has been applied (albeit 
mostly) in the Anglophone regions and has formed part of the lived experiences of the 
people. Rather than continue to ignore it, it should be recognised as a fact which 
constitutes the realities of Cameroon. 
 
2.2. Constitutionalism and Indigenous Customs and Institutions 
 
Like the colonial period, indigenous customs in contemporary Cameroon have 
maintained their relegated position to private law matters governing communities 
predominantly in the rural areas. Undoubtedly, some statutory recognition has been given 
to the application of indigenous customs and institutions.
85
 Moreover, judges have given 
effect to some customs that have been recognised as governing parties in a case 
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emanating from particular communities.
86
 However, a rule of native law or custom will 
not be applied if it was considered repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience or if it was incompatible with written law or public policy.
87
 
 
Advocating the revitalisation of indigenous customs and institutions here is subject to a 
number of caveats. Firstly, it is not every custom or institution that should be integrated 
as some may be incompatible with the exercise of CPR. The emphasis should be on the 
positive aspects that can make a contribution to the framework for their enforcement.
88
 
Secondly, given Cameroon’s cultural diversity, it may be difficult to identify specific 
features or to select some against others without creating further problems of ethnic 
divisions. Deng has noted that such a possibility always exists.
89
 However, in the case of 
Cameroon as Carlson Anyangwe has observed, there is a great deal of commonality 
between communities particularly as they have come to live in close proximity and 
interact closely.
90
 Moreover, due to migration and intertribal wars and conquests during 
pre-colonial times communities came to embrace or imbibe each other’s cultures.91 As a 
result, uniform or similar patterns can be identified amongst groups of communities.
92
 
Yenshu Vubo and George Ngwa identify some core ideas and practices of the Tikar and 
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Chambas as including a sense of community, collective welfare and consultation in 
decision making.
93
 Thirdly, reference to indigenous customs and institutions is not to 
indicate that Cameroonians revert wholesale to the lived experiences of the pre-colonial 
period. Indigenous customs or institutions then (and even now) on their own cannot 
sufficiently regulate society as it is today.
94
 Moreover, what is referred to in 
contemporary terms as custom or institutions is nuanced by the influence of colonialism 
and the subsequent evolution of these customs and institutions themselves.
95
 This does 
not preclude an examination of their pre-colonial position. However, any such 
examination should bear the important consideration that customs are not static and their 
application today may require some adaptation to reflect the lived realities of people 
today.
96
 Ideally, contextualisation should entail recapturing of traditional institutions to 
make them relevant to the present needs of the society rather than reproducing them 
especially where reproduction would not serve the purpose for which they are reproduced 
(in the present case the realisation of CPR).  
 
The rest of the subsection will look into some examples of indigenous customs and 
institutions. That examination will be conducted under two sub-headings; traditional 
authority, and judicial processes and regulatory bodies. Admittedly that division does not 
fit neatly into the framework for constitutionalism developed in Chapter 1 and applied 
throughout the thesis. Indigenous institutions and customs were not expressed in terms of 
Western concepts of constitutionalism. The concern here is less about unearthing 
principles or institutions expressed in those exact terms but more about elucidating on 
indigenous antecedents and how they resonate with, and can contribute to modern 
conceptions of constitutionalism in Cameroon.  
 
                                                 
93
 Vubo & Ngwa (n 91) 168, 172. 
94
 Cf Deng (n 13); Kamto (n 27) and Moyrand (n 27) above. 
95
 Woodman (n 32) 156; Pimentel (n 88) 6 esp n 22. 
96
 An-Nai’im seems to be of the view that African societies should seek to interpret their pre-colonial 
existence as if colonialism never existed. That is perhaps an impossible pursuit as it is generally accepted 
that pre-colonial law for instance was largely unwritten and early attempts at writing were done by Western 
scholars. An-Na’im admits the difficulties with such a proposition but also states almost controversially 
that historical notions of accountability and sovereignty should be adapted to contemporary realities by 
imagining how they might have evolved without the disruptive effect of colonialism.  See An-Na’im (n 7) 
31-35. cf. Woodman (n 32) 156; Pimentel (n 88) 6 esp n 22 who express an opposing view. 
 264 
2.2.1. Traditional Authority 
 
The organisation of traditional authority was influenced by what has been referred to as 
the ‘corporate spirit’97 which underpinned socio-political interaction between members of 
most indigenous communities in Cameroon.
98
 The ‘corporate spirit’ or corporate 
orientation refers primarily to a community composed of an aggregate of individuals with 
individual and collective entitlements and responsibilities.
99
 At the core of social 
interaction was the need to promote the common good, the well-being of the community. 
That did not imply that individual interests were subsumed by community interests.
100
 By 
placing emphasis on sensitivity to community interest, it ensured that as a group, 
members had their interest protected while at the same time individual interest or needs 
were taken into account.
101
 
 
In terms of the organisational structure of leadership, a chief or fon was usually at the 
apex and assisted by traditional councils or council of elders. The basis for traditional 
authority was the protection of the community and promotion of its wellbeing.
102
 
Authority was seen as a communal matter although it was vested in and exercised by 
community leaders.
103
 When these leaders exercised their authority, they did so in the 
interest and on behalf of the community. As a result, for exercise of authority to be 
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legitimate and elicit compliance it must have reflected the wishes of the people and had 
their prior approval through their representatives at the various levels of community 
groupings. According to Malcolm Ruel, the Bayang held that ‘When a leader speaks he 
speaks with the voice of the community, not his own voice.’104 Some chiefs or a-fon105 
whether in centralised or less centralised communities had little or no real powers and 
exercised authority through other traditional institutions.
106
 Among the less centralised 
communities within Tikars (such as the Aghem, Mbembe, Chamba and Widekum) 
traditional authority was exercised by a fon who wielded little or no political authority but 
ruled through a council of elders.
107
 That council was composed of the heads or 
representatives of the various family lineages (meukumsi) within the community. The 
village head or leader presided over the council’s meetings. However, the processes in 
the council were deliberative with the councillors given an opportunity to express their 
opinions on matters raised in the meetings. Decisions were arrived at by consensus and 
announced by the leader by virtue of his position as leader.  A similar pattern was 
exhibited among the less centralised Bayangs in the Cross River and the Coastal 
Bantus.
108
 The Kpe from the Coastal Bantu had at the head of the village a chief (sang’a 
mboa) who commanded authority and respect but had no wide powers.
109
 The chief was 
more the head of a body of elders of the village (vambaki) in whom formal powers were 
vested.
110
 The vambaki was composed of representatives from the quarter-heads which in 
turn consisted of representatives of the family lineages within the communities in the 
village.
111
 Even within more centralised communities like the Mankom (a Tikar 
community) the head of the village (or fondom in that case), the fon exercised traditional 
authority on behalf of the people through a regulatory society known as kwi’fo.112 Kwi’fo 
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also had the important mandate of acting as an accountability institution to streamline the 
arbitrary exercise of power by the fon.
113
  
 
These patterns have not changed dramatically in contemporary times except that the 
exercise of traditional powers by chiefs or a-fon has continued to decline due in part to 
the influence of state authority over indigenous communities and the involvement of 
some traditional leaders in politics to promote personal interest rather than community 
interest.
114
 The pattern of mutation of the influence of traditional authority however has 
been variegated with traditional leaders in the more centralised communities particularly 
in the Grassfield regions retaining remarkable influence and respect from their 
communities. Whereas, traditional leaders in the less centralised communities in the 
coastal and southern regions have retained only little influence compared to their 
Grassfield contemporaries.
115
 Indeed, traditional councils have gained increasing 
legitimacy and appear to command more respect from the populations.
116
 They are 
composed of respected and influential members of the community who purport to act 
collectively on behalf of the community. 
 
Certainly, the account above is not intended to imply that traditional authority in every 
indigenous community in Cameroon is underpinned by the need to safeguard the 
wellbeing of the community or that it is subject to some form of checks and balances. 
The Lamido (traditional leader) of Rey Bouba in the Northern Region of Cameroon is a 
noted instance of autocratic traditional authority characterised by such practices as 
slavery, arbitrary detention in private prisons and torture.
117
 Nevertheless, this is one of 
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the rare instances which go against the general trend and has not gone without 
condemnation from the Cameroonian public.
118
 
 
However, at least three aspects of great significance can be drawn from the general 
pattern and exercise of traditional authority. The first is the purported source and 
rationale for traditional authority; the second is their potential to contribute to the checks 
and balances system at the national level and the third is their potential to enhance 
popular participation at the local level.  
 
On the first point, although chiefs were regarded as supreme leaders their authority only 
derived from the people through their representatives in the traditional councils and 
leaders who attempted to extend their authority were fiercely opposed.
119
  Moreover, the 
rationale for their leadership was the leader’s ability to safeguard the wellbeing of the 
community. A legendary chief of the Kpe, Kuva Likenye, is known to have been one of 
the most prominent and respected of Kpe leaders.
120
 According to Martin Njeuma, 
Kuva’s competence and trustworthiness helped reinforce his authority and confidence in 
the community in his ability to protect their interest.
121
 It can be inferred, therefore, that 
failure to promote or safeguard that wellbeing or acting for self-interest was at variance 
with the basis for leadership and therefore a leader could be opposed or even deposed for 
those reasons. Edwin Ardener reported that a village-head or chief of the Mboko (a 
coastal Bantu community) once voluntarily stepped down due to age and age related 
incapacities in favour of a more active and astute person who could lead the 
community.
122
 The point being made here is that rationale for authority can be instructive 
in developing a contextualised basis for the vesting of and the exercise of public authority 
in Cameroon. A similar point has been made more broadly by Egoshe Osaghae who 
asserts that the philosophical perspective of traditional authority is that the source and 
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rationale for power is the collective good of all members of the community.
123
 Such a 
philosophical perspective he argues, can form a strong philosophical basis for the 
development of accountable governments in Africa.
124
  
 
On the second point, at the national level, a House of Chiefs (HoC) like that which 
existed in the former Southern Cameroons could be created and vested with more than 
just advisory powers in certain aspects. So, the HoC could have powers to consider Bills 
generally and give its opinion to Parliament.
125
 But on some specific areas such as 
constitutional amendments or legislation affecting its powers, presidential powers and 
CPR, a bill passed by Parliament should be assented to by a majority of the HoC. Where 
the latter votes down or proposes amendments to such a bill, it should go back to 
Parliament to be debated again to take into account the views of the HoC. However, the 
bill may be subsequently passed in its original form (without amendment proposed by the 
HoC) through an enhanced majority vote of Parliament. For instance, if at the first 
instance, the majority required was a one-third majority, then it could be increased to a 
two-third. It is recognised that though traditional chiefs represent their communities, they 
are not democratically elected and cannot therefore be granted veto powers. Nevertheless, 
although the HoC would not be exercising a veto, it has the capacity to influence the 
legislative process to ensure further debate on issues affecting CPR. In that way, it creates 
an additional level of oversight. 
At the regional level, traditional councils can be strengthened and attached to 
administrative authorities and the HoC so that these councils can directly channel the 
concerns of their communities to the central administration and the HoC. One advantage 
of using traditional councils is that, they are situated locally and therefore more 
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accessible to the population. They can provide avenues through which people discuss 
their concerns, their needs and expectations from the government. They can encourage 
popular participation and provide indirect access to governmental institutions which are 
currently removed from the population. Trutz von Trotha argues that, traditional authority 
is a forum for the articulation of local interests, and defender of such interests in the 
central government.
126
 
 
Advocating for recognition of traditional authority at the national and local level should 
not be perceived as idealistic. Botswana
127
 and Ghana
128
 for instance have a national 
House of Chiefs (and also regional houses in Ghana). It has been argued with respect to 
Botswana that, its democratic advancement can be attributed partly to its ability to 
synthesise indigenous practices with its inherited British model.
129
 Its House of Chiefs for 
instance is vested with powers to consider bills submitted to it by the National Assembly 
and for its resolution on such bills to be debated in the National Assembly.
130
 It is entitled 
to discuss matters within the executive and legislative authority which it deems to be in 
the interest of the communities it represents and to make representations to the President 
and the National Assembly.
131
 Moreover, the National Assembly is required to refer any 
bill to amend the Constitution, or bills affecting the powers of chiefs, other traditional 
authority, customary law courts, the ascertainment of customary law and tribal property 
to the HoC.
132
 At the local level, the Kgotla (village assemblies) facilitate the 
participation of citizens in local government by providing an avenue through which local 
issues can be debated.
133
  Because the Kgotla are attached to village development 
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committees which are represented in the district administration, they provide a channel of 
communication between the local population and the administration.
134
 It has been said 
that, political leaders, Members of Parliament and Cabinet Ministers are resorting 
increasingly to Kgotla to explain proposed government policies and obtain the opinion of 
the people.
135
 Besides the participatory aspect, the Kgotla can also be seen as a means 
through which citizens can demand better protection for their rights.  
 
With respect to Cameroon, as argued earlier, a HoC and traditional councils could 
plausibly be used to contribute to the reinforcement of constitutionalism and therefore 
more effective realisation of CPR. 
 
2.2.2. Judicial Processes and Regulatory Bodies 
 
Unsurprisingly, indigenous judicial processes in Cameroon were many and varied from 
community to community given their characteristic informality.
136
 Yet, some common 
features included the chief presiding at ‘judicial sessions’ with a ‘panel’ composed of 
representative of the community, the parties to a dispute given the opportunity to present 
their case and to defend an accusation, including the assistance of witnesses
137
 (which 
may some times include members of the panel).
138
 The panels were either special 
community groupings charged with ‘judicial’ functions, or traditional councils advising 
the chief or fon or a combination of various levels of traditional councils. The Banso (a 
Tikar community) ‘fon’s court’ (takebu) was composed of the fon and his councillors.139 
Whereas the Mankon as seen above had a special body, the kwi’fo which was specifically 
charged with judicial functions. Cases at the level of the chief’s court were usually those 
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that had been heard (unsatisfactorily) at lower levels such as the family or quarter level. 
The chief’s court was some form of appeal which prior to colonialism could be 
considered the final level. Although the chief participated in the discussions, he did not 
make unilateral decisions.
140
 The chief’s role was more of endorsement of the decision or 
advice of the council.
141
 Despite the merits indigenous judicial processes may have in the 
communities concerned, the institutional arrangements obviously raise issues of 
independence and transparency which are salient to modern judicial institutions and 
processes. However, what is of particular interest is the mechanism by which ‘judicial’ 
decisions were enforced. 
 
A common feature amongst indigenous communities in Cameroon was the existence of 
regulatory societies which enhanced the enforceability of decisions. Some of these 
include the kwi’fo, nwerong (of the Nso), nganya (of the Kpe) and the ekpe in the Cross 
River Communities.
142
 Decisions were enforced primary on the basis that they had been 
arrived at on behalf of the community and because the judicial processes were open to the 
public, where decisions were not overtly disapproved by the public, they were deemed to 
have acquired public assent and were therefore enforced.
143
 A party dissatisfied with the 
decision of traditional councils nowadays may defer to state courts. Prior to colonialism 
and more restrictedly during the colonial period, the support of regulatory societies was 
enlisted in extreme cases to enforce the decisions of the councils.
144
 Given that at the 
council level a decision may have been final, failure to comply represented a serious 
breach of authority and therefore a violation of the community which was represented by 
the council.
145
 In view of the severity, it required that an offender be subjected to extreme 
measures such as the use of a regulatory body to ensure enforcement.  
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The regulatory bodies were perceived as ‘protectors or defenders’ of the community 
acting for their well-being against perceived and supernatural threats.
146
 That perception 
of their role was fundamental to their legitimacy and consequently their authority.
147
 
Their authority was also influenced by the fact that they were composed of leading 
members of the community. In addition, these societies were perceived as a link with the 
forebears, a supernatural dimension which consolidated their authority.
148
 Thus, resisting 
compliance with a decision endorsed by a regulatory society was deemed inconceivable 
unless the recalcitrant person wished to invoke upon themselves intolerable misfortune. It 
was considered serious because on the one hand it went against the ethos of the 
community and, on the other, it demonstrated contempt for authority and therefore the 
community at large. According to Malcolm Ruel, in the Bayang communities, the 
regulatory body known as ekpe operated as a sanction to protect individual rights or 
uphold a community decision.
149
 The authority of ekpe was inviolable and greater than a 
community council acting alone. An individual failing to comply with an ekpe endorsed 
sanction was likely to be shunned by the society (in addition to possible misfortunes) as a 
reaction to contempt of the community and its ethos.
150
 Such consequences also had 
wider significance for other members of the community as they played a pre-emptive role 
to indicate to other members of the community that their membership imposed certain 
standards of behaviour and responsibility, breach of which would have elicited similar 
sanctions.
151
 Of particular significance in the execution of an ekpe endorsed sanction was 
the fact that the defiant party was given opportunity to explain to ekpe the reason for 
defiance which in certain circumstances might have required a rehearing of the original 
dispute.
152
 That fact suggested that ekpe methods were not necessarily arbitrary.   
 
Like traditional leadership, the authority of regulatory societies such as ekpe in 
contemporary times have weakened as members of these institutions get involved in 
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politics to promote personal ambition rather than community interest.
153
 This is more so 
in the urban areas where in addition, through the influence of Christianity and 
modernisation, regulatory societies are being portrayed as atheistic and moribund 
institutions which should be abolished.
154
 Yet, as Henry Kah reminds us, regulatory 
institutions played an important role in traditional governance and continue to do so, 
albeit with limited influence and their importance should not be undermined by the 
transplantation of Western orientated institutions.
155
 Because regulatory bodies had a 
value which contributed to the orderliness of society, it is worth examining (although not 
uncritically) their potential contribution to modern governance structures.
156
 Ekpe and 
similar institutions in the Grassfield regions continue to have significant influence on the 
members of these institutions.
157
 
 
With regards to Cameroon, in view of executive disregard for court orders as seen in 
Chapter 4, the enforcement role of regulatory societies could be informative. From one 
perspective and perhaps depending on the level of the executive authority in question, a 
neo-traditional regulatory society operating within the geographical jurisdiction in 
question may be empowered to take the matter up with the immediate hierarchical 
superior of the defiant authority and utilise public pressure to exact compliance. It may be 
difficult to envisage how a traditional community organisation can exert pressure on an 
executive authority who, in effect, is the representative of the State. It is almost like 
pitting a vulnerable indigenous community against the powerful State. Two responses are 
possible here.  
 
Firstly, the point is not that such regulatory bodies or traditional associations should be 
reproduced entirely. A community organisation that can take on an executive authority in 
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this way has to be ‘actualised and strategically reinvented’ (hence neo-traditional) 158 to 
render it beneficial for that purpose. This can involve slightly altering its composition and 
operational mechanisms without taking away the essence of that organisation – being 
grounded in the community. Secondly, by maintaining that community dimension, the 
organisation can be self-emboldened by the perceived need of its members to defend the 
interest of the community. The failure to release an unlawfully detained person, also 
affects other members of the community in that a similar incident can occur to them. By 
pressing forward to obtain a release pursuant to a court order, the community also 
preserves its future interest. As Mahmood Mamdani and Julia Eckert assert, the power of 
community engagement cannot be underestimated.
159
 In Australia, as an innovative 
mechanism to improve the criminal justice system in indigenous communities, neo-
traditional institutions, such as Community Justice Panels or Elders Panels, were 
created.
160
 These institutions are composed of elders and respected persons of the 
community including a member of the judiciary. Annette Hennessey asserts that one 
aspect which has significantly influenced the success of the institutions is the fact that it 
is composed of elders of the community who can direct the institutions.
161
 Similarly, 
Eckert argues that the Shiv Sena which developed in Mumbai originally as neo-traditional 
institutions to provide security and basic services for the communities (in the context of 
inadequate government involvement) derived their influence from their connection with 
the community.
162
 Thus, in Cameroon, community organisations can be similarly created 
and empowered. In addition, subsequent transformations and evolution can provide 
further scope for enhancing the clout of such organisations so that they can in conjunction 
with other institutions, assist in submitting executive authorities to the rule of law.
163
 The 
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Kgotla in Botswana provide such opportunities where grievances of the community can 
be channelled to a district commissioner through a village development committee.
164
 
 
In Cameroon, alternatively, the value of such traditional regulatory bodies to the 
enforcement of judicial decisions may inform the establishment of equivalent modern 
institutions to enhance judicial power. It could have a special mandate to deal with the 
problem of executive disregard for court orders which as demonstrated in Chapter 4, is 
adversely affecting the exercise of CPR. It may be argued that jurisdiction to deal with 
such matters is implicit in the mandate of the National Commission on Human Rights and 
Freedoms (NCHRF).
165
 Yet, the fact that the problem has persisted since the 
establishment of the NCHRF in 1990 (and its reformation in 2004) may be indicative of 
the incompetence of the NCHRF with regard to promoting the rule of law. Executive 
disregard for court orders is a serious predicament for a number of reasons including 
undermining the rule of law and perpetuating the violation of CPR. These are very 
significant issues that strike at the fabric of society and should be addressed by very 
stringent and innovative mechanisms including the creation of a special unit or regulatory 
body specifically vested with powers in that respect.
166
 
 
The above analysis is an overview of some indigenous values, the potential of which 
obviously should not be exaggerated. Yet, they demonstrate that some indigenous 
customs and institutions can be utilised as models to develop or be incorporated into the 
modern institutional framework for CPR enforcement. Given that they have been able to 
regulate indigenous communities and presumably these communities are more familiar 
with those practices it is important to give them more consideration. Efforts should 
therefore be geared towards seeking ways of integrating the positive features from 
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indigenous customs and institutions and those of the French and British colonial heritage. 
A possible approach to achieving that objective is considered below. 
 
3. CONTEXTUALISING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CAMEROON: THE 
OPTIMAL INTEGRATIVE APPROACH. 
 
3.1. The Meaning of OIA 
 
Contextualising constitutionalism in Cameroon may be a fascinating project if 
constitutional engineers have to grapple with two Western constitutional models as well 
as indigenous customs and institutions. The Optimal Integrative Approach proposes a 
process whereby all these systems are taken into account. In essence, the approach is one 
that seeks to enhance the realisation of CPR by ensuring that given Cameroon’s legally 
pluralistic nature, the best possible solution is achieved in constitutional engineering by 
synthesising the positive features of the three existing legal orders.  
 
The conceptual underpinning of ‘integration’ makes OIA reify Cameroon’s distinctive 
pluralism and what that condition of pluralism can imply in terms of improving outcomes 
for the protection and enhancement of CPR in Cameroon. OIA recognises the 
incompleteness of various constitutional models and the inadequacy of relying on one 
normative order to the exclusion of others. One model alone, as has been demonstrated 
already (in terms of the development and application of the French colonial legacy in 
Cameroon) may not be sufficient to develop a framework that offers adequate protection 
for CPR in Cameroon. Similarly, despite the assertion that Commonwealth African states 
have a better fundamental rights record due in part to the positive values attributed to that 
system, it still is not sufficient. The British colonial legacy may be a better option than 
the French, yet there is need to look beyond that. Again, indigenous customs and 
institutions have their own specific potential to contribute to the development of a more 
robust system. Yet, they are not without reproach neither can they sufficiently deal with 
the CPR problems of contemporary Cameroon.  
 
OIA is not only focused on integration. At its core, is the concept of ‘optimal’, which 
simply implies the best possible option. The driving force behind integration is the 
 277 
objective to secure the best possible solution to addressing particular concerns on 
mechanisms for enhancing CPR. Thus, selection of principles, institutional features and 
techniques should not be done in a random manner. The rationale for any synthesis 
process should be premised on the assumption that the outcome would produce the best 
solution that can deal with a CPR problem, than would be obtained under the uncritical 
application of a single constitutional model. Failure to give adequate recognition to the 
importance of outcome may lead to a situation of integration for the sake of integration. 
Such an approach only contextualises constitutionalism to the extent that it gives 
recognition to the existing normative orders - the lived experiences of the people of 
Cameroon. However, in the absence of a further focus on improving the CPR situation of 
Cameroonians, integration fails to be a useful process. In certain respects, it may even be 
worse than reliance on a single constitutional model. 
 
Such a situation, it may be argued is already apparent under the application of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). The CPC, which was promulgated in 2006, came into 
force in 2007 and has as a major characteristic the harmonisation of some features of the 
common law and French civil law criminal procedure.
167
 Yet, one of the weaknesses of 
the CPC is that attempts at harmonisation failed to take into account the need to ensure 
the best possible solution given the prevailing circumstances in the country. As a result, 
some attempts to improve the rights of the defence through the incorporation of common 
law principles appear to provide scope for executive manipulation. The provision on 
nolle prosequi for instance vests the Minister of Justice with discretion to discontinue 
prosecution at any stage in the trial before judgment is delivered if the continuance of a 
trial would seriously imperil social interest or public order.
168
 That power is exercised by 
the Minister through the Procureur Général of a Court of Appeal. Nolle prosequi may be 
advantageous from the point of view of the defence especially where they are being 
prosecuted for malicious reasons (as can happen for political purposes). However, the 
wide discretion and executive influence potentially undermine the advantage that may 
accrue to the defence.  
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Further, nolle prosequi can be used to perpetuate injustice to a victim whose rights have 
been violated, on the basis that prosecution of a violator can undermine public order. This 
is a potent weapon which can be used by the Minister to shield executive authorities or 
other cronies from prosecution.  Social interest and public order are terms with subjective 
interpretations and in particular, in the case of Cameroon, the mere articulation of 
opposition to the government may be sufficient to amount to a disturbance of public 
order.
169
 Where to draw the line and balance the interest of an individual against public 
order or social interest is not clear. By vesting such broad powers under undefined 
circumstances to an executive authority, it provides scope for utilising the nolle prosequi 
for political reasons. Moreover, the decision of the Minister is not subject to review as 
such, an accused person may walk free despite having violated another’s CPR. Even 
though prosecution can be reinstituted at any time after that ‘when it becomes 
necessary’170 this is perhaps more likely where it is in the interest of the government 
rather than a victim or even public order. The point therefore is that, integration should 
not be a random selection of devices which can be manipulated to achieve dubious ends.  
 
The OIA can offer a pragmatic framework for addressing the CPR concerns in Cameroon 
in a more productive way than has been achieved through the predominant application of 
the French colonial legacy. Historical developments of that system in Cameroon have 
paid little attention to how that system has actually been applied to impact on those 
rights. In the absence of that fundamental consideration, constitutional amendments have 
more often than not produced features which have further undermined the exercise of 
CPR in Cameroon.  
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3.2. Some Propositions Relating to the Application of OIA 
 
The potential for OIA to attain the ‘optimal’ goal can be enhanced if certain factors are 
taken into account. In consideration of the caveat that OIA is not presented here as a fully 
developed framework for integration, only a few propositions will be discussed at this 
point. They include adaptability, progressivism and pragmatism. 
 
3.2.1. Adaptability 
 
OIA as an approach rather than a model has the advantage of adaptability. That quality 
will be useful in determining the extent or level of integration necessary at any particular 
time because it may be impossible and perhaps impracticable to be prescriptive on the 
level or extent of integration to be applied at all times. The level and extent of integration 
should be determined by such considerations as the intended objective (rights realisation) 
and the prevailing circumstances. This can provide a flexible situation which allows for 
the development of a framework that takes into account how well that framework can 
best possibly address CPR concerns given the prevailing circumstances. That is not to say 
that the basic principles of constitutionalism would be offset by such flexibility. Rather, 
principles of constitutionalism continue to underlie any initiative on constitutional change 
geared at enhancing the rights. However, that flexibility is important because as has been 
noted, the basic principles of constitutionalism have to be applied taken into 
consideration the context in which they are applied. Given that context in itself is not 
fixed and immutable, an integrative approach can be advantageous from the perspective 
that its flexibility accommodates changing circumstances and ensures that the level and 
extent of integration provides the best possible solutions under given circumstances. An 
example was demonstrated in the process of drafting the interim constitution of South 
Africa, where ‘fluid transitional mechanisms’ were established to address the prevailing 
political tension between the apartheid regime and the revolutionary movement.
171
 
According to Heinz Klug, the transitional mechanisms provided the opportunity for 
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conflicting parties to negotiate and develop specific institutional and substantive 
elements, of acceptable understanding of alternative constitutional principles.
172
 
 
It is suggested that in the case of Cameroon, OIA should therefore take into account the 
dynamic nature of society which may require constant reinforcement of processes and 
institutions to reflect the changing needs of society. That flexibility is particularly 
important with respect to incorporating traditional institutions into modern governance as 
it will allow for the possibility of recapturing those institutions rather than unnecessarily 
reproducing them. 
 
3.2.2. Progressivism 
 
A further proposition is for OIA to be progressive. Progressivism as used in this context 
simply refers to the idea of developing integrative solutions aimed at achieving positive 
outcomes (rights realisation). It requires that there should be scope for evaluating 
solutions in terms of the extent to which they are achieving the goals for which they were 
established.   Samuel Nolutshungu notes that progressive approaches to the development 
of institutions and processes grounded in both Western and indigenous cultures provide 
innovative ways of promoting constitutionalism in Africa.
173
 The proposition for OIA to 
be progressive in orientation requires that it be concerned with continually improving on 
the constitutional system to ensure that the best possible solution is being applied at every 
point in time. Thus, if an integrated separation of powers system was established to 
mitigate the concentration of governmental powers and that has not occurred and an 
outcome has been the continued violation of CPR, it should be possible to make an 
assessment that the particular solution is inadequate and in need of reform.
174
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Arguably, most governments breach CPR from time to time. These may be isolated 
incidents which do not necessarily imply that the system is failing. With an effectively 
constructed constitutional system, such isolated incidents should be dealt with to prevent 
further breaches. However, violations that occur at a systemic level are indicative of the 
inadequacy of a system. The ability to make an assessment of the success or failure of 
any solution developed through OIA is fundamental to the purpose of contextualising 
constitutionalism. It is through such assessments that reforms can be initiated with the 
aim of a progressive development of a contextual solution. If one cannot concede that a 
solution is failing and needs to be reconsidered, then there is little rationale for investing 
efforts to design solutions that can be more useful in a particular context. A wholesale 
application of the basic tenets of constitutionalism may be considered in lieu of 
contextualisation. But of course, as already argued, context is important and the merits of 
contextual solutions can be appreciated more through an assessment of their performance. 
A similar view is expressed by Hastings Okoth-Ogendo and Prempeh for whom 
constitutionalism in Africa is on a trajectory that requires an assessment of successes and 
failures.
175
 Based on the assessments, they assert constitutionalism in Africa will require 
continuous correction and progressive reform.
176
 
 
An-Na’im on the contrary is averse to assessments which lead to a conclusion or an 
observation that constitutionalism is failing or has failed. Through what he refers to as the 
‘incremental success’ thesis, constitutional experiments in Africa should be seen as 
experiencing varying degrees of success rather than that they might be, or are failing.
177
 
According to An-Na’im incremental success or progressive development of 
constitutionalism are necessary outcomes of the contextualisation process as Western 
constitutional systems experienced similar trajectories in the development of their 
approaches to constitutionalism.
178
 Ironically, he admits that the process of adaptation 
and indigenisation necessarily entails encounters with difficulties which can only be 
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successfully addressed through evaluation of practical experiences overtime. The lessons 
learnt or insights gained into these practical experiences provide positive directives for 
the development and implementation of further strategies that better secure 
constitutionalism.
179
 
 
An-Na’im’s approach is controversial and contradictory in that it advocates notions of 
progressive constitutionalism yet it rejects any observation that constitutionalism is 
failing or has failed. If all contextualised approaches were seen as experiencing varying 
degrees of success, what would be the impetus to take decisive measures to develop more 
robust features of constitutionalism in particular contexts? From An-Na’im’s perspective, 
it would perhaps be inappropriate to state that the constitutional system in Cameroon has 
failed or is failing and therefore the problems with CPR cannot be attributed in part to it. 
Such a view may lead to adopting an approach which can overlook and by so doing 
accommodate deliberate attempts by governments to subvert constitutional developments 
and the exercise of CPR.
180
 If An-Na’im’s view is adhered to, constitutionalism in Africa 
is likely to fall into a situation which Joseph Oloka-Onyango refers to as ‘political 
transitions without attendant fundamental political change’.181 In the case of Cameroon as 
the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the supposed transition to democratic 
governance in 1990 and the purported constitutional reforms in 1996 geared at 
establishing a new era for constitutionalism and CPR, did not significantly improve on 
the institutional framework for their enforcement. 
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3.2.3. Pragmatism 
 
The requirement of progressivism also appeals to the need for pragmatism. Pragmatism 
should be considered important because constitutionalism is also about how principles 
are applied in practice to achieve the aim of constitutionalism. This is the more so with 
contextualisation which entails the development of contextual solutions taking account of 
the specific circumstances of the context in which they will be applied. Contextualisation 
is unlikely to effectively improve on a constitutional system if that connection with the 
actual realities on the ground are omitted or ignored. Moreover, circumstances do change 
requiring readjustments and innovative pathways in order to reflect those changes. But 
those should always be strictly based on the basic tenets of constitutionalism as 
cumulatively they aim to improve the rights situation.  
 
Recognition of pragmatism here should be strictly for the purpose of ensuring that 
solutions adopted have the greatest possibility of ameliorating the CPR situation. It 
should not be supported where its use is to justify departures from the basic tenets of 
constitutionalism or to undermine the capacity to attain the objective of contextualisation. 
Because OIA aims to achieve the best possible solution, a deviation from the basic tenets 
of constitutionalism which leads to adverse consequences for CPR cannot be justified on 
pragmatic grounds.   
 
Pragmatism also entails experimentation with various integrative possibilities (informed 
by the basic tenets of constitutionalism) with the objective of securing the best possible 
solution for the enforcement of CPR. However, it implies openness to comparative 
experiences even beyond Cameroon. That is not to suggest a direct transplantation of 
experiences or methods, otherwise it may imply returning to the same position that OIA 
is attempting to deviate from. Nevertheless, comparative experiences are important 
within the framework of OIA in order to ensure that informed choices are made by 
learning from what may have worked or failed in other circumstances. Kim Scheppele 
refers to this dichotomous process of recognising potential negative and positive 
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influence as aspirational and aversive constitutionalism.
182
 According to Scheppele, 
aspirational constitutionalism refers to a country’s commitment to progressive 
constitutional developments which represent the aspirations and goals of a society. This 
commitment or progressive aspiration is enhanced by further examination of positive 
examples of constitutional precepts and practices from other countries.
183
 While aversive 
constitutionalism refers to a process of consciously averting negative influences that have 
the potential to inhibit or circumvent the development of constitutionalism. The aversion 
process takes into account the past experiences of the particular country in question and 
attempts to avoid replicating the negative elements that affected its constitutional 
development. Moreover, negative influences from outside models and experiences are 
given due consideration as examples of what to avoid.
184
 
 
Evaluating the reasons for successes and failures of solutions in other jurisdictions is 
likely to provide an even more enlightened perspective on how a particular integrative 
solution might be constructed (or not) to achieve the best possible outcome in the context 
of Cameroon. By way of illustration, in Malawi it has been argued that constitutional 
experimentation with the concept of ubuntu has yielded differing outcomes. Under 
Kamuzu Banda’s regime, although some recognition was given to the concept of ubuntu, 
some of its fundamental principles such as those which emphasise humanity, reciprocity 
and caring for others, were not seriously considered as having a bearing on the 
foundation of governance.
185
 That, it has been argued, partially accounted for Banda’s 
oppressive regime.
186
 On the other hand, Bakili Muluzi’s government paid great attention 
to the philosophical underpinnings of ubuntu and in fact expressed that through periodic 
benevolent donations of basic subsistence material to sections of the population.
187
 
However, that was not usually backed by democratic principles of transparency and 
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accountability and thereby facilitated the development of a corrupt regime.
188
 Though 
sometimes such trends and conclusions may be overstated, what that observation 
demonstrates is that in the construction of any integrative solution, an optimal outcome 
may not be achieved if essential features which underlie a particular system are 
undermined or ignored. It points to the relevance of comparison of experiences elsewhere 
to developing more informed pragmatic choices.
189
   
 
The South African Constitution embodies that dual effort. On the one hand, to translate 
the positive aspirations informed by cross-constitutional influences from legal traditions 
such as the common law (for instance the Bill of Rights borrows significantly from the 
Canadian and American Constitutions), civil law (the bill of Rights also bears influence 
from the German Basic Law) and Roman-Dutch Law.
190
  On the other hand it has 
consciously averted its past model based on a system of apartheid that primarily denied 
fundamental human rights to the majority.
191
 In addition significant recognition has been 
given to the value of cultural practices rooted in indigenous communities.
192
 Although 
Dennis Davis regrets that sufficient reference is not being made to customary law, the 
courts have continued to emphasise that the Constitution must be interpreted with due 
regard to usages and traditions.
193
  
 
The preceding arguments are not meant to discount the importance of public participation 
in constitutional engineering. The decision on how to achieve the best possible solution is 
not something to be left to a single individual or institution. It is recognised here that, 
constitutional engineering should involve broad based participation from individuals in 
the society, politicians, policy makers, NGOs etc. Different avenues will normally be 
                                                 
188
 ibid 156-157. 
189
 Like the flexibility aspect, this is also particularly important with respect to incorporating traditional 
institutions and principles into modern governance. Being a relatively novel paradigm, learning from 
experiences elsewhere should not only be an aspect to consider but a necessary one. 
190
 Dennis M. Davis, ‘Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local History in the 
Reconstitution of Comparative Influence- The South African Experience’ (2003) 1(2) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 181. See also Karl Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ 
(1997)13 South African Journal of Human Rights 146. 
191
 Scheppele (n 180) 303-304. 
192
 T.  Bennett, Customary Law in South Africa (Juta & Co Ltd 2004). 
193
 S v Makanyane 1995 (3) SALR 391 & S v Zuma 1995(2) SALR 642 [15] (CC) cited in Davis, (n 190) 
193 esp  n 48. 
 286 
created for participants to express their opinion or aspirations with regards to the content 
of the constitution. The constitutional drafters can then be guided by the OIA to give the 
best expression to the wishes of the people. The latter can also have the last say in 
affirming or rejecting a draft constitution for instance through a referendum. That 
participatory approach was used in South Africa and is more widely applied in 
contemporary constitutional engineering as can be seen in the case of Ghana, Tanzania 
and Zambia which are currently undertaking constitutional review. In South Africa, the 
drafting of the 1996 Constitution was preceded by broad based participation facilitated by 
the Constitutional Assembly and the Constitutional Committee appointed by the 
former.
194
 Themed committees were established to enhance public participation by 
collecting views, ideas and opinions from various sectors of the population.
195
 Other 
avenues included a Constitutional Education Programme, Public Meeting Programme, 
electronic submissions, newsletters and public debates and discussions to explain 
provisions of the draft constitution.
196
 According to Klug, a technical refinement 
committee worked throughout the process to ensure consistency in the draft as it 
developed and that it was written in plain language that could be understood by ordinary 
citizens.
197
 The views collected from the public provided a background for the drafters to 
explore ‘potentially sustainable alternatives’ to meet the aspirations of the people.198 
 
With regard to Cameroon, while recognising the importance of people sovereignty, the 
OIA can be useful in developing contextualised solutions for the realisation of CPR, 
taking into account its historical development, contemporary circumstances and learning 
from experiences of other countries.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has proposed the idea of contextualising constitutionalism as a way forward 
to improving the prospects for realising CPR in Cameroon. It has drawn on the literature 
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on constitutionalism in Africa which suggests that African countries can usefully draw on 
the specific features of their countries and their indigenous mechanisms of government to 
reinforce features of Western constitutionalism being applied in their countries.  
 
The chapter has specifically identified, in the Cameroon context, the British legacy of 
judicial independence, constitutional review and to a limited extent constraints on 
executive power; the French colonial legacy of additional separation of powers and 
indigenous systems of traditional authority and ‘judicial’ regulatory processes as 
examples of features that can be applied to contextualise constitutionalism.  
 
Obviously, there is need for further research to determine the exact extent of synthesis 
that might be required to develop contextualised mechanisms in Cameroon. Nevertheless, 
as Botswana has demonstrated such proposals are not idealistic and can be achieved in 
practice. With respect to Cameroon, the OIA proposed here is a preliminary step towards 
achieving the objective of contextualisation for better protection and enhancement of 
CPR. Through OIA those elements identified can be used to strengthen and compliment 
each other with the potential outcome being the development of contextual and robust 
responses to CPR problems in Cameroon. This is not to imply that by adopting such an 
approach CPR will never be subject to infringement. Nonetheless, if the positive features 
of these normative orders are fused in ways that make them more than just constitutional 
proclamations, they are likely to enhance the enforcement of CPR in Cameroon. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis has identified and explained the possible source of the problem of systemic 
violation of CPR in Cameroon. It has also endeavoured to identify a possible solution to 
that problem. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis and in Chapters 2 to 5, the 
government’s record in the protection of CPR remains poor. International and domestic 
human rights organisations maintain that CPR violations including, arbitrary arrests and 
detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, denial of political 
freedoms and democratic rights have persisted.
1
 The government introduced liberal 
reforms to enhance the realisation of CPR in Cameroon. These include the enactment of 
Liberty Laws in the 1990s to enhance political and democratic freedoms
2
 and the 
promulgation of the 1996 Constitution purportedly to establish a ‘balance and separation 
of powers’ and a commitment to the ‘vigorous defence’ of CPR.3 So why has the problem 
of systemic violation of CPR persisted? 
 
The thesis has argued that, that problem can be attributed in part to the predominant 
influence of the French colonial constitutional legacy, in Cameroon’s bijural legal 
system. Despite having inherited the British common law and the French civil law, 
superimposed on indigenous customs and institutions, constitutional developments in 
Cameroon have been predominantly influenced by the French colonial legacy. That 
legacy, this thesis has argued, is not sufficiently supportive of the institutional features 
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relevant for the protection of CPR. And the particular way in which it has been developed 
and applied in post-independent Cameroon has further entrenched its weaknesses such 
that despite the purported legislative and constitutional reforms, CPR are not sufficiently 
protected. 
 
The principal arguments of this thesis have been developed in six main chapters, a 
summary of which is provided below. 
 
2.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND CPR IN CAMEROON 
 
In Chapter 1, the thesis draws on the concept of constitutionalism in order to examine the 
extent to which the constitutional system contributes to the CPR problem in Cameroon, at 
a systemic level. Although as discussed in that chapter, there are different conceptions of 
constitutionalism, there is a general understanding that it is concerned with the 
organisation of governmental powers, their exercise and how citizens interact with 
governmental powers and institutions to achieve certain objectives, of which the 
protection of fundamental rights (including CPR) has become a defining one.
4
 That 
understanding presupposes at a minimum that a good structure for the protection and 
enhancement of CPR should have an effective separation of powers and checks and 
balances system, an independent judiciary and effective mechanisms for judicial review 
of legislative and administrative acts.  
 
Additionally, in Chapter 1 it was submitted that in designing those institutional attributes, 
it is important that constitutional engineers should take into account the relevant socio-
political, economic and historical circumstances of the context in which a constitution is 
to apply. That is a particularly important consideration with respect to Africa where 
Western models of constitutionalism were transplanted to Africa which had different 
socio-political, economic and historical dynamics from the West.
5
 Scholars of 
constitutionalism in Africa have argued that the omission to take account of those 
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peculiar circumstances led to the transplantation of constitutional structures which were 
not sufficiently robust to deal with the prevailing circumstances in Africa.
6
 
 
Applying that understanding of constitutionalism described above, the minimum core 
elements of a good constitutional structure and the relevance of the contextual dimension, 
this thesis analysed the constitutional structure of Cameroon in Chapters 2 to 5. That 
structure was deemed inadequate for the protection of CPR, with respect to its system of 
separation of powers and checks and balances, judicial independence and judicial review. 
 
In Chapter 2, the thesis discussed the constitutional evolution of Cameroon, from the 
period of British and French colonial rule to immediate post-independence. When the 
former British and French territories became independent and subsequently reunited to 
form Cameroon as it is known today, the constitutional system adopted reflected 
primarily the French civil law heritage. Subsequent constitutional developments did not 
take into account the specific circumstances of Cameroon such as its legal pluralism, 
relatively young democracy, and other socioeconomic factors such as poverty, 
underdevelopment and ethnic diversity. As such, the immediate post independence 
Constitutions of 1961 and 1972 did not provide effective mechanisms for the protection 
of CPR. Instead, they facilitated the development of an authoritarian regime. The 1996 
Constitution was adopted against that background to provide a more suitable framework 
for the protection of CPR. However, the thesis has argued that because it continued to be 
significantly influenced by the features of its French civil law heritage, the constitutional 
structure remains inadequate for the effective protection and enhancement of CPR. 
 
Thus, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the institutional design for the separation of powers 
and checks and balances in the 1996 Constitution continues to ensure that the President is 
vested with extensive powers without corresponding checks and balances to limit their 
exercise. That deficiency has facilitated the arbitrary use of powers and the subordination 
of other institutions which should otherwise act as checks on the exercise of presidential 
powers. The separation of powers model has confined to a large extent the powers 
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conferred on other institutions and their ability to limit executive and in particular 
presidential powers.  
 
That is the case with the judiciary whose capacity to enforce CPR is undermined inter 
alia, by lack of independence. In Chapter 4, it was demonstrated that, the executive, in 
particular the President, exercises substantial control over the judiciary through the power 
of appointment, promotion, transfer, discipline and remuneration of judges. Even the 
financing and administration of the judiciary are left in the unfettered control of the 
executive. That position, it was argued undermines the individual independence of the 
judges and the institutional independence of the judiciary to the point that, the courts are 
not always in a position to assertively sanction executive violations of CPR. Even in the 
instances where some judges overcome their individual or institutional constrains to rule 
against executive officials who violate CPR, the general status of the judiciary as 
subordinate to the executive makes it difficult for their decisions to be enforced. That has 
facilitated the development of a culture of executive disregard for court decisions in 
Cameroon. 
 
A further weakness in the constitutional structure of Cameroon which makes the 
protection of CPR more difficult is the limited availability of judicial review. It was 
argued in Chapter 5 that, the system for the review of the constitutionality of laws is 
deficient for a number of reasons including the fact that there is no scope for post 
legislative review and individuals whose rights are likely to be breached do not have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of laws. The system has in effect limited the 
category of persons with standing to the same executive (that is to say, the President) and 
legislative authorities who would have proposed and voted those potentially rights- 
infringing laws in the first place. They are therefore unlikely to be inclined to challenge 
the constitutionality of their own laws. Those weaknesses have combined to undermine 
the development of a practice of constitutional review in Cameroon. Consequently, 
legislation such as the so-called Liberty Laws,
7
 ELECAM Law
8
 and the Penal Code
9
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regulating some CPR considerably circumscribe their exercise without a realistic 
possibility of any challenge to their constitutionality. 
 
Chapter 5 also examined the extent to which conventional review is practiced in 
Cameroon as an alternative mechanism for post legislative review. Although article 45 of 
the Constitution appears to provide scope for the review of national laws for 
compatibility with international instruments, that practice has not been developed in 
Cameroon. Therefore, its potentials to enhance the protection of CPR have not been 
realised. 
 
With respect to administrative review, Chapter 5 demonstrated that the mechanism is also 
deficient. For, although administrative review is in principle available, in practice it is not 
an effective mechanism for the protection of CPR. First it is excluded with respect to the 
category of acts known as actes de gouvernement (acts of the government). Secondly, the 
Supreme Court (which prior to March 2012) was vested with exclusive jurisdiction in 
that respect is also affected by the wider problem of lack of judicial independence. 
Thirdly, lengthy court procedures and a culture of delay undermine the capacity of that 
Court to administer justice in a timely manner. Fourthly, up to now, the problem of 
distance from Yaoundé (the seat of the Supreme Court) and cost of litigating in that Court 
undermined its accessibility. However, given that the Lower Administrative Courts have 
recently been created,
10
 the problem of distance has been addressed to some extent. It is 
also hoped that the problem of delay will be a problem of the past, as the Supreme Court 
will now be relieved of its original jurisdiction in that respect. Sadly, the other problems 
remain. 
 
In the light of the weaknesses in the constitutional structure for the protection of CPR as 
identified in Chapters 2 to 5, the question then is what can be done to enhance the 
realisation of CPR in Cameroon?  
                                                                                                                                                 
8
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3. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
This thesis has argued that a good constitutional structure would be the starting point to 
provide Cameroon with a more robust framework to reverse the trend of systemic 
violation of CPR. However, it must be acknowledged that establishing a robust 
constitutional system in a nascent and fragile democracy like Cameroon is problematic. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, democracy and constitutionalism are intertwined.
11
 While 
constitutionalism can provide the institutional and procedural mechanisms to promote 
democracy, a flourishing democracy can reinforce the constitutional system by enhancing 
government’s accountability and popular participation. In Cameroon, although 
democratic rights have been provided for and institutions such as the National Electoral 
Commission (ELECAM) have been established for their promotion, the inadequacy of 
the constitutional system limits the extent to which democracy can flourish. Although the 
thesis has not dealt specifically with democracy, through the examination of executive 
influence on the electoral system and ELECAM in Chapter 3, it can be inferred that the 
creation of democratic systems, well functioning institutions, a vibrant civil society and a 
rights respecting government can promote the development of democracy in Cameroon.  
 
It must also be acknowledged that in Cameroon there needs to be a change of leadership 
or at least a willingness on the part of the leadership to undertake meaningful reforms. 
Otherwise, a good constitution could be disrespected by a leadership that is not 
committed to rights enforcement. Nevertheless, establishing a good constitutional 
structure is an important point at which to commence meaningful reforms in Cameroon.  
 
The thesis has argued that a plausible way of establishing that good constitutional 
structure is by making more use of the three legal influences in Cameroon (the civil law 
system, the common law system and indigenous customs and institutions) to contribute to 
the constitutional arrangements based solely on its French colonial legacy. Drawing from 
the wider debate on the civil and common law distinction in post-colonial Africa, it was 
argued in Chapter 6 that, a robust constitution for the protection of CPR in Cameroon can 
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benefit from the British colonial legacy in a number of areas. These include, judicial 
independence, constitutional review and checks and balances on executive power. In 
terms of its French colonial legacy, the additional separation of powers between the 
President and Prime Minister is an attribute which if reinforced by an appropriate checks 
and balances system, can mitigate the problem of excessive presidential powers discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
 
The thesis also argued that, some recognition should be given to indigenous customs and 
institutions which form the lived experiences of people in Cameroon and have the 
potential to contribute to a good system for the realisation of CPR. As argued in Chapter 
6, traditional authorities continue to have a positive influence in their communities and to 
promote community interest. They can be used at the national level through the creation 
of a House of Chiefs (as in Botswana and Ghana) to add another dimension to the checks 
and balances system.
12
 Traditional councils and regulatory institutions can be 
strengthened, so that they can enhance popular participation and serve as additional 
avenues for accountability of public officials at the local levels. That proposition finds 
support in contemporary discourse on constitutionalism in Africa which highlights the 
potential role that autochthonous principles and institutions can play in fostering the 
development of constitutionalism in Africa.
13
 Some countries like Botswana, Ghana and 
South Africa have already taken the lead in integrating traditional customs and 
institutions into modern governance.  
 
Drawing from the three different systems raises the question of how to integrate 
constitutional features from disparate constitutional traditions. Undoubtedly, this may be 
a complicated task, one which this thesis has identified as requiring further extensive 
research. However, as a prelude to that, the thesis has preliminarily advanced the Optimal 
Integrative Approach (OIA) as a possible framework for combining features from each of 
the normative orders existing in Cameroon. The primary goal of OIA is to ensure that the 
best possible solution is achieved in constitutional engineering by synthesising some 
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positive features from the three legal orders. It is not every feature that will be considered 
suitable for integration. The purpose of OIA is to seek the best possible option through 
integration where practicable, always however based on the fundamental tenets of 
constitutionalism as presented in Chapter 1. If adequately constructed, there is optimism 
that such an approach to constitutional engineering would potentially result in a 
constitution that takes CPR commitments seriously, establishes robust mechanisms for 
their protection and enhancement and creates a society where people feel confident to 
exercise those rights.   
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